Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 14 (0.29 seconds)N. Venkataramanappa vs D.K. Naikar And Anr. on 7 November, 1977
Though the decision in N. Venkitaramanappa v. D.K. Naikar (AIR 1978
Karnataka 57) was overruled by a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in A.V.
Kowdi & Co. v. R.V. Laxshmi Devamma (ILR 1990 KAR 4355) that was not on
this point but on the point of applicability of S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act
in the matter of initiation of suo motu action under Art. 215 of the Constitution.
Section 14 in The Contempt Of Courts Act, 1971 [Entire Act]
P.N. Duda vs V. P. Shiv Shankar & Others on 15 April, 1988
This Court in the judgment in O.P.
7352 of 19185 (Contempt) (1986 KLT SN Case No. 38) while considering the
question of absence of consent of the Advocate General stated:--
Bal Thackrey vs Harish Pimpalkhute & Ors on 29 November, 2004
4. The learned Special Government Pleader
opposed the writ petition. He contended that the writ
petition is not maintainable because the grant or refusal
of sanction/consent by the learned Advocate General
under Section 15 (1) (b) of the Act is not justiciable.
The role of the learned Advocate General is that of an
amicus curiae to assist this Court on the administrative
side. Furthermore, the grant or refusal of sanction is
immaterial because even if the sanction is granted, this
Court can dismiss the contempt case, and the refusal of
sanction does not preclude this Court from suo motu
taking cognizance of the contempt. He relied on the
decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in
P.N.Duda v. P.Shiv Shanker and others [(1988) 3
SCC 167] and Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute
2025:KER:16799
W.P(C) 2407 OF 2025
5
and others [(2005) 1 SCC 254] and the decision of the
Karnataka High Court in N.Venkataramanappa v.
D.K.Naikar and others (AIR 1978 Kant 57) to
substantiate his contentions.
S. K. Sarkar, Member, Board Of Revenue, ... vs Vinay Chandra Misra on 12 December, 1980
In S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra [(1981) 1 SCC 436],
the Honourable Supreme Court has explained the powers of the
Advocate General under Section 15 of the Act as under:
Dr. Joseph Kuzhijalil vs Joseph Pulikunnel Alias P.S. Joseph And ... on 18 August, 1999
In the light of the emphatic proclamation of the
law in Joseph Kuzhijalil's case, an order declining
sanction by the learned Advocate General under Section
15 (1) (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is not
justiciable. Therefore, the writ petition has to
necessarily fail. Nonetheless, it is clarified that, the
dismissal of this writ petition will not fetter the right of
the petitioner to prosecute his application for initiating
proceedings against the 1st respondent under Section
229 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and this
Court from deciding whether criminal contempt of court
proceeding is to be initiated against the 1st respondent.
Mayer Simon Parur vs Advocate General Of Kerala And Ors. on 1 July, 1974
"6. S. 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act contemplates a motion either by
the Advocate General or by any other person with the consent in writing of the
Advocate General. The refusal of consent by the Advocate General cannot be
said to be justiciable. Unlike in the case of a refusal of sanction under S. 92 of
the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment in the year 1976, when an
Advocate General refuses sanction for moving the Court under S. 15(1) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, no right of a party could be said to have been
impaired. Hence the principle recognised by this Court in Simon v. Advocate
General (1975 KLT 78) may not have application to a case where the Advocate
General refuses the consent This was the view adopted by this Court
in Berely v. Xavier (1986 KLT 1078) wherein this Court held that the refusal
to give consent by the Advocate General is not justiciable and a petition
under S. 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to challenge that order was
not maintainable.
Berely vs Xavier And Anr. on 6 August, 1986
"6. S. 15(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act contemplates a motion either by
the Advocate General or by any other person with the consent in writing of the
Advocate General. The refusal of consent by the Advocate General cannot be
said to be justiciable. Unlike in the case of a refusal of sanction under S. 92 of
the Code of Civil Procedure before its amendment in the year 1976, when an
Advocate General refuses sanction for moving the Court under S. 15(1) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, no right of a party could be said to have been
impaired. Hence the principle recognised by this Court in Simon v. Advocate
General (1975 KLT 78) may not have application to a case where the Advocate
General refuses the consent This was the view adopted by this Court
in Berely v. Xavier (1986 KLT 1078) wherein this Court held that the refusal
to give consent by the Advocate General is not justiciable and a petition
under S. 226 of the Constitution of India seeking to challenge that order was
not maintainable.