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Darshan Kaur vs Union Of India & Anr on 14 November, 2018 cites

Uoi & Anr. vs Jor Bagh Asscn. Regd. & Ors. on 28 February, 2012

Insofar as the judgment in the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Jor Bag Association (supra) as relied upon by Mr. Yadav to contend that, the petitioner being not at fault but the tenant who committed the offending act, she should not be punished, is concerned, the said plea is without any merit as the High Court in para 74 of the judgment has clearly stated whether the lessee or his tenant are at fault is a factual dispute to be decided on the basis of pleadings in each case. That apart, from the following observation of the Division Bench in paras 77 and 78, it is clear that the power vested in the lessor (i.e the respondents in this case) to control misuse and unauthorized construction is in public interest and has to be upheld in its widest amplitude, and the lessor is within its power to insist on misuser charges.
Delhi High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 12 - P Nandrajog - Full Document

Union Of India And Ors vs Dev Raj Gupta And Ors on 23 October, 1990

58. As far as the reliance placed by Mr. Yadav on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.K. Mittal (supra) and this Court in M.G. Ramachandran W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 47 of 50 & Anr. (supra) to contend that the Master Plan has legal sanctity is concerned, there is no dispute on the said proposition but the same has no applicability to the facts of this case, more so, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in UOI v. Dev Raj Gupta (supra).
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 31 - P B Sawant - Full Document

Union Of India vs Mrs. P.R. Nair (Deceased Through Legal ... on 27 July, 2012

19. The petitioner has further stated in the writ petition that vide letter dated November 21, 2013, written by the Dy. L&DO, she was informed that W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 15 of 50 the Office Order No. 23/76 had been superseded by Office Order No. 29/83, dated September 08, 1983. It is the case of the petitioner that the said Office Order, 1983, nowhere records that the Office Order, 1976 had been superseded, and that in any case, it itself records that no misuse charges would be levied in cases where L&DO leased premises is being used both for residential and office purpose by an Embassy/Mission. The petitioner thereafter made several representations for withdrawal of the Demand Notice vide letters dated August 19, 2013, October 17, 2013, November 28, 2013, December 10, 2013, January 20, 2014, March 20, 2014, October 16, 2014, and November 11, 2014, reiterating the aforenoted stand. It was stated by the Petitioner in these letters that only part of the ground floor, which was in the tenancy of the Embassy was being used for office / cultural / chancery purposes. The remaining part of the ground floor premises was used for residential purposes. Reliance was placed on the office order No. 29/83 that since the premises was being used by the Embassy of Lebanon for both residential and cultural / chancery purposes, no notice could be taken of the said misuse and accordingly no misuse charges are liable to be levied on the said premises. Relying upon para 8 of the office order No. 23/76, it was stated without prejudice to the fact that no misuse charges are leviable or payable by the Petitioner, in case of misuse by the tenant, the landlord is only liable to pay 1% of the misuse charges. Reliance was placed by the Petitioner W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 16 of 50 on the judgment passed by a Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of Union of India Vs. P.R. Nair, 2012 IndLaw DEL 4210. It was also stated that after the premises had been vacated by the tenant on 08.04.2002, the same have been used by the Petitioner for residential purposes. The said property is self-occupied. It was also stated that all the payments of conversion of the property from leasehold to freehold have been made.
Delhi High Court Cites 7 - Cited by 2 - R S Endlaw - Full Document

Delhi Devt.Authority vs Ram Prakash on 15 March, 2011

48. As far as the reliance placed by Mr. Rajesh Yadav on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority vs. Ram Prakas (2011) 4 SCC 180, is concerned, in the said case, the facts were the respondent along with his mother purchased a property No.7, Community Center, East of Kailash, New Delhi in the year 1969. Possession of the plot was taken in the year 1972 and pursuant to which lease deed was executed. In the year 1983 pursuant to a routine inspection by the DDA, it was noticed that the respondent was using the basement of the building for office purposes which is in contravention of the prescribed usage. A Show-Cause Notice was issued on the same day calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why action for cancellation of lease be not taken. No action was taken for a period of seven years, when on June 28, 1990, another Show-Cause W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 37 of 50 Notice was issued stating as to why the lease should not be determined for violation of clause II(13) of the lease deed on the ground that both the basement and mezzanine floor of the building were being misused as an office instead of storage. In response to the second Show-Cause Notice, a reply was filed by the respondent. As the reply was not found to be satisfactory, further Show-Cause Notices were issued to the respondent on September 03, 1990 and December 11, 1990 denying the allegation made against him. A further inspection was carried out on April 24, 1991 and a show cause notice was issued on May 08, 1991. Ultimately, the respondent vide his letter dated July 09, 1991 stated that the mezzanine floor was being used as office. In reply to the said letter written on behalf of the respondent, the DDA informed the respondent that as per architectural design, the mezzanine floor could be used only for storage and unless the misuse is stopped the lease would have to be determined. In response, on November 13, 1991, the respondent once again asserted that the mezzanine floor in the Community Centre was not being misused.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 10 - A Kabir - Full Document

Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan vs Binani Cement Ltd. & Anr on 19 February, 2014

55. In so far as plea of Mr. Yadav, without admitting that Clause (i) of the Office Order No. 29/83 does not apply to the case of the petitioner, that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of clause 8 of the Office Order No. 23/76 dated March 31, 1976 being a general order is concerned, firstly the 1976 Office Order is a general order, which held the field till the issuance of the Office Order No. 29/83, which specifically relates to premises which are leased out to Foreign Missions. After the issuance of Office Order No. 29/83, the misuse charges are regulated (and ought to be) thereunder, being a specific order and not under order 23/1976 as stated by Mr. Yadav, on the principle of law that when general law and a special law dealing with some aspect dealt with by the general law are in question, the rule adopted and applied is one of harmonious construction whereby the general law, to the extent dealt with by the special law, is impliedly repealed. This principle finds its origin in the latin maxim of generalia specialibus non derogant, i.e., general law yields to special law should they operate in the same field, on W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 45 of 50 same subject (Ref. Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Ltd. and Ors., Civil Appeal No. 336 of 2003). So it follows, neither clause (7) nor clause (8), which I reproduce below, of the Office Order No. 23/76 is applicable to the case in hand.
Supreme Court of India Cites 26 - Cited by 60 - H L Dattu - Full Document

Union Of India & Ors vs N.R. Parmar & Ors on 27 November, 2012

39. It was his submission that since the said office order No.8/1999 introduced a new clause with effective changes which is totally different and in conflict with the original clause 8 the same cannot have retrospective effect but must be enforced prospectively i.e. for the period after April 06, 1999. It is therefore his case that even if the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of clause (i) of the office order No.29/83 then in the alternative the petitioner would be entitled to benefit of the unamended clause 8 of the office order No.23/76 from September 08, 1983 till April 06, 1999 and for that W.P.(C) No. 5022/2016 Page 28 of 50 period she would be liable to pay only 1% of the misuse charges and thereafter from April 06, 1999 till vacation of the premises by the tenant on April 08, 2002 the petitioner would be liable to in terms of office order No.8/1999. Mr. Yadav relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. N.R. Parmar and Ors., 2012 (13) SCC 340 to contend that one of the essential ingredients of a clarification is that it clarifies an unclear, doubtful, inexplicit or ambiguous aspect of an instrument. A clarification cannot be in conflict with the instrument sought to be clarified. A clarification does not introduce anything new to the already existing position. So, office order No.8/99 is not a clarification but an amendment and cannot have retrospective effect.
Supreme Court of India Cites 22 - Cited by 242 - J S Khehar - Full Document
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