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1 - 10 of 10 (0.20 seconds)The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Article 14 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
S. Nagalingam vs Sivagami on 31 August, 2001
In S.Nagalingam v. Sivagami, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3576, the question which falls for consideration was whether the second marriage entered into by the appellant therein with the second accused was a valid marriage under Hindu Law, so as to constitute an offence under Section 494 IPC. A contention was raised stating that Saptapadi is an important ritual which forms part of the marriage ceremony, having not been performed and therefore, there was no valid marriage in accordance with the Hindu rites. While deciding the matter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took into consideration Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, as inserted by the State of Tamil Nadu and pointed out that Section 7-A applies to any marriage between two Hindus solemnized in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons. The main thrust of this provision is that the presence of a Priest is not necessary for the performance of a valid marriage. The parties can enter into a marriage in the presence of relatives or friends or other persons and each party to the marriage should declare in the language understood by the parties that each takes other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband, and the marriage would be completed by a simple ceremony requiring the parties to the marriage to garland each other or put a ring upon any finger of the other or tie a thali. Any of these ceremonies, namely garlanding each other or putting a ring upon any finger of the other or tying a thali would be sufficient to complete a valid marriage. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court pointed out that Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 7-A specifically says that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, all marriages to which this provision applies and solemnized after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967 shall be good and valid in law. Further, Sub-section (2)(b) says that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967 or in any other law in force immediately before such commencement or in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, all marriages to which this Section applies solemnized at any time before such commencement, shall be deemed to have been valid.
Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
R. Pandian And Anothera. Deivendran Son ... vs State Of Tamil Naduthrough The ... on 21 October, 1997
5. It is the say of the petitioner by reference to the observations of Lord Denning, in R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Common Wealth Affairs, (1982) 2 All E.R. 118 that customary laws are not written down, but they are handed down by tradition from one generation to another and they are well established and have the force of law within the community.
Section 494 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 3 in The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 [Entire Act]
Dr.Subramanian Swamy vs Director, Cbi & Anr on 6 May, 2014
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Subramnian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 682, after taking note of several of its earlier decisions on the ambit and scope of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, pointed out that it is well established that while Article 14 of the Constitution of India forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia vs Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar & ... on 28 March, 1958
In Ram Krishna Dalmia's case (supra), the Constitutional Bench pointed out that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. The legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. In the absence of any material to dislodge the presumption as to the validity of the statute, the question of striking it down at the instance of the petitioner by way of this Public Interest Litigation does not arise.
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