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1 - 10 of 12 (0.23 seconds)Article 226 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Section 24 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Article 227 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
State Of U.P vs U.P. State Law Officers Assn on 25 January, 1993
28 In the matter of State of U.P. Vs. U.P. State Law
Officers' Association, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1654, the Supreme
Court has observed that the Law Officers are not appointed as a
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part of the spoils system. Having been selected on merit and for no
other consideration, they are entitled to continue in their office for
the period of contract of their engagement and they can be
removed only for valid reasons. The people are interested in their
continuance for the period of their contracts and in their non
substitution by those who may come in through the spoils system.
Liberty Oil Mills & Others vs Union Of India & Others on 1 May, 1984
The expression at any time
merely means that the termination may be
made even during the subsistence of the term
of appointment and 'without assigning any
cause' means without communicating any
cause to the appointee whose appointment is
terminated. However, without any cause is not
to be equated with without existence of any
cause. It merely means that the reason for
which the termination is made need not to be
assigned or communicated to the appointee. It
was held in Liberty Oil Mills vs. Union of India
(1984) 3 SCC 465 : (AIR 1984 SC 1271) that the
expression 'without assigning any reason'
implies that the decision has to be
communicated, but reasons for the decision
have not to be stated; but the reasons must
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exist, otherwise, the decision would be
arbitrary. The non-assigning of reasons or the
non-communication thereof may be based on
public policy, but termination of any
appointment without the existence of any
cogent reason in furtherance of the object for
which the power is given would be arbitrary
and, therefore, against public policy. Cl. 3 of
para 7.06 must, therefore, be understood to
mean that the appointment of a District
Government Counsel is not to be equated with
appointment to a post under the Government in
the strict sense, which does not necessarily
mean that it results in denuding the office of its
public character; and that the appointment may
be terminated even during currency of the term
by only communicating the decision of
termination without communicating the
reasons which led to the termination. It does
not mean that the appointment is at the sweet
will of the Government which can be terminated
at any time, even without the existence of any
cogent reason during the subsistence of the
term. The construction, suggested on behalf of
the State of U.P. Of this provision, if accepted,
would amount to conceding arbitrary power of
termination to the Government, which by itself
is sufficient to reject the contention and thereby
save it from any attack to its validity.
Shri. Vikas Baburao Patil-Shirgaonkar vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 25 March, 2015
31 Heavy reliance is placed by the Respondents on the
judgment of Division Bench of this Court, delivered at Mumbai, in
the matter of Vikas Baburao Patil Shirgaonkar Vs. State of
Maharashtra and others (Writ Petition No.3015 of 2015, decided
on 25.03.2015). The petition was presented by a District
Government Pleader and Public Prosecutor, District Court Satara,
challenging the notification / notice issued by the Collector dated
19.03.2015 so also the notification dated 03.02.2015 / 13.02.2015,
issued by the State of Maharashtra, whereby the Maharashtra Law
Officers Rules have been amended. The notification challenging
the aforesaid matter is containing identical clause in respect of
automatic termination of the existing Law Officers on
selection/appointment of Law Officers pursuant to the
Notification.
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons vs Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Bombay on 27 April, 1989
It is true that there is a presumption of validity of State
action and the burden is on the person, who alleges violation of
Article 14, to prove the same. However, if the State is unable to
produce the material to justify its action as fair and reasonable,
the burden on the person alleging arbitrariness, must be held to
have been discharged. It is true that the scope of judicial review is
limited as indicated in the case of Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons
Vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, reported in AIR
1989 SC 1642, to oversee the State action for the purpose of
satisfying that it is not vitiated by the vice of arbitrariness and no
more.
State Of U.P. And Anr vs Johri Mal on 21 April, 2004
35 This aspect of the matter was not disclosed to the
Division Bench at Mumbai, which has resulted in drawing a
conclusion that the State Government does not propose to
terminate engagement of the Law Officers enblock. The Division
Bench at Mumbai, though referred to the judgment in the matter
of Shrilekha (supra), as well as in the matter of Johri Mal (supra),
has not dealt with the issue in respect of observance of procedure
prescribed under the Rules while terminating engagement of the
existing Law Officers before completion of their tenure. Though
Rule 30 has been reproduced in the judgment, the action of the
State Government in respect of discontinuance of engagement of
existing Law Officers in breach of Rule 30(6) of the Law Officers
Rules, has not been dealt with in the judgment. The Division
Bench at Mumbai was misinformed as regards intention of the
State Government to continue the engagement of existing Law
Officers enblock.