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1 - 10 of 18 (0.31 seconds)The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 307 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 164 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 162 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
The Arms Act, 1959
Firozuddin Basheeruddin & Ors vs State Of Kerala on 20 August, 2001
50. Learned counsels for the appellants have seriously contended that
Crl.A.Nos.901, 922, 954, 999, 1141, 1199, 1250 & 1562 of 2013 Page 48 of 51
though convicted with the aid of 120B IPC the learned Trial Court has
neither considered the conspiracy involved in the matter in the present case
nor returned a finding there on. Conspiracies are often hatched in secrecy
and a direct proof thereof is seldom available. Whether the assailants have
conspired to commit the offence has to be inferred from the facts of the case.
In the present case Sonu (P.O), Deepak, Anil, Surender, Naresh, Sanjay
(P.O.) of Mundka and Samman @ Sandeep belonging to Goyla Gaon had
come together in two cars armed with guns and indiscriminate firing ensued.
From the facts it can be easily inferred that the accused not only shared the
intention but there was an agreement to commit the said offence. The
conspiracy stands proved. The legal position on fastening criminal liability
in a case of conspiracy is well settled as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in (2001) 7 SCC 596 Firozuddin Basheeruddin and others vs. State of
Kerala:
Nasar Ali vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 14 February, 1957
It is
merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is, that in such
cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be
disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of
weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of
circumstances, but it is not what may be called "a mandatory
rule of evidence". (See Nisar Ali v. State of U.P. [AIR 1957 SC
366 : 1957 Cri LJ 550] ) Merely because some of the accused
persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of
them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not
lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been
convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a court
to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted from those
who were convicted.