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M.N. Aryamurthy And Anr. vs M.D. Subbaraya Setty (Dead) Through L. ... on 20 September, 1971 cites

Pandipati Subbarami Reddi (Minor) By ... vs Pandipati Ramamma on 31 March, 1920

12. Technical objections were also raised to the alleged family arrangement embodying Ext. A A on the ground that one of the sons, M.L. Vasudeva Murthy, defendant No. 8, had just attained majority when he had signed the acceptance of the Will and the other son, Dasaratha Setty, who was then a minor, had also signed the Will. There is no evidence to show that Vasudtva Murthy who was a callowlad at the time, had independent advice when he had signed along with his brothers; and, so far as the minor Dasaratha Setty is concerned, his signature below the Will has absolutely no voluet Lachiah was the guardian of Dasartha Setty at the time and, as pointed out in Subbarami Rfddi v. Ramamma (supra), the arrangements made in the will could not have been supported as against Dasaratha Setty on the ground that his father Lachiah was also a party to it. And, when one of the sons of the family shown to have not accepted or participated in the family arrangement, the family arrangement as a binding agreement between the several coparceners must fail (See Mohammed Amin v. Vakil Chand 1952 S.C.R. 1133).
Madras High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 11 - Full Document

Lakshman Dada Naik vs Ramchandra Dada Naik on 2 August, 1876

The decisions proceed on the principle which was well-settled in Vittla Bulten v. Yamenamma (1874) 8 M.H.C.R. 6, and Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramachandra Dada Naik 5 Bom. 48 P.C. that a coparcener cannot devise joint family property by will, because, on the date of his death when the will takes effect, there is nothing (or the will to operate on, as, at the moment of his death, his interest passes by survivorship to the other coparceners.
Bombay High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 47 - Full Document

Kunwar Brijraj Singh vs Kunwar Sheodan Singh on 5 May, 1913

9. It is true that, in some cases, the Privy Council had given effect to a "will" by a coparcener when the dispositions had been made with the consent of the other coparceners (See Brijraj Singh and Anr. v. Sheodan Singh and Ors. 40 I.A. 161, and Lakshmi Chand v. Anandi and Ors. 53 I.A. 123, But, in both these cases the will was given (fleet to not as a will but as a family arrangement which was acted upon.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 23 - Full Document

Ram Gopal vs Nand Lal And Others on 14 November, 1950

But that is only for the purpose of finding out the intended meaning of the words which have actually been employed (See Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal and Ors. 1950 S.C.U. 766. The Will here does not show that there was any occasion for making a family arrangement The Will itself discloses that all the sons were on amicable terms, there were no dissensions, no contrary claims and no reasonably anticipated disharmony. On the other hand, the father exhorts the sons to continue to remain joint and undivided for the greater glory of the family as one unit. It is true that in para 20 he states that all his children had solicited him to make suggestions with a view that no differences or ill-feelings should arise amongst themselves. But that is only a manner of speaking, because such forebodings of diff lenses and ill-feelings are in here not in every joint family. In the absence of any evidence of even a whisper of disharmony in the family, the statement that the children had solicited him to make suggestions is, to our m nds, only a flourish. But what is important to note is that the father does not propose a partition or a severance of status. On the contrary, he exhorts the sons to live united as members of a joint family on the same cordial terms which prevailed till then, A father in a Mitakhshara joint family has the undoubted right to divide the family property at any moment during his life, whether his sons consent or do not consent to the division. The only limitation on his powers is that the division directed by him must be a fair one in which he gives his son an equal share with himself. The will does not show that he wanted to exercise any such power and, since a partition was very far from his mind, he merely made his own "suggestions" as to what he would regard as proper if, in some remote future, the members of the family thought about severance of status These suggestions, if acted upon, would have given plaintiff Nagappa a 4-anna share, defendant No. 1 a 2-anna share and his wife Rukminiamma a 2-anna share, while the other eight sons would have got only an anna share each. This would have been a very unequal partition. Two of the sons would have got much more than they were entitled to on a partition and the mother, who was not entitled under the Hindu Law as it prevailed in Mysore in 1933 to any share on partition in the family, would have got a 2-anna share If these suggestions had been acted upon voluntarily by the various parties perhaps there would have been some point in the contention raised on behalf of the plaintiff. The father Lachiah died in January, 1936 and the family continued to be joint till a submission was made to the Arbitrators in 1940. But as long as the suggestions were not acted upon, they remained more suggestion of the father and, in our opinion, paras. 18 and 19 of the Will can only be read as embodying the exhortations and recommendations of an affectionate father to his dutiful sons to act in a particular circumstances. The father, it is obvious, did not contemplate a severance of the joint family status in the foreseeable future. Deaths of sons were not unlikely to occur which would have completely upset the shares suggested by him in para. 19 Secondly, a situation, like the one we have in this case where only one of the members of the family wanted to separate from the others, was bound to create a difficult problem. A son, in disregard of his father's exhortation to remain joint, desires to separate, while the other sons, in obedience to the father's wishes, do not desire to separate. In such a case, the latter would be able to retort to the former. "Since you disregard the father's wishes that we should continue to be join, we are discharged from the necessity or obeying father's wishes with regard to shares in partition." A problem of this kind would inevitably create difficulties in the matter of sharing the family property as suggested by the father and, for that reason also, the contents of para, 19 are better construed as "suggestions" of the father as expressly stated by him in para, 20. In short, the contents of paras 18 and 19 are merely in the nature of exhortations or recommendations, not binding like a contract for want of mutuality or consideration, though the sons have endorsed under the Will that they had read the will and had attested it whole heartedly agreeing to act accordingly.
Supreme Court of India Cites 4 - Cited by 104 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document

Mohd. Amin And Others vs Vakil Ahmed And Others on 22 October, 1952

12. Technical objections were also raised to the alleged family arrangement embodying Ext. A A on the ground that one of the sons, M.L. Vasudeva Murthy, defendant No. 8, had just attained majority when he had signed the acceptance of the Will and the other son, Dasaratha Setty, who was then a minor, had also signed the Will. There is no evidence to show that Vasudtva Murthy who was a callowlad at the time, had independent advice when he had signed along with his brothers; and, so far as the minor Dasaratha Setty is concerned, his signature below the Will has absolutely no voluet Lachiah was the guardian of Dasartha Setty at the time and, as pointed out in Subbarami Rfddi v. Ramamma (supra), the arrangements made in the will could not have been supported as against Dasaratha Setty on the ground that his father Lachiah was also a party to it. And, when one of the sons of the family shown to have not accepted or participated in the family arrangement, the family arrangement as a binding agreement between the several coparceners must fail (See Mohammed Amin v. Vakil Chand 1952 S.C.R. 1133).
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 75 - N H Bhagwati - Full Document

Lachhmi Chand vs Musammat Anandi And Ors. on 21 November, 1922

9. It is true that, in some cases, the Privy Council had given effect to a "will" by a coparcener when the dispositions had been made with the consent of the other coparceners (See Brijraj Singh and Anr. v. Sheodan Singh and Ors. 40 I.A. 161, and Lakshmi Chand v. Anandi and Ors. 53 I.A. 123, But, in both these cases the will was given (fleet to not as a will but as a family arrangement which was acted upon.
Allahabad High Court Cites 3 - Cited by 1 - Full Document
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