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1 - 9 of 9 (0.48 seconds)Section 557 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Companies Act, 1956
Municipal Commissioners vs Baranagore Jute Factory Co. Ltd. on 3 February, 1937
In the course of the judgment they observed that there were "no general words to be found in it (class i), which would be wide enough to include such a business" (e.g. insurance business). It was possible to put the construction on the words occurring in class I, which they put upon it, only because there were no general words; that is to say, words which would include every trade or business, used in qualifying class I as it stood. In the case before us, there are general words, namely, "which exercise any trade, profession or calling whatsoever for profit" in item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act. It seems to us that those general words were introduced in view of the observations of Patterson J. in Municipal Commissioners of Barranagore v. Barranagore Jute Factory, Ltd. . There would not have been any scope for argument on behalf of the respondent company, if item 1 had contained an exhaustive list of trades, professions and callings, and in our judgment those general words have the same effect as if there had been such an exhaustive list. In our judgment even if the word 'specified' in the phrase in question occurring in Sections 123(1)(f) and 182 has the effect as attributed to it by the Company's advocate item 1 of the schedule as it stands after amendment of 16-12-1940 is in accordance with those sections. In this view, it is not necessary to consider the question in reference to item 1 as it stood before the said amendment, on which there was difference of opinion.
Corporation Of Calcutta vs Standard Marine Insurance Company on 1 April, 1895
6. Section 123(1)(f) empowers the commissioners of a municipality to impose "a tax on trades, professions and callings specified in Schedule IV," and Section 182, which is the charging section requires every person who exercises in the municipality any of the professions, trades or callings specified in schedule iv to take out a license and to pay the tax imposed under Section 123(1)(f) by the commissioners. The said schedule can be altered or added to by notifications issued by the Provincial Government, (Section 557) and the schedule so altered by the Provincial Government is as much a part of the Act as the original schedule which had been enacted by the Legislature itself. This fact is in our judgment very material. The different items of that schedule stand on the same footing as the sections of the Act itself. As the tax is to be a tax on persons who exercise trades, professions or callings the Provincial Government cannot by an amendment, either by addition to or by way of alteration of that schedule as enacted by the Legislature itself, include an item which has no connection with "trade, profession or calling." That is the manifest limitation on the powers of the Provincial Government and is the only limitation. The amendment of item 1 made by the notification issued by the Provincial Government on 16-12-1940 satisfies the test, for, it refers not to a company, association or body of individuals simpliciter, but to a company, association or body of individuals exercising trade, profession or calling. One of the reasons given in Corporation of Calcutta v. Standard Marine Insurance Co. ('95) 22 Cal. 581, on which the company relies, does not therefore apply to the case before us. The other reason given therein does not also apply. Moreover, there are some observations therein to which we will refer hereafter, which, in our opinion, support to a considerable extent the alternative contention of the Municipality.
Section 148 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980
Section 87 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Landale And Clark Ltd. vs Chairman Of Jalpaiguri Municipality on 31 May, 1937
We may, however, say that we prefer to follow the decision in Landale and Clerk v. Chairman of the Jalgaiguri Municipality 24 A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 531. We are also inclined to uphold the alternative contention of the advocate appearing for the Commissioners and to hold that "specified" means "as specified."
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