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1 - 10 of 21 (0.29 seconds)The General Clauses Act, 1897
Section 27 in The General Clauses Act, 1897 [Entire Act]
Section 138 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
K. Bhaskaran vs Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan And Anr on 29 September, 1999
22. As noticed earlier, Section 444 does not use the expression give. However, it indicates the mode of serving notices. The limitation of accepting an interpretation that would connote its receipt are obvious. As has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Bhaskaran's case, the object of giving could be defeated by refusal.
Municipal Corporation Of Delhi vs Qimat Rai Gupta & Ors on 27 July, 2007
17. Reliance of the petitioner on Para 27 is misconceived. The said paragraph refers to Section 126(4) of the Act, i.e. the date or the period within which assessment order for modification of the assessment list is to be made and is not made in reference to Section 126(1) of the Act and the proviso thereto. The above interpretation becomes clear on examining the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Qiamat Rai Gupta (supra). The Supreme Court has held that the term 'made' is not synonymous with 'communicate' and in ordinary parlance carry different meanings. It was also noticed that the word 'made' is past and past participle of the word 'make'. Accordingly for the purpose of Section 126(4) of the Act, assessment order or an order for enhancement of the rateable value is made when the order is passed and not when the order is communicated to the affected person. Reference in this regard was made to the case of Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M/s. M.M. Rubber and Co. Tamil Nadu reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 471 wherein it was observed that order or decision of an authority comes into force and becomes operative from the date it is signed or it is made. Date of communication of an order to the party whose rights are affected is not the relevant date for determining whether the power was exercised within the prescribed time. Communication of an order is a necessary ingredient to provide opportunity to the aggrieved party to take recourse to law and raise his defense in accordance with the statute in question. However, the present case involves interpretation to proviso to Section 126(1) of the Act and the expression 'giving of notice' used therein.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs M/S. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. on 17 September, 1992
22. Reliance placed upon the case of Shyam kishore (supra) by the respondents-assessed is misconceived. The said decision concerns Section 170 of the Act and is a ratio on the question whether an assessed is required to deposit tax before his appeal under Section 169 is heard. It was in that context that the provisions of Sections 124-129 of the Act were examined and summarised as the Supreme Court also dealt with the question whether taxes were to be paid for the base year or for later years also. The question with reference to proviso to Section 126(1) of the Act and whether a notice for enhancement served after end of the financial year was never gone into and examined. A decision is binding on the question which is actually decided and is not a ratio for issues that did not arise for consideration or were not the subject matter of the decision. Decisions or reasoning given by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are not to be read as statutes. (Refer, CIT v. Sun Engineering and ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and also State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illyas
Icici Bank & Anr vs Municipal Corporation Of Greater ... on 4 August, 2005
22. Reliance placed upon the case of Shyam kishore (supra) by the respondents-assessed is misconceived. The said decision concerns Section 170 of the Act and is a ratio on the question whether an assessed is required to deposit tax before his appeal under Section 169 is heard. It was in that context that the provisions of Sections 124-129 of the Act were examined and summarised as the Supreme Court also dealt with the question whether taxes were to be paid for the base year or for later years also. The question with reference to proviso to Section 126(1) of the Act and whether a notice for enhancement served after end of the financial year was never gone into and examined. A decision is binding on the question which is actually decided and is not a ratio for issues that did not arise for consideration or were not the subject matter of the decision. Decisions or reasoning given by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are not to be read as statutes. (Refer, CIT v. Sun Engineering and ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and also State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illyas
State Of Orissa & Ors vs Md. Illiyas on 22 November, 2005
22. Reliance placed upon the case of Shyam kishore (supra) by the respondents-assessed is misconceived. The said decision concerns Section 170 of the Act and is a ratio on the question whether an assessed is required to deposit tax before his appeal under Section 169 is heard. It was in that context that the provisions of Sections 124-129 of the Act were examined and summarised as the Supreme Court also dealt with the question whether taxes were to be paid for the base year or for later years also. The question with reference to proviso to Section 126(1) of the Act and whether a notice for enhancement served after end of the financial year was never gone into and examined. A decision is binding on the question which is actually decided and is not a ratio for issues that did not arise for consideration or were not the subject matter of the decision. Decisions or reasoning given by the High Courts and the Supreme Court are not to be read as statutes. (Refer, CIT v. Sun Engineering and ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and also State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illyas
Shyam Kishore And Others vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi And ... on 3 September, 1992
However, the said judgment is impliedly overruled and is contrary to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Subhash Chand Goyal and Anr. (supra) wherein a similar contention was raised by the assessed therein but rejected, inter alia, holding as under: