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1 - 10 of 12 (0.27 seconds)The Companies Act, 1956
Article 144 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 3 in The Commissions Of Inquiry Act, 1952 [Entire Act]
Allen Berry And Co. Private Ltd. And Anr. vs Vivian Bose And Ors. on 8 October, 1959
(23) Secondly, even if the Government were relying solely on the report and the proceedings of this Commission to think that a prima facie case for the disciplinary inquiry exists against the petitioners, the decision to direct the Indian Oil Corporation to hold disciplinary proceedings against the petitioners is an independent one. It exists apart from the report of the Commission. The report cannot even G be used as evidence against the petitioners in the disciplinary inquiry Allen Berry & Co. P. Ltd. v. Vivian Bose & Others, Can this Court quash the decision of the Government ? Obviously not. Just as this Court cannot compel the Government to hold a disciplinary inquiry against the petitioners similarly this Court cannot compel the Government not to hold such disciplinary inquiry against the petitioners. If this is the legal position, it would be perfectly futile for this Court to quash the report of the Commission. Such quashing only kills the action directly based on the report. It cannot affect action which is not compelled by I he report but which is based on iin independent decision of the Government. This is the crux of the distinction between a fact- finding inquiry and a disciplinary inquiry. The former does not compel any action and does not impose any punishment. The latter necessarily results in action or punishment. Therefore, the former cannot be quashed while the latter can be quashed.
Manak Lal vs Dr. Prem Chand on 6 February, 1957
(27) Secondly, the petitioners did not object to the participation to Sarvashri Modak and Bhide in the inquiry when the Commission was holding the inquiry. Objection against Shri Modak is raised for the first time before us. Objection against Shri Bhide was raised before the Commission after the arguments of the other parties were over and only the argument of the Refinery was being heard. This conduct of the petitioners amounted to a waiver of their right, if any, to challenge the participation of Sarvashri Modak and Bhide in the inquiry by the Commission [Mandak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957) Scr 575(18)]. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument- that Sarvashri Modak and Bhide were disqualified by then" bias. the other two Members were not so disqualified. The report would still, therefore. be valid as the report of the other two Members. Even if we go further and assume that the whole of the report is vitiated still this Court would not exercise its discretion in quashing the report. The reasons would be the same which we have stated above in coming to the conclusion that we would not exercise our discretion in quashing the report even if we were to hold that adequate hearing had not been granted to the petitioners during the inquiry by the Commission.
Amalendu Ghosh vs North Eastern Railway (By The District ... on 15 January, 1960
It is only if the material so gathered discloses a prima fade case against a person that a disciplinary inquiry would be held against him. In such a disciplinary inquiry, he would be in the position of a defendant or an accused and would be given a full opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, no question of giving such an opportunity of defending himself in a fact-finding inquiry arises at all. (See Amalendu Ghosh G v. District Traffic Superintendent, North Eastern Railway, , Champak Lal v. Union of India , State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali Khan, and Parry-Jones v. Law Society (1968) 2 Wlr 397(s).
Section 1 in The Commissions Of Inquiry Act, 1952 [Entire Act]
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & ... on 28 March, 1958
In Dalmia's case, the tenth term of reference ased the Commission to recommend action to be taken "as and by way of securing redress or punishment" to act as a preventive in future cases. At pages 294-295 of the report Das C. J. speaking for the Court considered the argument by. the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the Commission could not be asked to suggest any measure, legislative or executive, to be taken by the appropriate Government and observed as follows:- We are unable to accept the proposition so widely enunciated. An inquiry necessarily involves investigation into facts and necessitates the collection of material facts .from the evidence addu.eed before or brought to the notice of -the .person or body conducting the inquiry and the recording of its findings on those facts in its report cannot but be regarded as ancillary to the inquiry itself, for the inquiry becomes useless unless the findings of the inquiring body are made available to the Government which set up the inquiry...... The whole purpose of setting up of a Commission of Inquiry consisting of experts will be frustrated........ if the opinion and the advice of the expert body.................... cannot be placed before the Government for consideration notwithstanding that doing so cannot be to the prejudice of anybody because it has no force of its own.... . . . -From this point of view, there can be no objection even to the Commission of Inquiry recommending the imposition of some form of punishment which will, in its opinion, be sufficiently deterrent to delinquents in future."