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1 - 10 of 12 (0.34 seconds)Dinonath Ghose And Anr. vs Shama Bibi, Widow Of Chhanu Lal ... on 1 June, 1900
In dealing with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act it has been held that a person who purchases property between the date of the disposal of the suit and the filing of the appeal would be bound by the rule of lis pendens, Gobind Chunder Roy v. Guru Churn Kurmokar (1887) I.L.R. 15 C. 94, Dinonath Ghose v. Sliama Bibi (1900) I.L.R. 28 Ck. 23, Sukhdeo Prasad v. Jamna (1900) I.L.R. 23 A. 60, Settappa Gounden v. Muthia Gounden (1907) I.L.R. 31 M. 268. If the appeal is only a continuation of the original proceedings and the suit is, for the purpose of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, regarded as pending between the date of the decree and that of the filing of an appeal, it is difficult to see why the same rule should net apply when dealing with Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle has been extended by Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer, JJ. to the interval elapsing between the disposal of a claim and the filing of a regular suit under Order 21 Rule.
Section 13 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Gobind Chunder Roy vs Guru Churn Kurmokar on 9 November, 1887
In dealing with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act it has been held that a person who purchases property between the date of the disposal of the suit and the filing of the appeal would be bound by the rule of lis pendens, Gobind Chunder Roy v. Guru Churn Kurmokar (1887) I.L.R. 15 C. 94, Dinonath Ghose v. Sliama Bibi (1900) I.L.R. 28 Ck. 23, Sukhdeo Prasad v. Jamna (1900) I.L.R. 23 A. 60, Settappa Gounden v. Muthia Gounden (1907) I.L.R. 31 M. 268. If the appeal is only a continuation of the original proceedings and the suit is, for the purpose of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, regarded as pending between the date of the decree and that of the filing of an appeal, it is difficult to see why the same rule should net apply when dealing with Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle has been extended by Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer, JJ. to the interval elapsing between the disposal of a claim and the filing of a regular suit under Order 21 Rule.
Section 52 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 11 in The Limitation Act, 1963 [Entire Act]
Panchanada Velan vs Vaithinatha Sastrial And Ors. on 10 November, 1905
Panchanada Velan v. Vaithinatha Sastrial (1905) I.L.R. 20 M. 333 and Rami Chetti v. Karuppan Chetti (1915) 29 M.L.J. 551 are also authorities for holding that the District Judge was not debarred from deciding the appeals on their merits simply because no appeal was filed against the decree in the connected suit.
Section 11 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Balkishan Das vs Madan Lal And Ors. on 23 January, 1907
5. When S.S. No. 412 of 1912 was decided, the time allowed by the Limitation Act for preferring appeals against the decision in Suits Nos. 466 of 1909 and 276 of 1910 had not run and it is not disputed that the appeals to the District Judge were filed in time. The only question for determination is whether the decision of another suit between the same, parties not on the merits but on the ground that the decisions subsequently appealed against rendered the question res judicata would bar the appeals from the prior decisions unless the later decision was also appealed against. There is a conflict between the views taken by Holloway, J. in Suryanarayanarazu v. Chellamkuri Chellamma (1870) 5 M.H.C.R. 176 and that taken by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Balkishan v. Kishan Lal (1888) I.L.R. 11 A. 148; but while the dictum, of Holloway, J. was only obiter the point arose directly for determination in the later case.
Ramasamy Chetty vs Karuppan Chetty And Ors. on 8 September, 1915
In Ramaswami, Chetty v. Karuppan Chetty (1915) 29 M.L.J. 551, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Srinivasa Aiyangar held that, where judgments were delivered in respect of two suits, the one being based on and following the other, the fact that the party had not appealed against one of the decrees would not render the questions raised' in the decree appealed against res judicata. The same principle is applicable to cases when separate judgments are delivered in a number of connected suits. In the present case except the fact that the pattas tendered were for separate faslis the cause of action and the parties are the same, and the principle of the decisions above referred to may well be applied to the facts of the present case.