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The Official Liquidator Of Navinon Ltd. ... vs Indian Link Chain Mfg.Ltd. ... on 27 November, 2025
cites
Section 41 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 41 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Shri Laxman Yeswant Prabhudesai vs Nrc Limited on 22 March, 2010
A. Section 441(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, makes clear that the
winding up of a company is deemed to have commenced from the
date of presentation of a winding-up petition, which in the facts of
the present case was admittedly on 3rd November 2001. The Deed of
Assignment was executed on 16th May 2019, which is nearly
eighteen years after the commencement of winding up.
B. Section 536(2) of the Companies Act unequivocally provides that any
disposition of a company's property made after the commencement of
winding up is void, unless the Court specifically directs otherwise.
The provision is mandatory, and the power of validation conferred
Kiran Kawre
::: Uploaded on - 01/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 22:00:44 :::
21/26 3-IAL-26905-2024.DOC
upon the Court is an exceptional one, as is clear from the decisions in
the case of Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official Liquidator , Laxman
Yeshwant Prabhudesai v. NRC Ltd. , and Sarigam Containers Pvt. Ltd. v.
Magatul Industries Ltd. Thus the discretion vested in the Court under
Section 536(2) of the Companies Act is one which is to be exercised
sparingly and only where the transferee clearly establishes that the
transaction was bona fide, effected in the ordinary course of the
company's business, or was demonstrably beneficial to the company
or its creditors or in those circumstances where no possible prejudice
would be caused by validating such a transaction. These decisions
clearly enunciate that the Official Liquidator's delay or inaction, the
transferee's good faith, or private dealings without the Liquidator's
knowledge cannot displace the statutory presumption of voidness.
Such factors alone cannot justify the disposition of a company's
property after the commencement of winding-up proceedings against
the company.
Section 529 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 529A in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 530 in The Companies Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Sunita Vasudeo Warke Apellant vs Official Liquidator And Others on 11 January, 2013
A. Section 441(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, makes clear that the
winding up of a company is deemed to have commenced from the
date of presentation of a winding-up petition, which in the facts of
the present case was admittedly on 3rd November 2001. The Deed of
Assignment was executed on 16th May 2019, which is nearly
eighteen years after the commencement of winding up.
B. Section 536(2) of the Companies Act unequivocally provides that any
disposition of a company's property made after the commencement of
winding up is void, unless the Court specifically directs otherwise.
The provision is mandatory, and the power of validation conferred
Kiran Kawre
::: Uploaded on - 01/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 22:00:44 :::
21/26 3-IAL-26905-2024.DOC
upon the Court is an exceptional one, as is clear from the decisions in
the case of Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official Liquidator , Laxman
Yeshwant Prabhudesai v. NRC Ltd. , and Sarigam Containers Pvt. Ltd. v.
Magatul Industries Ltd. Thus the discretion vested in the Court under
Section 536(2) of the Companies Act is one which is to be exercised
sparingly and only where the transferee clearly establishes that the
transaction was bona fide, effected in the ordinary course of the
company's business, or was demonstrably beneficial to the company
or its creditors or in those circumstances where no possible prejudice
would be caused by validating such a transaction. These decisions
clearly enunciate that the Official Liquidator's delay or inaction, the
transferee's good faith, or private dealings without the Liquidator's
knowledge cannot displace the statutory presumption of voidness.
Such factors alone cannot justify the disposition of a company's
property after the commencement of winding-up proceedings against
the company.
Sarigam Containers Pvt. Ltd. And ... vs Magatul Industries Limited (In ... on 2 June, 2008
A. Section 441(2) of the Companies Act, 1956, makes clear that the
winding up of a company is deemed to have commenced from the
date of presentation of a winding-up petition, which in the facts of
the present case was admittedly on 3rd November 2001. The Deed of
Assignment was executed on 16th May 2019, which is nearly
eighteen years after the commencement of winding up.
B. Section 536(2) of the Companies Act unequivocally provides that any
disposition of a company's property made after the commencement of
winding up is void, unless the Court specifically directs otherwise.
The provision is mandatory, and the power of validation conferred
Kiran Kawre
::: Uploaded on - 01/12/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 22:00:44 :::
21/26 3-IAL-26905-2024.DOC
upon the Court is an exceptional one, as is clear from the decisions in
the case of Sunita Vasudeo Warke v. Official Liquidator , Laxman
Yeshwant Prabhudesai v. NRC Ltd. , and Sarigam Containers Pvt. Ltd. v.
Magatul Industries Ltd. Thus the discretion vested in the Court under
Section 536(2) of the Companies Act is one which is to be exercised
sparingly and only where the transferee clearly establishes that the
transaction was bona fide, effected in the ordinary course of the
company's business, or was demonstrably beneficial to the company
or its creditors or in those circumstances where no possible prejudice
would be caused by validating such a transaction. These decisions
clearly enunciate that the Official Liquidator's delay or inaction, the
transferee's good faith, or private dealings without the Liquidator's
knowledge cannot displace the statutory presumption of voidness.
Such factors alone cannot justify the disposition of a company's
property after the commencement of winding-up proceedings against
the company.
Supdt. Of Taxes, Dhubri & Ors vs Onkarmal Nathmal Trust Etc. Etc on 1 May, 1975
Mr. Khan
placed reliance upon the decision in the case of Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri
v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust11 to point out that estoppel cannot be inferred
against a statutory authority.