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1 - 10 of 26 (0.47 seconds)The Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996
The Census Act, 1948
The Produce Cess Act, 1966
The Building And Other Construction Workers 'welfare Cess Act, 1996
Section 34 in The Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 [Entire Act]
M.L. Dalmiya And Co. vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 22 March, 1961
"16. ...I am supported in my above view by the
observations of P.C. Mallick, J. as made in AIR 1963
Calcutta 277- M.L. Dalmiya and Co. v. Union of
India..... If any payment is made on a running bill,
such sum will be deducted from the final bill as being
an advance payment on account of the final bill. If one
or more of the running bills submitted by the
contractor has or have not been paid and the cause of
action for the realization of the same has become time
barred due to the passage of time, nevertheless, the
contractor will be entitled to recover the same as a
part of the final bill. Failure to pay the final bill
constitutes a new cause of action and the starting point
of limitation for payment will arise from the date of
default in the payment of the final bill."
K.V. Mohd. Zakir vs Regional Sports Centre on 16 September, 2009
35. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits
that the finding returned by the Arbitral Tribunal holding the petitioner
responsible for the delay being one of fact, cannot be disturbed. He
places reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in K.V.
Mohammed Zakir v. Regional Sports Centre (2009) 9 SCC 357, to
buttress his contention. He submits that clauses similar to those involved
herein have been interpreted by this Court only to uphold the award of
additional costs in similar factual situations. He further relies upon the
Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 17.05.2017 in
OMP (Comm.)
Bbel-Mipl Joint Venture vs National Highway Authority Of India on 7 July, 2015
45. Challenging the above, the counsel for the petitioner submits that
the BOCW Act became operational on 01.03.1996 and the Cess Act,
1996 was in force since 03.11.1995. It is further submitted by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that the Gujarat Building and Other
Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 2003 had been published by the State Government vide
notification dated 18.08.2003, which was prior to the Base Date. She
submits that liability to pay Cess would arise from the date of enactment
of the Central Act and that the same being prior to the Base Date, the
OMP (Comm.) No.416/2017 Page 34
respondent ought to have considered the Cess liability while submitting
its bid price. She submits that the date of constitution of the State Welfare
Board will not be an impediment to the State‟s responsibility to collect
the labour cess and in support thereof, relies on the Judgment of the
Supreme Court in A. Prabhakara Reddy & Co. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 1 SCC 600 and of this Court in Bbel-Mipl Joint
Venture v. National Highway Authority of India, 2015 SCC OnLine Del
10222.
M/S. Dewan Chand Builders & Contractors vs Union Of India & Ors on 18 November, 2011
In this regard, I may note
that this Court in National Highways Authority of India v. Gammon -
Atlanta (JV), 2013(4) Arb.LR 61 (Delhi) (DB), relying upon the
Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dewan Chand Builders &
Contractors v. Union of India and others, (2012) 1 SCC 101, has held
that where the bids were made in 2000 and the Notification in question
was issued in 2008, the burden of Cess could not be passed on the
contractor. In the present case, though the State Government of Gujarat
OMP (Comm.) No.416/2017 Page 38
had notified the rules in August 2003, it was only in January 2006 that
the BOCW Welfare Board passed a resolution for charging the Cess with
effect from 18.12.2004. Relying on the same, the Arbitrator has held that
the legislation therefore, was to be implemented from December 2004,
that is after the Base Date. The same being a subsequent legislation,
therefore, fell within the ambit of sub-clause 70.7 of the COPA and the
burden thereof could not have been passed on to the respondent. In fact,
the petitioner also did not deduct the Cess at the relevant time.