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1 - 10 of 23 (3.15 seconds)Section 68 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 65 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 66 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Section 67 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Musammat Biro vs Atma Ram on 1 February, 1937
iv. The power of attorneys are admitted to be executed and
that on the strength of those POAs defendant no. 1 actually
has sold part of the suit land and admittedly distributed the
sale proceeds amongst the plaintiffs also. The above
narrated circumstances creates doubt as to the execution
of the WILL especially when the defendants produced it on
filing of the suit for the first time in the year 2015 whereas
it was executed in the year 1986 i.e. 30 years ago. In the
present context there is one judgment delivered by the
Privy Council which fits into the situation prevailing. The
Privy Council in Mr.Biro v Atma Ram &Ors., AIR 1937 PC
10 1 had an occasion to consider an analogous case where
the wife was practically disinherited and there was
unexplained delay in producing the will in public. There the
alleged will by a testator gave only a life estate to his
daughter who was the only child and who was to get some
property at her marriage. The bulk of the estate was vested
in the widow of the testator and three other women,
namely, his mother, his step-mother and his paternal aunt.
These women though entitled under the Hindu Law only to
maintenance, were made joint owners equally with the
widow of the testator. None of the devisees could get the
estate partitioned or alienate it for necessity. It was
however, provided that the lady, who survived the other
three devisees, would become the absolute owner of the
estate. The widow of the testator would not get her
[23]
husband's estate, if she predeceased any of her codevisees.
The will was not produced until 22 years after its execution
though there were occasions to produce it, had it been in
existence. Considering these circumstances, the Privy
Council observed (at 104): "It is most unlikely that a person
having a wife and a minor unmarried daughter, who should
be the objects of his affection, would make a will which
would practically disinherit them. That the testament is
unnatural and runs counter to the ordinary sentiments of
persons, having a status in society similar to that of
Harbans Lal, cannot be seriously disputed." The above
judgment opined that the WILL produced after 22 years to
be clouded with suspicion and accordingly did not rely on
the said WILL. In the present case, another facet also
requires to be considered that the WILL is admitted to be a
conditional WILL. In this regard, the evidence of DW8 i.e.
mother of the parties to the suit deserves discussion.
Defendant no. 8 is her written statement admitted
execution of the WILL but stated that it is one of the
condition of the WILL that if marriage of the plaintiffs was
held during the lifetime of the testator or after his death if
the expenditure in that case borne by his sons from second
marriage i.e. defendants no. 1 to 4, only in that case the
plaintiffs will not get any share over the property left by
him. She further stated that the marriages of the plaintiffs
took place after the death of Lal Mohan Sarkar and
defendants no. 1 to 4 did not bear the expenditure of such
marriage. She supported the suit of the plaintiffs and
prayed for a decree of partition. However, she deposed as
DW2 stating altogether a different story stating that the
marriage of plaintiff no. 3 was given during the lifetime of
her husband and the remaining plaintiffs were given in
[24]
marriage after his death the expenditure of which was
borne by defendants no. 1 to 4. However, she also
admitted execution of power of attorney and that the legal
heirs of Anil Chandra Sarkar transferred their entire share
in favour of the plaintiffs and defendants no. 1 to 4 and she
herself. She also admitted that the sale proceed obtained
on the strength of POA executed by the plaintiffs was
distributed amongst all of them. The said evidence of DW2
is totally beyond her pleading as in her W/S she stated that
the condition of the WILL was not fulfilled due to which the
plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of partition but in her
evidence she stated that the said condition was fulfilled.
Her evidence being in contrary to her pleading cannot be
considered and outright discarded . Having discussed the
above situation it gets clear that the WILL purported to be
executed by the testator is a conditional WILL and there is
no cogent evidence on record as to the fulfillment of such
condition. The defendants in one end is admitting
execution of POAs by the plaintiffs and sale of part of the
suit land distributing the proceed amongst themselves and
on the other end is denying the share of the plaintiffs on
the basis of the WILL in question. Presently, this Court is
not going into the discussion of fulfillment of the condition
of the WILL as its execution is not free from suspicion as per
the above discussion. To sum up this Court is of the opinion
that the defendants could not remove the suspicious
circumstance roaming around the execution of the WILL
bearing no. III-22 dated 15.03.1986 and accordingly, is
liable to be declared canceled. The plaintiffs are found to
be entitled for a decree of declaration in this respect."