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Chippagiri Nagireddi vs Venkadari Somappa on 6 October, 1942

In Chippagiri Nagireddi v. Venkadari Somappa, AIR 1943 Mad 1, a Full Bench consisting of nine judges of the Madras High Court held that where the manager of a joint Hindu family who does not happen to be the father also is sued on a negotiable instrument such as a promissory note executed by him in his personal capacity and the decree contains no direction that it shall be executed out of family property, the manager alone is liable to satisfy the decree. The learned judges also specifically clarified that they are not concerned with the application of the pious obligation rule in such execution proceedings, because the manager of the family in that case was not the father and that they were concerned only with a case in which the manager of a joint Hindu family and not the father is sued and that too on a negotiable instrument executed by him in his personal capacity.
Madras High Court Cites 9 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

S. M. Jakati & Another vs S. M. Borkar & Others on 24 September, 1958

In S.M. Jakati v. S.M. Borkar, AIR 1959 SC 282, it was held that unless the Hindu son in a Mitakshara coparcenary family succeeds in proving that a decree obtained against his father was based on a debt, which was for an immoral or illegal purpose, the creditors' right of seizing in execution of his decree the whole coparcenary property including the son's share remained unaffected because except where the debt is for an illegal or immoral purpose, it is open to the execution creditor to sell the whole estate in satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the father alone. It was further emphasised therein that as between the sons' right to take a vested interest jointly with their father in their ancestral estate and the remedy of the father's creditors to seize the whole of the estate for payment of his debt not contracted for immoral or illegal purpose, the latter will prevail and the sons are precluded from setting up their right and that this will apply even to the divided property, which under the doctrine of pious obligation continues to be liable for the debts of the father.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 56 - J L Kapur - Full Document

Anthonyswamy vs M. R. Chinnaswamy Koundan (Deed) By L. ... on 6 October, 1969

In Anthonyswamy v. M.R. Chinaswamy Koundan (died) by Lrs., AIR 1970 SC 223, the apex court held that the doctrine of pious obligation is not of a religious character or is inextricably connected with Hindu religious belief but has passed into the realm of law and the same is a necessary and logical corollary to the doctrine of the right of the son by birth to a share of the ancestral property and that both these conceptions are correlated. By way of further emphasis, it was added that the liability imposed on the son to pay the debt of his father is not a gratuitous obligation thrust on him by Hindu law but is a salutary counterbalance to the principle that the son from the moment of his birth acquires along with his father an interest in joint family property.
Supreme Court of India Cites 5 - Cited by 9 - V Ramaswami - Full Document

Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd., ... vs Sohanlal Gagu Mal And Anr. on 9 May, 1969

In Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Sohanlal Gagu Nal, AIR 1970 P & H 67, a Full Bench of that High Court held that the surety bond under their consideration created a personal liability on the father to pay the third person's debt and that debt being neither illegal nor immoral, the joint family estate in the hands of the sons was also liable for the payment of the same in view of the doctrine of pious obligation of the sons to pay their father's debts.
Punjab-Haryana High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document

Prasanjit Mahtha vs The United Commercial Bank Ltd. on 4 September, 1978

In Prasanjit Mahta v. United Commercial Bank Ltd., AIR 1979 Patna 151, a Division Bench of Patna High Court has held that a surety bond creates a personal liability to pay the debt and comes within the meaning of the term "vyavaharika" and the joint family estate in the hands of the son is liable for the payment of the same in view of his pious obligation to pay his father's debt.
Patna High Court Cites 13 - Cited by 5 - Full Document

Prasad & Ors vs V. Govindaswami Mudaliar & Ors on 8 December, 1981

In Prasad v. V. Govindaswami Mudaliar, AIR 1982 SC 84, we find the court was not really concerned with the liability of the sons under the principle of pious obligation to discharge the debts of the father but the said case dealt more with the binding nature of a debt and the right of the father in a joint family to sell or mortgage the joint family property including the sons' interest to discharge the debts created by him for his own benefit.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 23 - D A Desai - Full Document

Faqir Chand vs Harnam Kaur & Anr on 5 August, 1966

The decision in Faqir Chand v. Saradarni Harnam Kaur (died) by Lrs., AIR 1967 SC 727, held that a father, as manager can incur debt by creating a mortgage of a joint family property for discharging his debt and his son is under pious obligation to pay the mortgage debt, which his father is personally liable to pay, provided that it is not incurred for immoral purposes and that the son's liability cannot be confined only to money decree against his father. While pointing out that the distinction in the procedure for execution does not affect the pious obligation of a Hindu son to pay his father's debt, it was also observed therein that the son has no right to interfere with the execution of a decree or with the sale of the property in execution proceedings unless he can show that the debt for which the property is sold is either non-existent in the sense that there is no debt which his father is personally liable to pay or that the same is tainted with immorality or illegality.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 27 - R S Bachawat - Full Document

