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Varun Seacon Ltd. vs Bharat Bijlee Ltd. on 14 August, 1997

9. In the case of Shetty's Constructions, stated (supra), the Supreme Court after taking into consideration and Sections 85 and 21 of the 1996 Act, has held that the new Act came into force on 26.1.1996. Section 21 of the 1996 Act lays down that unless otherwise agreed to between the parties, the arbitration suit in respect of arbitration dispute commenced on the date on which the request for referring the dispute for arbitration is received by the respondents. Referring to that ruling of the Supreme Court, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there is no request, whatsoever, from the respondent herein to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator, even assuming that there is an arbitration clause in the partnership deed. On the other hand, prior to the crucial date of 25.01.1996, the petitioners simply filed an application in I.A. No. 200 of 1993 in the month of March, 1993. In the absence of any request to refer the matter for arbitration, as per the judgment of the Supreme Court, the order passed by the trial Court cannot be legally sustained since all the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the 1940 Act have not been saved. He further contended that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act also would not come to the rescue of the respondent in view of the saving clause contained in the 1966 Act, which substantially saved the arbitration proceedings initiated prior to the date 25.01.1996. The judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Varun Seacon Limited v. Bharat Bijlee Limited (supra), is also to the same effect.
Gujarat High Court Cites 12 - Cited by 11 - M S Shah - Full Document

Smt.Kalpana Kothari Appellant vs Smt.Sudha Yadav & Ors. Respondents on 31 October, 2001

In this context, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kalpana Kothari (Smt.) v. Sudha Yadav (Smt.) and Ors., . In the said case, the respondent had filed a civil suit for dissolution of partnership and for accounts and also filed applications for appointment of receiver and for injunction. The defendants have initially filed applications in the suit before the trial Court invoking the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not only the applications filed by the respondent before the trial Court were rejected but the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act by the appellants came to be allowed and further proceedings in the suit filed by the respondent came to be stayed. At the appellate stage, after filing a written application for dismissal of the applications filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as not pressed in view of the repeal of the 1940 Act and coming into force of the 1996 Act and getting orders thereon, the appellants have once again moved the High Court under Section 8 of the Act with a request for stay of proceedings before the High Court as well as the trial Court. The application came to be rejected by the High Court that no such application could be filed, once the application earlier filed under the 1940 Act was got dismissed as not pressed and also on the ground of estoppel, based on the very same fact. On appeal, the Supreme Court held as follows :
Supreme Court of India Cites 8 - Cited by 81 - Full Document

The Cotton Corporation Of India Ltd., (A ... vs Kanakadhara Spinning Mills (P) Ltd., ... on 20 July, 2001

13. Section 21 of the 1996 Act on which much reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners lays down that the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commences on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. This Court in case of The Cotton Corporation of India Limited v. Kanakadhara Spinning Mills (P) Limited, (2001) 3 CTC 591, while construing a similar phraseology employed in Section 37(3) of the 1940 Act that an arbitration shall be limited to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other parties thereto a notice requiring the appointment of an Arbitrator, where the arbitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to a person named or designated in the agreement requiring that the difference be submitted to the person so named or designated, held that the terms of the notice cannot be very rigidly construed in a very hyper technical manner. The provisions of the Arbitration Act are applicable even to lay parties also and hence should be construed and interpreted liberally.
Madras High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 2 - Full Document
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