Search Results Page

Search Results

1 - 10 of 34 (0.34 seconds)

Niranjan Lal Bhargava vs Mt. Ram Kali Devi on 19 December, 1949

61. The three Allahabad cases, Niranjan Lal v. Ram Kali (supra), Raghuraj Singh v. Shobaman (FB) (supra) , Shyam Sunder v. Shagun Chand (FB) (supra) are of one category. No doubt in the first of the cases which is a second appeal it was held that the High Court was bound to take into account S. 15 of the Rent and Eviction Act which came into force pending the appeal. Once again it should be remembered that it was a relief and a right created in a tenant which the Court held that it should be enforced even at the stage of second appeal. The second one is a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. The U.P. Tenancy Amendment Act made an alteration in the period of limitation for suits. The Full Bench held that the new rule of limitation could be applied for deciding cases which had reached the stage of appeal. While laying down this proposition the Full Bench held that under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the repeal of an enactment does not prima facie affect pending actions which are to be decided as if the repealed enactment was still in force. Again, the right to sue is a vested right and, although retrospective operation may be given to rules of procedure, no such operation can normally be given to a law of limitation when it affects a right of suit which was not barred under the law existing at the date when the suit was instituted or to revive a right which had already become barred. All those rules are subject to one condition and that is that the Legislature has not shown a contrary intention either in express words or by necessary implication. The third of the cases is another Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court. Once again under the Control of Rent and Eviction Act a new relief was brought into existence during the pendency of an appeal and that relief was given in appeal. Again this is giving a substantive relief declared by the Legislature to a citizen even at the stage of appeal.
Allahabad High Court Cites 2 - Cited by 9 - Full Document

Orient Paper Mills Ltd vs Union Of India on 16 March, 1967

26. On the other hand, it was maintained by the learned standing counsel for the Central Government that if there was another remedy provided for the redress, the mere existence of such a remedy would be a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. Such remedy need not be efficacious, and Clause (3) does not contemplate that such a remedy should be an efficacious one. He also submitted that suit in certain cases could be another remedy. When the statute, the breach of which is complained of, itself provides for another remedy, a writ petition is barred. He referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai (supra), Orient Paper Mills v. Union of India, and that of the Madras High Court in In re Thippaswami, . Learned standing counsel also contended that the Government could object to the maintainability of the writ petition even at the stage of final disposal since it could not intervene at the admission stage. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the State endeavoured to construe the word 'such redress' as the redress postulated by Clause (b) or (c). He pointed out that the concept of sufficiency, efficacy and speediness does not come into the picture in view of new Clause (3). The mere existence of a remedy is sufficient. The objection to the maintainability of the writ petition can be raised at any stage of the writ petition. Suit is not ruled out as an alternative remedy. Law in force takes in common law also.
Supreme Court of India Cites 6 - Cited by 177 - M Hidayatullah - Full Document
1   2 3 4 Next