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Bashir Ahmed vs The State Of West Bengal And Ors. on 8 September, 1975 cites

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious ... vs Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar Of Sri ... on 16 April, 1954

In the case of Commr. Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, the Supreme Court discussed the concept of Mahantship and observed that the word 'property' as used in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution should be given a liberal and wide connotation and so interpreted, should be extended to those well recognised types of interest which had the insignia or characteristics of proprietary right. Besides the right to manage its own affairs in matter of religion, the Supreme Court observed, which was given by Article 26, Clause (b), the next two clauses of Article 23 guaranteed to a religious denomination the right to acquire and own property and to administer such property in accordance with law. The administration of its property by a religious denomination had thus been placed on a different footing from the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. The latter was a fundamental right which no Legislature could take away, whereas the former could be regulated by laws which the Legislature could validly impose It is clear, therefore, that questions merely relating to administration of properties belonging to a religious group or institution were not matters of religion to which Clause (b) of Article 26 applied. What constituted the essential part of a religion was primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of the Hindus prescribed that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that these involved expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character. The language of Articles 25 and 26 was sufficiently clear to enable the Court to determine without the aid of foreign authorities as to what matters came within the purview of religion and what did not. Freedom of religion in the Constitution of India was not confined to religious beliefs only; it extended to religious practices as well subject to the restrictions which the Constitution itself had laid down. Under Article 26(b) a religious denomination or organisation enjoyed complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies were essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority had any jurisdiction to interefere with their decision in such matters Of course, the scale of expenses to be incurred in connection with these religious observances would be matter of administration of property belonging to the religious denomination and could be controlled by secular authorities in accordance with any law laid down by a competent legislature. The Supreme Court, further, observed that under Article 26(d) it was the fundamental right of a religious denomination or its representative to administer its properties in accordance with law; and the law, therefore, must leave the right of administration to the religious denomination itself subject to such restrictions and regulations as it might choose to impose. A law which took away the right of administration from the hands of a religious denomination altogether and vested it in other authority would amount to a violation of the right guaranteed under Clause (d) of Article 26.
Supreme Court of India Cites 67 - Cited by 618 - B K Mukherjea - Full Document
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