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Kunj Behari Lal Butail And Ors vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Ors on 18 February, 2000

11. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that Clause 2(1)(c) of the Regulations of 2017 could not be permitted to travel beyond what was provided under Section 220(1) of the Code. Since the expression "members" had been employed in the said provision, the expression "member(s)" used in Clause 2(1)(c) being against the spirit of the statutory provision could not be relied upon. To substantiate this contention, reliance was placed on the decisions in Kunj Behari Lal Butail and Ors. (supra) and Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors.(supra) . It has been held in Kunj Behari Lal Butail that a delegated power to legislate by making rules "for carrying out the purposes of the Act" is a general delegation without laying down any guidelines. It cannot be so exercised 11/13 OOCJ WP(L)-20352-2023.doc Dixit ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 05/09/2024 16:48:10 ::: as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of such Act.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 132 - R C Lahoti - Full Document

Kerala State Electricity Board vs Thomas Joseph Alias Thomas M. J. on 16 December, 2022

This position has been reiterated in Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors.(supra) and it has been further observed that while considering the validity of a subordinate legislation, the Court would have to consider the nature, object and scheme of the enabling Act as well as the area over which power has been delegated under such Act and thereafter decide whether the subordinate legislation confirms to the parent statute. Rules or Regulations cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it. . There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid legal position. We however find that in the present case, Clause 2(1)(c) of the Regulations of 2017 seeks to indicate the manner in which a Disciplinary Committee can be constituted. It could comprise of either a whole-time member or whole- time members. It therefore cannot be said that this clause travels beyond what has been provided by Section 220(1) since the latter provision merely requires the members of the Disciplinary Committee to be whole- time members of the IBBI.
Supreme Court of India Cites 39 - Cited by 16 - D Maheshwari - Full Document

Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors on 11 March, 1997

Merely for the reason that in some other proceedings, a Disciplinary Committee consisting of two whole-time members had been constituted would not mean that a single member Disciplinary Committee was not permissible under the Code or the Regulations of 2017. He referred to the provisions of Section 240 of the Code to contend that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1), the Regulations of 2017 had been framed and they were consistent with the provisions of the Code. He referred to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the IBBI as well as copies of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Bulletins to indicate the manner in which the Regulations had been placed before both the Houses of Parliament. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors 1997 INSC 258, Premachandran Keezhoth & Anr. Vs. Chancellor Kannur University & Ors., 2023 INSC 1032 and Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi Vs. The State of Gujarat 5/13 OOCJ WP(L)-20352-2023.doc Dixit ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 05/09/2024 16:48:10 ::: and Ors., 2022 INSC 259. The interim order passed by the Gujarat High Court could not be treated as a precedent for the proposition that a Disciplinary Committee of a single whole-time member could never be constituted.
Supreme Court of India Cites 1 - Cited by 22 - S C Agrawal - Full Document

The Newspapers Ltd vs The State Industrial Tribunal, U.P on 20 March, 1957

. What is relevant to note is that though the words in singular would include the plural and vice-a-versa, the same is subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the matter. In other words, it is not that in all situations a word in the singular can mean to include the plural and vice-a-versa. The context in which such expression has been used would govern the matter. If the subject or context indicates otherwise, it would not be permissible to interpret a singular word to include the plural and vice-a-versa. Reference in this regard can be made to the decisions in The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal 1957 INSC 25 and Dhandhania Kedia & Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax 1958 INSC 87 wherein it has been held that the principle underlying Section 13 of the Act of 1897 does not have universal application and that the said principle can apply only when no contrary intention is deducible from the scheme or the language used in the statute.
Supreme Court of India Cites 17 - Cited by 106 - J L Kapur - Full Document

Messrs. Dhandhania Kedia & Co vs The Commissioner Of Income-Tax on 17 October, 1958

. What is relevant to note is that though the words in singular would include the plural and vice-a-versa, the same is subject to there being nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the matter. In other words, it is not that in all situations a word in the singular can mean to include the plural and vice-a-versa. The context in which such expression has been used would govern the matter. If the subject or context indicates otherwise, it would not be permissible to interpret a singular word to include the plural and vice-a-versa. Reference in this regard can be made to the decisions in The Newspapers Ltd. Vs. The State Industrial Tribunal 1957 INSC 25 and Dhandhania Kedia & Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax 1958 INSC 87 wherein it has been held that the principle underlying Section 13 of the Act of 1897 does not have universal application and that the said principle can apply only when no contrary intention is deducible from the scheme or the language used in the statute.
Supreme Court of India Cites 15 - Cited by 30 - Full Document

Dr. Premachandran Keezhoth vs The Chancellor Kannur University on 17 October, 2023

Merely for the reason that in some other proceedings, a Disciplinary Committee consisting of two whole-time members had been constituted would not mean that a single member Disciplinary Committee was not permissible under the Code or the Regulations of 2017. He referred to the provisions of Section 240 of the Code to contend that in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1), the Regulations of 2017 had been framed and they were consistent with the provisions of the Code. He referred to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the IBBI as well as copies of the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Bulletins to indicate the manner in which the Regulations had been placed before both the Houses of Parliament. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Jagdish Singh vs Lt. Governor, Delhi And Ors 1997 INSC 258, Premachandran Keezhoth & Anr. Vs. Chancellor Kannur University & Ors., 2023 INSC 1032 and Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi Vs. The State of Gujarat 5/13 OOCJ WP(L)-20352-2023.doc Dixit ::: Uploaded on - 04/09/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 05/09/2024 16:48:10 ::: and Ors., 2022 INSC 259. The interim order passed by the Gujarat High Court could not be treated as a precedent for the proposition that a Disciplinary Committee of a single whole-time member could never be constituted.
Supreme Court - Daily Orders Cites 0 - Cited by 0 - Full Document
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