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1 - 10 of 12 (0.26 seconds)Section 106 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Shrinivas Pannalal Chokhani vs State Of M.P on 29 May, 1953
Mr. Daji has also relied on the decision of M. P. High Court in the case of Pannalal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, which was a case of breach of contract with the government by a contractor, and it was held (para 15) that the Explanation to Section 73 of the Contract Act casts a burden upon the person complaining of breach to show that he did not possess means of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract.
Section 34 in The Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 103 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Prafulla Ranjan Sarkar vs Hindusthan Building Society Ltd. on 1 September, 1959
I have referred to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Prafull Ranjan's case, also in another context.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
S. S. Shetty vs Bharat Nidhi, Ltd on 17 September, 1957
It would be convenient to refer at the outset to the decision of the highest Court on the point, and that is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. S. Shetty v. Bharat Nidhi Ltd., in which Bhagwati, J. delivering he judgment of the bench, laid down (paragraph 13) that if the contract of employment is for a specific term, the servant would, in that event, be entitled to damages the amount of which would be measured, prima facie and subject to the rule of mitigation, in the salary of which the ,aster and deprived him. Bhagwati J. then proceeded to lay down in the same paragraph that the servant would, in that event, be entitled to the whole of the salary, benefits etc., which he would have earned had he continued I the employ of the master for the full term of the contract, subject for the full term of the contract, subject of course, to mitigation of damages by way of seeking alternative employment. The appellant in that case had taken up service with the respondent, but was discharged on the pleas that he had become surplus to the requirement of the Respondent company. On adjudication by the industrial tribunal, his discharge was held to be illegal and the appellant was ordered to be reinstated within a month of the date of the publication of the award. The respondent having failed to reinstate the appellant, the appellant claimed Rs. 47,738 as compensation on account of the pay he would have earned till his 55th year of age. The Supreme Court took the view (paragraph 22) that, having regard to the terms and conditions of the appellant's service, it was possible for the respondent had been found which the respondent to terminate the service of the appellant by paying him one month's salary in lieu of notice, but that in view of certain unfair practice of which the respondent had been found guilty, that right, which the respondent would have had, could not be availed of by the respondent and, having regard to all these factors. the Supreme Court came to the conclusion (paragraph 24) that it would be reasonable to compute the benefit of reinstatement which was awarded to the appellant at the amount of Rupees 12,500. Though, therefore, this was not a case of an employment for a fixed term, the Supreme Court, in discussing the law on the point, has made (paragraph 13) the observations to which I have referred above. it is too well settled to need authority that even he obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are entitled to the highest respect at the hands of all Courts in this country and should be accepted as law. , unless they are in the nature of mere passing observations. In view of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the said case, it is really unnecessary for me to refer to any other authorities on the point. I may, however briefly cite some of them.
Sree Minakshi Mills Ltd. vs T.C. Anantarama Ayyar on 7 October, 1929
5. Having construed the relevant statutory provisions in the preceding paragraph, I will now proceed to deal with the rival contentions of the parties. It is the contention of Mr. Daji that in cases of breach of a contract of service, damages are never given for the fill remaining term of service, but that they have been given by Courts only for a reasonable period or for a reasonable period of notice. It is further contention of Mr. Daji that, in any event, there was a duty on the plaintiff to mitigate damages, that the onus of proving what efforts he made to obtain alternative employment is on the plaintiff, and that the evidence that the plaintiff, and that the evidence that the plaintiff has given on the point shows that he has really made no efforts whatsoever to mitigate damages the onus which according to Mr. Daji, lies upon him. As far as the first proposition that in cases in which the contract of employment was for a fixed period, the normal measure of damages would be the salary for the whole of the unexpired period of service. The cases cited by Mr. Daji were all cases in which there was no fixed term of employment for a fixed term, damages have been given for a shorter period, as being the normal measure apart. It is not necessary for me to deal with each one of the cases on which Mr. Daji has relied, but I may refer to three of them to show that the principle of awarding damages for a reasonable period or reasonable period of notice comes into play only when the contract of employment is not for a fixed term. The case of Sree Minakshi Mills Ltd. v. Anantarama Ayyar cited by Mr. Daji. The statement at p. 658 in the judgment in the said case that the Court had after all to see in each particular case what time may reasonably by expected to elapse before a person wrongfully dismissed can secure a similar employment, must be read in the context of the facts of that case which show clearly that the employment was not for a fixed term. It may be mentioned that it was observed in the said judgment that the doctrine of reasonable that that is the time during which a fresh employment may reasonably by obtained, and that both the principles come to the same thing. No question of reasonable notice can possibly arise in the case of a contract for a fixed term, and it is, therefore, clear that the principle laid down in the said case has no application to a case like the present one in which the contract was admittedly for a fixed term of five years.
The Gokak Municipality vs Rajaram Shridhar Kulkarni on 3 July, 1940
The same principle has been laid down earlier by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gokak Municipality v. Rajaram Shridhar, 42 Bom LR 886 at p. 8994 = (AIR 1940 Bom 386 at p. 390) though that was also a case in which there was no contract to employ the plaintiff for a definite period.