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1 - 10 of 17 (0.30 seconds)Section 220 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Section 273 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Section 307 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Section 214 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Section 216 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Mahomed Yusuf vs Abdur Rahim Bepari And Ors. on 3 July, 1899
9. We might notice another answer which was given by the learned Subordinate Judge to this objection, and it was that a mortgage was not a "debt" within the meaning of Section 214, Succession Act, and that the bar of this Section did not consequently apply. In view of our finding on the question of benami, it is not necessary to press this point, and it is sufficient to state that there is ample authority in this Court in support of the view expressed by the learned Subordinate Judge, though the Allahabad High Court appears to have struck a different note. See for instance the cases in Roghu Nath v. Poresh Nath (1888) 15 Cal 54, Kanchan Modi v. Baij Nath Singh (1892) 19 Cal 336, Baid Nath Das v. Shamanand Das (1895) 22 Cal 143, Mahomed Yusuf v. Abdur Rahim Bepari (1899) 26 Cal 839 and Umash Chandra Pramanik v. Mathura Mohan Haldar (1901) 28 Cal 246.
Section 332 in The Indian Succession Act, 1925 [Entire Act]
Brij Narain vs Mangla Prasad on 24 November, 1923
It was however conceded on their behalf, having regard to the fact that Rambiswas was the son of Ramchatti, that if it was shown that the mortgage was for the purpose of satisfying an antecedent debt of Ramchatti, not tainted with immorality, the mortgage would be binding on Rambiswas, even though he was no party to it and though the debt was a personal debt of Ramchatti: see Brij Narain v. Mangala Prasad (1924) 11 AIR PC 50 and Lal Bahadur v. Ambika Prasad (1925) 12 AIR PC 264. The appellants relied on the limited scope of the authority given by Ramchatti by the power of attorney, Ex. N, which he granted to Ramdas to execute the mortgage, and maintained that the mortgage debt was only in part the debt of Ramchatti, namely to the extent that it went to satisfy the prior mortgage in favour of Lachmandas Purukchand, and not the two promissory notes. In that view, it was argued that Rambiswas could be held bound, if at all, only to the extent of the dues under the said prior mortgage. We have already held how-ever that Ramdas had authority under the power of attorney to execute the mortgage on behalf of Ramchatti in its entirety, and the debts under the two promissory notes were equally the debts of both the brothers. This argument therefore fails.