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1 - 10 of 10 (0.24 seconds)Section 36 in The Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963
The Gujarat University Act, 1949
Section 141 in The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [Entire Act]
Smt. Gunwant Kaur And Ors. vs Municipal Committee, Bhatinda And Ors. on 4 December, 1969
The High Court
is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under article 226 merely because in considering the
petitioner's right of relief, questions of fact may fall to
be determined. In a petition under article 226 the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law.
Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but
the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. When the petition raises complex questions of
fact, which may for their determination require oral
evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is
of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be
tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try
a petition see Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality(1).
If, however, on consideration of the nature of the
controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case,
that it
(1) A.I.R. 1970 S. C. 802.
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
The Barium Chemicals Ltd. And Anr vs The Company Law Board And Others on 4 May, 1966
In some cases, however, where it
is not possible for the court to arrive at a definite
conclusion on account of there being affidavits of either
side containing allegations and counter-allegations, it
would not only be desirable but in the interest of justice
the duty also of the court to summon a deponent for cross.-
examination in order to arrive at the truth (see
observations of Shelat J. in Barium Chemical's- Ltd. & Anr.
v. The Company Law Board & Ors.(1). The fact that the court
permits cross-examination of some of the deponents in a writ
petition does not warrant the proposition that the court is
bound to permit cross-examination of each and every one of
the deponents whom a party wishes to cross-examine. In a
case like the present where as many as 40 persons filed
affidavits in support of one party and 27 persons filed
affidavits in support of the opposite party, the High Court,
in our opinion, was well justified in the exercise of its
discretion in selecting such persons whom it considered to
be really important Ind crucial for the purpose of cross-
examination. The effect of permitting cross-examination was
not that the High Court was divested of all direction and
control in the matter and was bound to call for cross-
examination each and every deponent who was named by citlher
party. We have reproduced above the material part of carder
dated September 19, 1973 and it would appear therefrom that
the High Court selected for cross-examination five of those
councillors who, according to respondent No. 1, were present
in the meeting wherein the motion of no confidence was
alleged to have been passed but who, according to the
appellant were not present in that meeting. These five
councillors had filed affidavits in support of the case of
respondent No. 1. In addition to these five councillors, the
High Court selected Babubbai Dahyabhai Khamar, local
correspondent of Gujarat Samachar, who claimed to have been
present in the Council Hall at the time of the above meeting
and where sent a report about the proceedings of that
meeting to the Gujarat Samachar. From amongst the deponents
who had filed affidavits in support of the case of the
appellant.
Article 40 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 141 in The Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
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