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1 - 10 of 17 (0.31 seconds)Section 16 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
State Bank Of India & Ors vs S.N. Goyal on 2 May, 2008
(iii) 2009-1-L.W.1 STATE BANK OF INDIA & OTHERS vs. S.N.GOYAL
Laxman Tatyaba Kankate & Anr vs Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak on 8 July, 2010
12. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2010(7) SCC 717 [ Laxman Tatyaba Kankate and another vs. Taramati Harishchandra Dhatrak]; an excerpt from it would run thus:
Chilukuri Venkateswarlu vs Chilukuri Venkatanarayana on 8 December, 1953
13.In Chilukuri Venkateswarlu v. Chilukuri Venkatanarayana3 in a suit filed by a Hindu son against his father for partition it was contended that the plaintiff was not the legitimate child of the defendant. The defendant relied upon certain documents by which he had agreed to pay maintenance to the plaintiffs mother and upon a deed gifting a house to her and assertions made in a previous suit that he had no intercourse with her after he married a second wife.
Karapaya Servai vs Mayandi on 15 December, 1933
The Court in that case observed, following the judgment of the Privy Council in Karapaya v. Mayandi4 that non-access could be established not merely by positive or direct evidence; it can be proved undoubtedly like any other physical fact by evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which is relevant to the issue under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, though as the presumption of legitimacy is highly favoured by law it is necessary that proof of non-access must be clear and satisfactory, and since on the basis of that proof there was evidence on the record that the plaintiffs mother lived in the house gifted to her by her husband and there was no impossibility of cohabitation between the parties, there was no acceptable evidence of non-access."
Goutam Kundu vs State Of West Bengal And Anr on 14 May, 1993
"21. above is the dicta laid down by the various High Courts. In matters of this kind the court must have regard to Section 112 of the Evidence Act. This section is based on the well-known maxim pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (he is the father whom the marriage indicates). The presumption of legitimacy is this, that a child born of a married women is deemed to be legitimate, it throws on the person who is interested in making out the illegitimacy, the whole burden of proving it. The law presumes both that a marriage ceremony is valid, and that every person is legitimate. Marriage or filiation (parentage) may be presumed, the law in general presuming against vice and immorality.
Dukhtar Jahan vs Mohammed Farooq on 20 January, 1987
23. Dukhtar Jahan (Smt) v. Mohammed Farooq this Court held: (SCC p. 629, para 12)
... Section 112 lays down that if a person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man or within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution and the mother remains unmarried, it shall be taken as conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. This rule of law based on the dictates of justice has always made the courts incline towards upholding the legitimacy of a child unless the facts are so compulsive and clinching as to necessarily warrant a finding that the child could not at all have been begotten to the father and as such a legitimation of the child would result in rank injustice to the father. Courts have always desisted from lightly or hastily rendering a verdict and that too, on the basis of slender materials, which will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and its mother an unchaste woman.
(emphasis supplied)
Shalimar Chemicals Works Ltd vs Surendra Oil & Dal ... on 27 August, 2010
In this connection, I hark back to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2010) 8 SCC 423 [ Shalimar Chemical Works Limited vs. Surendra Oil and Dal Mills (Refineries and others) ]; certain excerpts from it would run thus:
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & ... on 8 October, 2003
In support of the submission he relied upon a decision of this Court in R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.Temple where it was observed as follows: (SCC p.764, para 20)
"20. .....The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself is inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior court." (emphasis in original).