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1 - 10 of 14 (0.37 seconds)The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Kale & Others vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation Ors on 21 January, 1976
In Kale and others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation
and others, AIR, 1976, Supreme Court, 807, a case decided by a bench
of three Judges of the Apex Court, it was held, as under: -
Maturi Pullaiah And Anr. vs Maturi Narasimham And Ors. on 1 March, 1966
In Maturi Pullaiah Vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR, 1966,
Supreme Court, 1836, it was held that even if, there was no conflict or
legal claims, but the settlement, was a bona fide one, it could be
sustained by the Court. Similarly, it was also held that even the
disputes, based upon ignorance of the parties, as to their rights, were
sufficient to sustain the family arrangement.
Krishna Biharilal vs Gulabchand Am Ors on 16 March, 1971
In Krishan Biharilal Vs.
Gulabchand (AIR, 1971, Supreme Court, 1041), it was pointed out
that the word family had a very wide connotation and could not be
confined only to a group of persons, who were recognized by law, as
having a right of succession or claiming to have a share. To consider a
settlement, as a family arrangement, it is not necessary, that the parties
to the compromise should all belong to one family.
S. Shanmugam Pillai And Ors vs K. Shanmugam Pillai And Ors on 4 May, 1972
In S. Shanmugam
Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugan Pillai (AIR, 1972 Supreme Court, 2069),
the entire case law, was discussed, and the Apex Court, observed that
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if, in the interest of the family properties, or family peace the close
relations had settled their disputes amicably, the Court would be
reluctant to disturb the same. It was further observed that the Courts
generally leaned in favour of the family arrangements.
Ramgouda Annagouda Patil vs Bhausaheb on 11 July, 1927
In Ramgouda
Annagouda Vs. Bhausaheb (AIR, 1927 Privy Council, 227), there
were three parties, to the settlement of a dispute, concerning the
property of the deceased person. These were the widow of the
deceased, the brother of the widow, and the son-in-law of the widow.
It was obvious, therefore, that in the presence of the widow neither her
brother nor her son-in-law could be regarded, as the legal heirs of the
deceased. Yet, having regard to the near relationship, which the
brother, and the son-in-law, bore to the widow, the Privy Council held
that the family settlement by which the properties were divided
amongst these three parties, was a valid one. In Kale and other's case
(supra), Lachman died leaving a grandson and two daughters. The
grandson had no legal title, in the property of Lachman, so long as the
daughters were there, still as the settlement was made, to end the
disputes and to benefit all the near relations of the family, it was
accepted.
H.P. Pyarejan vs Dasappa(Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors on 6 February, 2006
In Madvan Nair Vs. Bhaskar Pillai (2005) 10,
SCC, 533, Harjeet Singh Vs. Amrik Singh (2005) 12, SCC, 270, H.P.
Pyarejan Vs. Dasappa, JT 2006(2), SC, 228, and Gurdev Kaur and
others Vs. Kaki and others (JT 2006 (5) SC, 72, while interpreting the
scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the principle of
law, laid down, was that the High Court, has no jurisdiction to interfere
with the findings of fact, arrived at by the trial Court, and the first
Appellate Court, even if the same are grossly erroneous as the
legislative intention was very clear that the legislature never wanted
second appeal to become a "third trial on facts" or "one more dice in
R.S.A. No. 4088 of 2007 8
the gamble." It was further held that the jurisdiction of the High Court
in interfering with the judgements of the Courts below, is confined only
to the hearing of substantial questions of law. Admittedly, Bagrawat,
husband of Ram Piari, defendant, died, in the year 1944. As stated
above, succession never remains, in abeyance. Immediately, on the
death of Bagrawat, the succession opened. Ram Piari, inherited that
property, under the Hindu Women Right to Property Act, 1937. She
remained, in continuous possession of the property, in dispute, and was
also in possession, at the time of coming into force of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. Accordingly, in view of the provisions of
Section 14(2) of the Act ibid, she became, the full-fledged owner
thereof. Since, she became the full-fledged owner of the property, in
dispute, after coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, she
had every right, to suffer the decree, in favour of anybody, she liked.
Even otherwise, defendants/respondents No. 1 to 3, are nearly related
to Ram Piari. She never challenged the decree dated 09.03.94. She on
the other hand admitted the legality and validity thereof, in the written
statement. Even Sheo Narain, has not challenged the decree dated
01.08.94. Since the plaintiff/appellant, had no right, to inherit the
property of her father, in the year 1944, she could not claim any title
therein. The Courts below, were, thus, right in holding, that the
plaintiff/appellant, had no locus-standi, to challenge the decree dated
09.03.94, passed, in Civil Suit No. 195 of 1994, and the decree dated
01.08.94, passed, in Civil Suit No. 149 of 1994. The findings of the
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Courts below, in this regard, being correct, are affirmed.