Chettikulam Prasauna Venkatachella ... vs Chettikulam Kumara Venkatachella ... on 3 August, 1909

In Cettikulam Venkitachala Reddiar v. Cettikulam Kumara Venkatachala Reddiar [1905] ILR 28 Mad 377, Tukarambhat v. Gangaram Mulchand Gujar [1898] ILR 23 Bom 454 and Rasik Lal Mandal v. Singheswar Rai ILR 39 Cal 843, it has been held that the ancestral property in the hands of the son is equally liable for a surety debt due by his father for his having given security for payment of a debt, unless the debts can be shown to have been incurred for immoral or illegal purposes. So far as the facts and circumstances of the case are concerned, there is no controversy or dispute that the decree obtained by the first respondent-bank against Gulab Singh, the husband of the first appellant and the father of appellants No. 2 and 3 was on the basis of and on account of his having stood as surety securing the repayment of the debt advanced by the bank in favour of the first defendant, who borrowed the said sum from the bank for purchasing a truck. The objections raised by the appellants were more on the basis that their shares in the joint family property could not be proceeded against for the decree passed against the second judgment debtor Gulab Singh and that the family property being agricultural property and also the only residential house of the appellants and the judgment debtor, the same cannot be proceeded against. The objections based on the property being agricultural land or that the house being the only residential house and the immunity claimed from those properties being brought to sale in execution of a decree has not been pursued seriously in the light of an earlier decision of the Division Bench of this court, which had the approval of the apex court apart from the said issue having earlier been also rejected in this case. In such context, the only objection that was seriously pressed and argued at length in the course of arguments was only about the non-liability of the shares of the appellants, as claimed by them in the joint family property, for being proceeded against in realisation of a decree for money obtained personally against the father, Gulab Singh. Of course to some extent, the grievance of the appellants that the learned single judge has not chosen to decide the character of the property, and as to whether it is the personal and individual property of judgment debtor No. 2 or that it is the joint family property consisting of judgment debtor No. 2 and his sons, cannot be brushed aside though there is hardly any scope or justification to consider the first appellant-wife to be also a member of the joint family even when her husband, the father and head of the family is alive. The materials on record produced in the form of jamabandi record from 1949-50 onwards would go to show that the one fourth share said to have been entered in the name of the second judgment debtor is indisputably the ancestral property belonging to the joint Hindu family consisting of judgment debtor No. 2 Gulab Singh and his own minor sons and there is no material produced on behalf of the bank to the contra, to take a different view. Be that as it may, the decree being one based on a debt, which could not be said to be one for an illegal or immoral purpose, and the judgment debtor No. 2, the father and head of the joint Hindu undivided family having stood as surety and guarantor for the payment of the debt undertaking to pay the debt in the case of default by the original debtor-borrower and the civil court having passed a money decree rendering the father and head of the family also to be personally liable to pay the sum, the properties of the joint family including the sons' interest therein become liable to be proceeded against in satisfaction of the decree passed against the father by the application of the pious obligation rule and, therefore, the order passed by the learned single judge overruling the objections and directing the execution proceedings to be pursued further against the joint family properties, as a whole, cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity in law or on facts. The conclusion arrived at by the learned single judge though does not purport to give detailed or sufficient reasons, on an objective consideration of all the relevant principles adverted to by us, yet in the light of the unmistakable declaration of law in this regard of the liability of the share or interest of the sons also in the joint family property to be proceeded against in execution of a decree passed against the father, in the absence of proof of the debt itself being an "avyavaharika" one no exception could be taken to the ultimate order passed by the learned single judge.
Madras High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 8 - Full Document

Kanisetti Audilaxamana Rao vs Attipalli Raghurami Reddi (Died), ... on 24 July, 1969

In Kanisetti Audilaxamana Rao v. Attipalli Raghurami Reddi (died), Attipalli Mallareddi, AIR 1970 AP 158, Full Bench of the said High Court held, following a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Thangathammal v. Arunachalam Chettiar [1919] ILR 41 Mad 1071, that where a Hindu father executed his surety bond saying that he would make good payment due under a promissory note, if the debtor defaults in payment of the same to the creditor, the suretyship is one for payment and for that matter the surety's sons are'also bound to pay.
Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana) Cites 4 - Cited by 4 - P J Reddy - Full Document
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