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1 - 10 of 29 (0.32 seconds)The Central Universities Act, 2009
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 8 in The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956
Section 3A in The Central Universities Act, 2009 [Entire Act]
Section 23 in The Central Universities Act, 2009 [Entire Act]
Sheo Nath Singh vs Appellate Assistant Commissioner ... on 12 August, 1971
In Gee Vee Enterprises v. Additional Commissioner of Income-tax [1975] 99 ITR 375 reference was made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sheo Nath Singh v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner and L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer and it was observed that this Court would not be warranted in dismissing a writ petition on the preliminary ground of the failure to avail the alternative remedy if the Court once considers the merits of the case. In our view, the merits of the case are considered first when a writ petition is admitted. These writ petitions were admitted and were ordered to be heard together. At first, notice to show cause why the writ petitions be not admitted were issued. The counter-affidavits were filed showing cause why they should not be admitted. After hearing the parties, the Court admitted these writ petitions, apparently after considering the merits of each case. Once this is done it would not be fair according to the observations of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned decisions to dismiss these cases at this late stage on the preliminary ground that the petitioners have not availed themselves of the alternative remedy. In out view, an order admitting the writ petition means that the Court will decide the case on merits. If the preliminary objection of law had to be considered, it should have been considered at the time of admitting the writ petitions.
L. Harday Narain vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, U.P. on 8 September, 1964
In the L. Hirday Narain's case , the Supreme Court also observed that if the High Court had not entertained the writ petition, the petitioner would have resorted to the statutory remedy before it was barred by time. Hence, in such circumstances, the High Court cannot dismiss the writ petition on the ground that it is not maintainable, because the petitioner has not availed himself of the alternative remedy. It may be mentioned further that at the time when the writ petitions were filed clause (3) had not been added to article 226 of the Constitution and now again on the date on which we are deciding the writ petitions also clause (3) of article 226 which had been added in the meantime by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act has been repealed by the Constitution (Forty-fifth Amendment) Act, which has been ratified by the States and has just been assented to by the President. It is not, therefore, a bar for our entertaining and deciding the writ petitions."
Harnam Singh And Ors. vs The State Of Punjab And Ors. on 8 January, 1974
25. Because of the view I have taken of the scope of the notification dated February 27, 1978 I am not discussing various cases cited before me (Harnam Singh v. State of Punjab , P. V. Naik v. State of Maharashtra .) by Shri Wazir Singh, the learned counsel for the Revenue, on the question of interpretation of special and general provisions in the same statute. The particular provision contained in the notification of October 21, 1975 cannot be operative because of the subsequent implied supersession by the notification dated February 27, 1978. I am also not specifically noticing various other cases cited at the Bar laying down that different provisions of the same statute, which are apparently inconsistent with one another should be construed so as to give effect to all the provisions, so as to avoid repugnancy. It is true that implied repeal is not readily inferred. The Courts as a rule lean against implying a repeal unless the two provisions cannot stand together. In the case before me exemptions from sales tax or modification of sales tax has been granted by the two statutory notifications. The two have not been issued simultaneously. The subsequent notification does not add another entry to the earlier notification but is an independent one. This notification has to be given full scope and amplitude and cannot be whittled down by importing limitations not inserted by the Administrator. Even if there is some ambiguity, the benefit must go to the taxpayer.