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1 - 10 of 18 (0.76 seconds)Section 5 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Union Of India vs Ram Charan & Others on 30 April, 1963
We must notice here that the earlier judgments of the
equi benches and even that of larger benches (three Judge
Bench) in the case of Ram Charan (supra) were not brought to the
notice of the Court.
P.K. Ramachandran vs State Of Kerala & Anr on 19 September, 1997
In the reply filed to the application seeking
condonation of delay by the appellant in the
High Court, it is asserted that after the
judgment and decree was pronounced by the
learned Sub-Judge, Kollam on 30-10-1993,
the scope for filing of the appeal was
examined by the District Government Pleader,
Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the
Advocate General and in accordance with
their opinion, it was decided that there was no
scope for filing the appeal but later on,
despite the opinion referred to above, the
appeal was filed as late as on 18.1.1996
without disclosing why it was being filed. The
High Court does not appear to have examined
the reply filed by the appellant as reference to
the same is conspicuous by its absence from
the order. We are not satisfied that in the
facts and circumstances of this case, any
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explanation, much less a reasonable or
satisfactory one had been offered by the
respondent-State for condonation of the
inordinate delay of 565 days.
Katari Suryanarayana & Ors vs Koppisetti Subba Rao & Ors on 8 April, 2009
We may also notice here that this judgment had been
followed with approval by an equi-bench of this Court in the case
of Katari Suryanarayana (supra)
Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Perinadu ... vs Bhargavi Amma (D) Thr. Lrs on 11 July, 2008
15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the
judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom (supra).
In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of
this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the
principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with
applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along
with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation
of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal
representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the
Court held as under:-
State Of Bihar & Ors vs Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr on 27 April, 2000
In the case of State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad
Singh [(2000) 9 SCC 94], this Court had taken a liberal approach
for condoning the delay in cases of the Government, to do
substantial justice. Facts of that case were entirely different as
that was the case of fixation of seniority of 400 officers and the
facts were required to be verified. But what we are impressing
upon is that delay should be condoned to do substantial justice
without resulting in injustice to the other party. This balance has
to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding such applications.
Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961
In the case of Ramlal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., [AIR
1962 SC 361] this Court took the view:
Collector Of Central Excise, Madras vs A. Md. Bilal And Co. on 22 February, 1999
Similarly, in
the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. A.MD. Bilal &
Co., [1999 (108) Excise Law Times 331 (SC)], the Supreme Court
declined to condone the delay of 502 days in filing the appeal
because there was no satisfactory or reasonable explanation
rendered for condonation of delay. The provisions of Order 22
Rule 9, CPC has been the subject matter of judicial scrutiny for
considerable time now. Sometimes the Courts have taken a view
that delay should be condoned with a liberal attitude, while on
certain occasions the Courts have taken a stricter view and
wherever the explanation was not satisfactory, have dismissed the
application for condonation of delay. Thus, it is evident that it is
difficult to state any straight-jacket formula which can uniformly be
applied to all cases without reference to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of a given case. It must be kept in mind that
whenever a law is enacted by the legislature, it is intended to be
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enforced in its proper perspective. It is an equally settled principle
of law that the provisions of a statute, including every word, have
to be given full effect, keeping the legislative intent in mind, in
order to ensure that the projected object is achieved. In other
words, no provisions can be treated to have been enacted
purposelessly. Furthermore, it is also a well settled canon of
interpretative jurisprudence that the Court should not give such an
interpretation to provisions which would render the provision
ineffective or odious. Once the legislature has enacted the
provisions of Order 22, with particular reference to Rule 9, and the
provisions of the Limitation Act are applied to the entertainment of
such an application, all these provisions have to be given their
true and correct meaning and must be applied wherever called for.
If we accept the contention of the Learned Counsel appearing for
the applicant that the Court should take a very liberal approach
and interpret these provisions (Order 22 Rule 9 of the CPC and
Section 5 of the Limitation Act) in such a manner and so liberally,
irrespective of the period of delay, it would amount to practically
rendering all these provisions redundant and inoperative. Such
approach or interpretation would hardly be permissible in law.
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Liberal construction of the expression `sufficient cause' is intended
to advance substantial justice which itself presupposes no
negligence or inaction on the part of the applicant, to whom want
of bona fide is imputable. There can be instances where the
Court should condone the delay; equally there would be cases
where the Court must exercise its discretion against the applicant
for want of any of these ingredients or where it does not reflect
`sufficient cause' as understood in law. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P.
Ramanatha Aiyar, 2nd Edition, 1997] The expression `sufficient
cause' implies the presence of legal and adequate reasons. The
word `sufficient' means adequate enough, as much as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. It embraces no more
than that which provides a plentitude which, when done, suffices
to accomplish the purpose intended in the light of existing
circumstances and when viewed from the reasonable standard of
practical and cautious men. The sufficient cause should be such
as it would persuade the Court, in exercise of its judicial
discretion, to treat the delay as an excusable one. These
provisions give the Courts enough power and discretion to apply a
law in a meaningful manner, while assuring that the purpose of
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enacting such a law does not stand frustrated. We find it
unnecessary to discuss the instances which would fall under
either of these classes of cases. The party should show that
besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its
power and control and had approached the Court without any
unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is
sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party
by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon,
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]