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1 - 10 of 17 (0.21 seconds)Annamalai Chettiar vs Malayandi Appaya Naick And Ors. on 20 February, 1906
157 : 47 C. 377 : 31 C. L. J. 98 : 24, C. W. N. 229, in the second place, as has been frequently pointed out, for example, in Annamalai Chettiar v. Malayandi Appaya Nath 29 M. 426; I. M. L. T. 145 : 16 M. L. J. 372 (F. B.), and Tinoodhan Chatterjee v. Trilokya Saran Sanyal 18 Ind. Cas.
Tinoodhan Chatterjee, Minor By His ... vs Trilokya Saran Sanyal on 13 December, 1912
157 : 47 C. 377 : 31 C. L. J. 98 : 24, C. W. N. 229, in the second place, as has been frequently pointed out, for example, in Annamalai Chettiar v. Malayandi Appaya Nath 29 M. 426; I. M. L. T. 145 : 16 M. L. J. 372 (F. B.), and Tinoodhan Chatterjee v. Trilokya Saran Sanyal 18 Ind. Cas.
Rajlakshmi Dasee vs Katyayani Dasee on 8 August, 1910
Rajlakshmi Dasse v. Katyayani Dasee 12 Ind. Cas.
Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein And Anr. vs Kishory Mohun Roy And Ors. on 16 September, 1890
126 which, it may be noted, was decided on another ground on appeal to the Judicial Committee: Mahomed Mozzffer Hoissein v. Kishori Mohun Boy 22 I. A. 129 (P. C.) : 22 C. 909 : 5 M. L. J. 101 : 6 Sar. P C. J. 583 : 11 Ind. Dec. (n. s.) 602.
Uttam Chandra Daw vs Raj Krishna Dalal And Anr. on 7 August, 1919
107 at p. 145 : 64 L. T. 353 : 60 L. J. Q. B. 145 : 39 W. R. 657 : 55 J. P 676, and the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Uttam Chandra v. Raj Krishna 55 Ind. Cas.
Raja Rai Bhagwat Dayal Singh vs Debi Dayal Sahu on 4 January, 1908
L. R. 591 : 5 C. L. J. 344 : 11 C. W. N. 474: 4 A. L. J. 232: 2 M. L. T. 145 : 17 M. L. J. 238 : 29 A. 331 : 10 O. C. 117, and Bhagwat Dayal v. Debt Dayal 35 I A 8 : 35 C. 420 : 7 C. L. J. 335 : 12 C. W. N. 39 : 18 M. L. J. 100 : 5 A. L. J. 184 : 14 Bur. L. R. 49 : 3 M. L. T. 344 : 10 Bom;, L. R. 230 (P. C.). The substance of the matter is that the compromise decree was of the same type as the conditional decree, such as may be and is often made in suits by reversioners, where the alienation by a limited owner is set aside on equitable terms. We are of opinion, consequently, that even according to the test formulated by Sir Richard Couch, the plaintiff mast be held bound by the doctrine of lit pendens.
Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi vs Midnapur Zemindari Company Ltd. on 6 July, 1914
363 (P. C.), and Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapore Zemindari Co. 53 Ind Cas. 534 : 46 I. A. 240 : 47 C. 485 : 31 C. L. J. 293 : 37 M. L. J. 525 : 17 A. L. J. 1117 : 24 C. W. N. 177; (1920) M. W. N. 66 : 27 M. L. T. 42 : 11 L. W. 301 : 22 Bom. L. R. 488 (P. C.). Indeed, to validate the mortgage in favour of the plaintiff, quite as much as the mortgage in favour of the Rathis and the Dutts, it was essential that the title of the mortgagor should be established, and that result was accomplished only by the consent decree of the 31st March 1908, which affirmed the agreement of the 28th January 1908, inclusive of the mortgage comprised therein as an integral component element. As between the plaintiff and his mortgagor (the first defendant) the principle of estoppel may apply and the after acquired title of the mortgagor may be made to inure to the mortgagee, but the case is otherwise as between the first defendant and the Rathis and the Dutts mortgagees. The case of a mortgage given back by the purchaser to the vendor of an estate stands upon a footing of its own. While it is true that, where money is loaned or something equivalent done, upon the security of a mortgage in fee with general warranty, the mortgagor cannot set up an after acquired estate against the unsatisfied mortgagee; it is equally true that, where the transaction is simply a purchase, with such mortgage back to secure payment of the purchase money, the rule does not apply. We are, consequently, of opinion that the Subordinate Judge has correctly held that the mortgage in suit must be postponed to the mortgage in favour of the Rathis and the Dutts. The plaintiff, it is satisfactory to find, cannot make a real grievance of this conclusion; for, as the Subordinate Judge has observed, there is overwhelming evidence that the compromise was brought about by the plaintiff himself: it was he who was the virtual plaintiff in the other suit in the cloak of Balachadra and employed his own men and money actively to prosecute the suit. The compromise which he thus brought about included the mortgage with its express recital that the charge thereunder would have priority over all other charges. The plaintiff cannot now very well complain when it transpires that this is precisely the result of the application of the rule of lit pendent.