Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 10 (0.27 seconds)Bihta Co-Operative Development Cane ... vs The Bank Of Bihar & Ors on 12 October, 1966
Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar [AIR 1967
SC 389] this Court was called upon to consider Explanation to Section
48(1) of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act, 1935. This Court
observed that the Court should not go only by the label. The Court
observed that an explanation must be read ordinarily to clear up any
ambiguity in the main section and it cannot be construed to widen the
ambit of the section. However, if on a true reading of an Explanation it
appears to the Court in a given case that the effect of the Explanation
is to widen the scope of the main section then effect must be given to
the legislative intent. It was held that in all such cases the Court has to
find out the true intention of the legislature.
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan & Ors. Etc vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 27 January, 1977
Dattatraya Govind Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548
“9. …It is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the
meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and
to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention
of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot
control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the
legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis
the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the
intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to
the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the
provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe
Civil Appeal No(s).
S. Sundaram Pillai, Etc vs V.R. Pattabiraman Etc on 24 January, 1985
49. The principles laid down by the aforesaid authors are fully supported
by various authorities of this Court.
Shailesh Dhairyawan vs Mohan Balkrishna Lulla on 16 October, 2015
Explanation added to a statutory
provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as
the plain meaning of the word itself shows it is merely meant to explain
or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory
provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC
619
“31. …The principle of “purposive interpretation” or “purposive
construction” is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to
attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind
such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed
to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the court
is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed to realise.
As Aharon Barak puts it:
Grid Corpn. Of Orissa Ltd.&Ors vs Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys & Ors Etc on 31 August, 2010
33. We may also emphasise that the statutory interpretation of a provision
is never static but is always dynamic. Though the literal rule of
interpretation, till some time ago, was treated as the “golden rule”, it is now
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 19 of 25
the doctrine of purposive interpretation which is predominant, particularly
in those cases where literal interpretation may not serve the purpose or may
lead to absurdity. If it brings about an end which is at variance with the
purpose of statute, that cannot be countenanced. Not only legal process
thinkers such as Hart and Sacks rejected intentionalism as a grand
strategy for statutory interpretation, and in its place they offered
purposivism, this principle is now widely applied by the courts not only
in this country but in many other legal systems as well.”
(emphasis supplied)
Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys,
(2011) 11 SCC 334
“25. …The golden rule of interpretation is that the words of a statute
have to be read and understood in their natural, ordinary and popular
sense. Where however the words used are capable of bearing two or
more constructions, it is necessary to adopt purposive construction, to
identify the construction to be preferred, by posing the following
questions: (i) What is the purpose for which the provision is made? (ii)
What was the position before making the provision? (iii) Whether any
of the constructions proposed would lead to an absurd result or would
render any part of the provision redundant? (iv) Which of the
interpretations will advance the object of the provision? The answers
to these questions will enable the court to identify the purposive
interpretation to be preferred while excluding others. Such an exercise
involving ascertainment of the object of the provision and choosing the
interpretation that will advance the object of the provision can be
undertaken, only where the language of the provision is capable of more
than one construction….”
(emphasis supplied)
Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Assistant Collector Of Central ... vs National Tobacco Co. Of India Ltd on 9 August, 1972
Asstt. Collector, Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co., (1972) 2 SCC
560
“30. …This rule flows from the maxim: “Expressio unius ast exclusio
alterius”.
Section 15 in The Wakf Act, 1995 [Entire Act]
The State Of Maharashtra vs Shaikh Mahemud on 27 January, 2022
6. Per-contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 by placing
reliance upon the decision of this Court in The State of Maharashtra vs.
Shaikh Mahemud & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.2784 of 2022 arising out of
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.11652 of 2021) decided on
06.04.2022, and the decision of the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Shri Asif S/o. Shaukat Qureshi vs.
The State of Maharashtra and Anr. (Writ Petition No. 4343 of 2016)
decided on 22.12.2016, submits that one shall read the provision as a
whole, and not in piecemeal. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has
thought it fit to apply Explanation II to Section 14(1)(b) of the 1995
Act, only to a Member of Parliament, or a Member of the State
Legislative Assembly, who ceases to hold the said posts. Placing
reliance on the maxim, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, he
Civil Appeal No(s). 3797 & 3798 of 2025 5 of 25
submits that there is a conscious omission on the part of the Legislature
to the effect that a Member of the Bar Council is excluded from the
purview of Explanation II. In such view of the matter, there is no need
for interference in the impugned judgment.
1