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Swami vs Ajendraprasad
cites
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 80 in The Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
Section 80 in The Indian Trusts Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
The Indian Trusts Act, 1882
Section 11 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Section 151 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Principal, S.V. Doshi Girls High School ... vs Lilaben Somabhai Gadasa on 9 January, 2008
11.2 This
Court is quite aware with the fact that during the discharge of his
judicial power and discretion, the competent judicial Court has
passed the impugned order in a matter which is pending on his file
and though at the first sight it appears that the said order is not
bad for want of total lack of jurisdiction, but I am of the view that
though at the first sight the impugned order dated 08/03/2013 appears
very innocuous, but if the said action of the trial Court be allowed,
it definitely gives wrong signal to the society, more particularly,
when the dispute is directly related to Swaminarayan Sampraday of
Vadtal Gadi, which also related to Gadhada, Junagadh Pradesh covered
under the Vadtal Gadi. Under the above-referred circumstances, I am
of the view that, so far as impugned order dated 08/03/2013 passed
below exh. 1 in Special Civil Suit No. 156 of 2002 is concerned, the
trial Court concerned is required to be restrained, in exercise of
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It has been argued by the learned senior advocate for the
respondents that as learned Senior Civil Judge, who has passed the
impugned order has not been impleaded as party in this petition, the
same is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. On this point, the Division Bench of this High Court, in
Principal, S. V. Doshi Girls High School Vs. Lilaben Somabhai
Gadasa, reported in 2012 (2) GLH 428 has put reliance on the
observations made by the Full Bench in Savitri Devi Vs. District
Judge, Gorakhpur and Others, reported in AIR 1999 SC 976. It is
observed that, It is high time that the practice of impleading
judicial officers disposing of civil proceedings as parties to writ
petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Special
Leave Petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was
stopped. We are strongly deprecating such a practice . In my
view, the above observation is applicable to the case on hand.
Savita Devi vs District Judge, Gorakhpur And Others on 18 February, 1999
11.3 It
has also been argued by the learned senior advocate for the
respondents that the Court should not issue a Writ of Prohibition as
the petitioners herein, by impugned order dated 08/03/2013, have been
called for hearing and they are yet to be heard by the learned trial
Court and hence, this petition is premature. It is well settled that
a Writ of Prohibition lies to prevent the trial Court for exceeding
its jurisdiction. As referred above, the right / liberty granted by
this Court to pray for rejection of plaint under O. 7 R. 11(a) of the
Code at the subsequent stage has not been exercised by the
respondents for more than 08 years or 13 years as referred above and
by taking active part in the said proceeding, the respondents have
practically waived their said right / liberty. Now, after recording
of depositions of 35 witnesses of the petitioners / original
plaintiffs, who have also been cross-examined by the respondents
original defendants, the learned trial Court wants to put his leg suo
moto in the shoes of respondents original defendants
indirectly, which in my view, the learned trial Court cannot and
under the circumstances, the action of passing suo moto order
dated 08/03/2013 below exh. 1 in Special Civil Suit No. 156 of 2002
calling upon the petitioners to show cause as to why the plaint be
not rejected under the provisions of O. 7 R. 11(a) and Section 151 of
the Code, is nothing but, in my view, the learned trial Court has
exceeded its jurisdiction at the belated stage, after approximately,
08 years or 13 years, as referred above and thus, the said belated
action of passing the impugned order dated 08/03/2013 below exh. 1 in
Special Civil Suit No. 156 of 2002 of the trial Court concerned, is
not tenable under the principles of res judicata.