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1 - 9 of 9 (0.21 seconds)Article 8 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Article 5 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Union Of India vs Chaman Lal Loona on 30 April, 1957
There, in March, 1947, the Government of India had certain quantities of long-cloth for sale as disposal of surplus stock, and those goods were lying at the Ordnance Parachute Factory, Lahore. Those goods were purchased by the plaintiffs therein, who were residents of Baroda, by three sale notes executed on March 10, 1947. The contract was, therefore, for the purpose of purchasing goods situated in Lahore. The said goods continued under the control of the Dominion of Pakistan after August 15, 1947. In those circumstances, the High Court might have been justified, though I am not expressing my opinion on the same, in holding that the contract was for the purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan. One of the learned Judges, who was a party to that decision, did not understand the decision to lay down that whatever might have been the original purpose of the contract the statutory situs of the goods in respect of which the said contract was entered into would have the effect of making it a purpose of that Dominion in which the said goods were situated on the appointed day; for, in the present case, he held that, though the goods were in Pakistan on the- appointed day, the contract was not for the purposes which were exclusively for the purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan. Though this question did not directly fall to be decided in Union of India, v, Chaman Lal Loona, some observations made by this Court in a different context may usefully be referred to. There, though the fodder was supplied to the Military Farms at Lahore, the Joint Defence Council had powers of control over it and to send it to whichever place they wanted it to be sent. On that; basis it was contended that the purpose of the contract was not for the purpose exclusively for the Dominion of Pakistan. This Court in rejecting the contention observed at p. 1050 thus:
The Union Of India vs Chinubhai Jeshingbhai And Ors. on 2 April, 1952
In that case the purpose of the contract was to supply fodder to the Manager, Military Farms, Lahore Cantonment, which farms were in Pakistan on the appointed day. This Court, therefore, held that the said contract was exclusively for the purposes of the Dominion of Pakistan as from the appointed day. But the question now raised in this case, namely, that whatever might have been the original purpose of the contract, if on the appointed day the goods covered by the said contract had statutorily vested in the Dominion of Pakistan, the purposes must be deemed to be exclusively those of Pakistan, did not arise for decision in that case. That question falls to be decided in the present case. The test laid down by Article 8(1) of the Order, as interpreted by this Court, is to ascertain whether, if the contract had been entered into on August 15, 1947, it would have been a contract exclusively for the purposes of Pakistan. Though, by fiction, the date of the contract is shifted to August 15, 1947, there is no statutory change in the terms of the contract, including the purposes for which it was entered into. The purpose of the contract, therefore, has to be ascertained by the terms of the contract and not by any other extraneous considerations, statutory or otherwise. The scope of the fiction cannot be extended beyond the limits prescribed by the article.
Article 4 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Loke Nath Saha on 1 December, 1950
The learned Judge has also expressly approved of the decision in Krishna Ranjan Basu's case and disapproved the contrary view-expressed in Union of India, v. Loke Nath. In the case of Chaman Lal Loona this Court was dealing with a contract entered into on behalf of the Governor-General in Council for the supply of fodder to the Manager, Military Farms, Lahore Cantonment, which was in Pakistan on August 15, 1947. The trial Court had found that the contract was not enforceable against the Union of India, but this conclusion was reversed by the High Court on the ground that the fodder constituted military stores under the exclusive control of the joint Defence Council on the appointed day, and that it was liable to be transferred to anywhere in India. This Court held that even if it be assumed that the High Court was right in holding that the fodder was liable to be transferred to anywhere in India, the contract must nevertheless be held to be one exclusively for the purposes of Pakistan and the Union of India could not be made liable thereunder. This conclusion was based on the fact that the purpose of a contract is not to be confused with the ultimate disposal of the goods supplied thereunder, since such disposal can in no way determine or modify the contract. It would thus be seen that in considering the nature of the contract in the present appeal either of the two artificial tests approved by this Court must be applied.
Article 1 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Krishna Ranjan Basu Ray vs Union Of India (Uoi) Representing ... on 12 July, 1954
The learned Judge has also expressly approved of the decision in Krishna Ranjan Basu's case and disapproved the contrary view-expressed in Union of India, v. Loke Nath. In the case of Chaman Lal Loona this Court was dealing with a contract entered into on behalf of the Governor-General in Council for the supply of fodder to the Manager, Military Farms, Lahore Cantonment, which was in Pakistan on August 15, 1947. The trial Court had found that the contract was not enforceable against the Union of India, but this conclusion was reversed by the High Court on the ground that the fodder constituted military stores under the exclusive control of the joint Defence Council on the appointed day, and that it was liable to be transferred to anywhere in India. This Court held that even if it be assumed that the High Court was right in holding that the fodder was liable to be transferred to anywhere in India, the contract must nevertheless be held to be one exclusively for the purposes of Pakistan and the Union of India could not be made liable thereunder. This conclusion was based on the fact that the purpose of a contract is not to be confused with the ultimate disposal of the goods supplied thereunder, since such disposal can in no way determine or modify the contract. It would thus be seen that in considering the nature of the contract in the present appeal either of the two artificial tests approved by this Court must be applied.
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