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1 - 10 of 12 (0.18 seconds)Section 253 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Queen-Empress vs Chotu on 22 October, 1886
L.R. 350 and the Allahabad Full Bench case of Queen-Empress v. Chotu (1886) I.L.R. 9 All. 52, F.B. deal with orders under Section 253. But the Courts have laid down principles which appear to apply equally to an order of discharge passed under either section. The suggestion is that a Magistrate has a wider discretion to appreciate evidence under Section 253 than he has under Section 209, that the Magistrate in this case ought to have passed his order under Section 209 and that under that section he was not entitled to weigh the evidence but ought to have committed the case to the superior Court as soon as it appeared that evidence was produced in support of the complaint. That proposition, however, is clearly untenable in view of the cases to which I have referred.
Section 210 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 437 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Emperor vs Hari Ramji Pavar on 11 January, 1918
11. The learned Government Pleader who appeared to support the order of the Sessions Judge maintained that a distinction ought to be drawn between orders of discharge passed under Section 253 and such orders passed under Section 209. No such distinction appears to be recognised in the cases cited. Emperor v. Rawji Hari , In re Bai Parvati (1910) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 163: s.c. 12 Bom.
Emperor vs Bai Mahalaxmi on 6 August, 1915
L.R. 350 and the Allahabad Full Bench case of Queen-Empress v. Chotu (1886) I.L.R. 9 All. 52, F.B. deal with orders under Section 253. But the Courts have laid down principles which appear to apply equally to an order of discharge passed under either section. The suggestion is that a Magistrate has a wider discretion to appreciate evidence under Section 253 than he has under Section 209, that the Magistrate in this case ought to have passed his order under Section 209 and that under that section he was not entitled to weigh the evidence but ought to have committed the case to the superior Court as soon as it appeared that evidence was produced in support of the complaint. That proposition, however, is clearly untenable in view of the cases to which I have referred.
Section 451 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Manikka Padayachi And Ors. vs King Emperor on 15 January, 1925
13. Manikka Padayachi v. King-Emperor (1925) I.L.R. 48 Mad. 874 as also cited as laying down the proposition that whenever the evidence is of such a nature that the guilt of the accused can be held to be proved or disproved only as the result of the valuing and weighing it, the Magistrate must commit the accused to the Sessions ; but if the evidence be of such a nature that no reasonable person would ever on that evidence hold the accused guilty he must be discharged under Section 209. That is the judgment of a single Judge and it appears to us to go farther in limiting the discretion of the Magistrate than the decisions of this Court would warrant. The view we take is that the Magistrate is both entitled and bound to value and weigh the evidence and that, if he disbelieves the evidence and makes an order of discharge, the question whether it ought to be set aside in revision depends on whether it is a reasonable order, the criterion being, not whether the revising Court agrees with it, but whether it is rational in the sense that it cannot be fairly described as perverse or manifestly contrary to the evidence. In the present case we have gone through the evidence and have considered the orders of the Magistrate and of the Sessions Judge. We think that the case against the present applicants accused Nos. 4 and 5 was very weak and that the Magistrate had good grounds for taking the view which he did take and refusing to accept the testimony of the complainant and some of his witnesses against these accused. I have already pointed out that, although the very foundation of the case against these accused was conspiracy, there is not really any evidence whatever to prove conspiracy between them and the other accused. We cannot, therefore, see anything perverse or irrational in the Magistrate's order discharging the accused.