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1 - 9 of 9 (0.23 seconds)Kunj Behari Lal Butail And Ors vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors on 18 February, 2000
11. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner
was that Clause 2(1)(c) of the Regulations of 2017 could not be permitted
to travel beyond what was provided under Section 220(1) of the Code.
Since the expression "members" had been employed in the said provision,
the expression "member(s)" used in Clause 2(1)(c) being against the spirit
of the statutory provision could not be relied upon. To substantiate this
contention, reliance was placed on the decisions in Kunj Behari Lal Butail
and Ors. (supra) and Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors.(supra) . It has
been held in Kunj Behari Lal Butail that a delegated power to legislate by
making rules "for carrying out the purposes of the Act" is a general
delegation without laying down any guidelines. It cannot be so exercised
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as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities
not contemplated by the provisions of such Act.
Kerala State Electricity Board vs Thomas Joseph Alias Thomas M. J. on 16 December, 2022
This position has been
reiterated in Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors.(supra) and it has been
further observed that while considering the validity of a subordinate
legislation, the Court would have to consider the nature, object and
scheme of the enabling Act as well as the area over which power has been
delegated under such Act and thereafter decide whether the subordinate
legislation confirms to the parent statute. Rules or Regulations cannot be
made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it.
. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid legal position. We
however find that in the present case, Clause 2(1)(c) of the Regulations of
2017 seeks to indicate the manner in which a Disciplinary Committee can
be constituted. It could comprise of either a whole-time member or whole-
time members. It therefore cannot be said that this clause travels beyond
what has been provided by Section 220(1) since the latter provision
merely requires the members of the Disciplinary Committee to be whole-
time members of the IBBI.
Bharathidasan University & Anr vs All India Council For Technical ... on 24 September, 2001
For the very same reason, the ratio of the
decision in Bharathidasan University and Anr. (supra) cannot be applied to
the case in hand. The interim order passed by the Gujarat High Court
merely expresses a prima-facie view which cannot be treated as a
precedent.
Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors on 11 March, 1997
Merely for the reason that in some
other proceedings, a Disciplinary Committee consisting of two whole-time
members had been constituted would not mean that a single member
Disciplinary Committee was not permissible under the Code or the
Regulations of 2017. He referred to the provisions of Section 240 of the
Code to contend that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1),
the Regulations of 2017 had been framed and they were consistent with
the provisions of the Code. He referred to the affidavit-in-reply filed on
behalf of the IBBI as well as copies of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha
Bulletins to indicate the manner in which the Regulations had been placed
before both the Houses of Parliament. The learned counsel placed reliance
on the decision in Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors 1997 INSC
258, Premachandran Keezhoth & Anr. Vs. Chancellor Kannur University &
Ors., 2023 INSC 1032 and Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi Vs. The State of Gujarat
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and Ors., 2022 INSC 259. The interim order passed by the Gujarat High
Court could not be treated as a precedent for the proposition that a
Disciplinary Committee of a single whole-time member could never be
constituted.
The Newspapers Ltd vs The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P on 20 March, 1957
. What is relevant to note is that though the words in singular would
include the plural and vice-a-versa, the same is subject to there being
nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the matter. In other words,
it is not that in all situations a word in the singular can mean to include
the plural and vice-a-versa. The context in which such expression has been
used would govern the matter. If the subject or context indicates
otherwise, it would not be permissible to interpret a singular word to
include the plural and vice-a-versa. Reference in this regard can be made
to the decisions in The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal
1957 INSC 25 and Dhandhania Kedia & Co. Vs. The Commissioner of
Income Tax 1958 INSC 87 wherein it has been held that the principle
underlying Section 13 of the Act of 1897 does not have universal
application and that the said principle can apply only when no contrary
intention is deducible from the scheme or the language used in the
statute.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Messrs. Dhandhania Kedia & Co vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 17 October, 1958
. What is relevant to note is that though the words in singular would
include the plural and vice-a-versa, the same is subject to there being
nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the matter. In other words,
it is not that in all situations a word in the singular can mean to include
the plural and vice-a-versa. The context in which such expression has been
used would govern the matter. If the subject or context indicates
otherwise, it would not be permissible to interpret a singular word to
include the plural and vice-a-versa. Reference in this regard can be made
to the decisions in The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal
1957 INSC 25 and Dhandhania Kedia & Co. Vs. The Commissioner of
Income Tax 1958 INSC 87 wherein it has been held that the principle
underlying Section 13 of the Act of 1897 does not have universal
application and that the said principle can apply only when no contrary
intention is deducible from the scheme or the language used in the
statute.
Dr. Premachandran Keezhoth vs The Chancellor Kannur University on 17 October, 2023
Merely for the reason that in some
other proceedings, a Disciplinary Committee consisting of two whole-time
members had been constituted would not mean that a single member
Disciplinary Committee was not permissible under the Code or the
Regulations of 2017. He referred to the provisions of Section 240 of the
Code to contend that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1),
the Regulations of 2017 had been framed and they were consistent with
the provisions of the Code. He referred to the affidavit-in-reply filed on
behalf of the IBBI as well as copies of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha
Bulletins to indicate the manner in which the Regulations had been placed
before both the Houses of Parliament. The learned counsel placed reliance
on the decision in Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors 1997 INSC
258, Premachandran Keezhoth & Anr. Vs. Chancellor Kannur University &
Ors., 2023 INSC 1032 and Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi Vs. The State of Gujarat
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and Ors., 2022 INSC 259. The interim order passed by the Gujarat High
Court could not be treated as a precedent for the proposition that a
Disciplinary Committee of a single whole-time member could never be
constituted.
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