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1 - 10 of 11 (0.20 seconds)Section 2 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
The Limitation Act, 1963
Kunwar Rajendar Bahadur Singh vs Rajeshwar Bali on 18 June, 1937
This view also derives support from the Privy Council case in 'RAJENDRA BAHADUR v. RAJESHWAR BALI', AIR (24) 1937 PC 276, in which the delay arising from lawyer's mistake was excused, the finding being that there was "no gross negligence."
H.H. Darbar Alabhai Vajsurbhai vs Bhura Bhaya on 9 September, 1936
11. A question has been raised whether on such an application the strict standard of deligence that is necessary to be made out under Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies, when the application is for an amendment of the cause-title. It has been held in 'GOPALA KRISTNAYYA v. A. LAKSHMANA RAO', AIR 1925 Mad 1210 followed in 'ALABHAI VAJSURBHAI v. BHURA BHAYA', AIR 1937 Bom 401, that such an application for amendment is under Section 153 of the Civil P. C. It is true that in theory the appeal can be taken as having been filed against the person whose name has been brought on the amendment only on the date of the amendment. In that sense, therefore, considerations germane to Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not altogether out of place, on an application for amendment under Section 153 when it is beyond time. But it is to be remembered that in a case where the appeal has, in fact, been filed in time, but there has been a mistake in the array of parties, particularly as regards respondents, there can be no doubt that the appeal itself must have been intended to be filed as against all the necessary parties and the mistake is more often bona fide than not. In that respect it stands on a different footing, from an appeal not filed at all against any person until after limitation. In the latter cases it has been laid down that every day of delay has to be adequately explained. But it is not necessary to express any final opinion on this matter, because in the present case no question of prejudice to substantive vested rights of the parties sought to be impleaded is involved aS stated at the outset, the only question that has been decided by the order under appeal is that a particular objection raised by the judgment-debtor is one that has to be put forward if at all, by a separate suit and not in the execution proceedings. The decision therefore related to the appropriate procedure by which the objection is to be ventilated and does not decide any substantive right against the judgment-debtor or in favour of the decree-holders. The result of declining to excuse the delay in the present case can only be that the judgment-debtor will be driven to file a suit immediately against the two persons now sought to be impleaded, while he is still litigaing the question of procedure in the present appeal. This cannot but lead to certain degree of embarrassment and is not conducive to advancement of substantial justice.
Shib Dayal And Anr. vs Jagannath Prasad on 7 February, 1922
8. There can be no doubt in matters of this kind the question is ultimately one depending on the discretion of the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances. It is difficult to lay down any stereo-typed rules to govern all cases. But decided cases have indicated certain broad principles for the exercise of that discretion. Where the mistake which occasioned the delay is clearly and definitely attributable to the litigant himself or to his servant, or agent, what is required to be proved is that the mistake has occurred in spite of due diligence on their part. But in considering what is the standard of due diligence to be expected, one must necessarily have regard to various circumstances including the prevalent conditions. But where the mistake is attributable to the lawyer to whom he has entrusted his work, the Courts have generally thought it proper to condone the delay unless the mistake of the lawyer is due to unreasonable negligence. See 'RAM RAVJI v. PRALHADAS', 20 Bom 133; 'SHIB DAYAL v. JAGANNATH', 44 All 636; 'SURENDRA MOHAN v. MOHENDRA NATH', 59 Cal 781; 'DATTATRAYA v. SECY. OF STATE', 45 Bom 607.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
The General Clauses Act, 1897
Ambika Ranjan Majumdar vs Manikganj Loan Office Ltd. on 15 November, 1927
In 'AMBIKA RANJAN v. MANIKGANJ LOAN OFFICE', 55 Cal 798 and 'SURENDRAMO-HAN v. MAHENDRANATH', 59 Cal 781 the question as to how far a party would suffer for the negligence of his legal adviser was considered and reliance was placed on the following observations of Brett M. R. in 'HIGHTON v. TREHERNE', (1879) 48 L J Ex 167.
Surendra Mohan Rai Choudhury vs Mohendra Nath Banerjee And Ors. on 6 August, 1931
8. There can be no doubt in matters of this kind the question is ultimately one depending on the discretion of the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances. It is difficult to lay down any stereo-typed rules to govern all cases. But decided cases have indicated certain broad principles for the exercise of that discretion. Where the mistake which occasioned the delay is clearly and definitely attributable to the litigant himself or to his servant, or agent, what is required to be proved is that the mistake has occurred in spite of due diligence on their part. But in considering what is the standard of due diligence to be expected, one must necessarily have regard to various circumstances including the prevalent conditions. But where the mistake is attributable to the lawyer to whom he has entrusted his work, the Courts have generally thought it proper to condone the delay unless the mistake of the lawyer is due to unreasonable negligence. See 'RAM RAVJI v. PRALHADAS', 20 Bom 133; 'SHIB DAYAL v. JAGANNATH', 44 All 636; 'SURENDRA MOHAN v. MOHENDRA NATH', 59 Cal 781; 'DATTATRAYA v. SECY. OF STATE', 45 Bom 607.