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1 - 9 of 9 (0.43 seconds)The State vs Mt. Anwarbi And Ors. on 25 April, 1952
12. But Mr. Kadar rightly invited my attention to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported in ((1983)1 Criminal Law Cases 168)3. It was held in that case that if the wife refused to cohabit with her husband without any just and reasonable cause, and it on that account if the husband is drive to marry second wife, the first wife cannot claim maintenance from husband because if she is allowed to do so, it will mean that she will be allowed to take advantage of her own wrong.
Tejabai vs Shankarrao Baswanappa on 3 March, 1965
In Tejabai's case it was also held that in every case when a husband validly marries a second wife, not only the first write but even the second wife is entitled to live separately from her husband and still claim maintenance from him just because her husband has had two spouses. But that part of the law laid down by that authority has no bearing upon the present case although I must state that I am inclined to have my own reservations about this view.
Ramji Malviya vs Smt. Munni Devi Malviya on 20 March, 1959
10. The first authority relied upon by him was the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ramji Malviya v. Smt. Munni Devi Malviya. In that case, the wife had been living away from her husband without any justification for a period of nearly four to five years with the result that the husband was constrained to enter into a second marriage. If appears that the second marriage was not void at the time even though the parties were Hindus. In these circumstances, the Allahabad High Court held that there was no 'neglect' on the part of the husband to maintain his wife during the period of until he had married the second wife. The High Court held that the position did not change in any way after his second marriage. The wife's refusal to respond to the husband's desire to lead a happy matrimonial life disentitles her claiming maintenance from her husband, and if she continued with her obstinacy and indifference, intervention of the second marriage did not change the position. If the conduct of the husband of not paying maintenance to the wife because it was the wife who was at fault in living away was a justified conduct. Till the date of his second marriage, the factum of his second marriage does not change the nature of the conduct. This is what the Allahabad high Court has held in this connection in para 6 of its judgment which runs as follows :---
Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum And Ors on 23 April, 1985
18. The last authority which I must examine is the latest judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and others . Mr. Mantri wanted to rely upon the same for analogy but could not because the same was not reported in any well-known law reports at the tie of arguments but was briefly reported in the newspapers. The fact of the case were of little different type. In that case the wife was entitled to live separately from her husband because she was divorced wife. There was no question of her being not entitled claim maintenance from her husband because she was living separate from him without legitimate reason. She had to live separate because she was no more he wife of her husband in view of the divorce. The question before the Supreme Court was as to whether the divorced wife was entitled to claim maintenance from her husband having regard to the provisions of Clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. As per the explanation, the word 'wife' used in section 125(1) includes a divorced wife so long as she has not remarried etc. the question was as to whether this Explanation applies to Muslims as well. The Supreme Court held that section 125 has an over-riding effect over the Personal Law of the parties. Evidently the Supreme Court declined to accept the argument that in the explanation to clause (b) of section 125(1) the word 'wife' should be read as 'Hindu wife or as a wife other than Muslim wife". The Supreme Court found no justification reading down the clauses so as to confine it to Hindus or to husband whose personal law prohibited bigamous marriage.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Deochand vs The State Of Maharashtra And Anr. on 4 April, 1974
16. The next authority which is the judgment of the Supreme Court Deochand v. State of Maharashtra and another, involves facts which are similar to the facts in the Madras case. In that case the wife wanted to live away from the husband because he had married a second wife. Chandrachud, J., as he then was, held that she had every right to live separately from her husband. No question was required to be considered by the Supreme Court whether it was the first wife who had driven the husband to marry the second wife. From the judgment it is not clear as to whether the second marriage had taken place before 1955. In any event, the provisions in regard to the separated residence and maintenance of a Hindu wife would apply. Moreover, Section 488 of the old Cri.P.C. itself left no room for doubt after its amendment in the year 1949, referred to above, that second marriage of the husband was a sufficient ground for the wife to lie separately and still claim maintenance from him. With great respect, in the set of facts with which the Supreme Court was dealing, there was really no scope for the contention that the wife was not entitled to live separately and claim maintenance from her husband. The contention advanced was that the husband band had not neglected to maintain his wife. But the husband had not stated that he was prepared to maintain his wife even if resided separated from him.
Kandaswami Gounder vs Nachammal on 2 November, 1962
However, to my mind, it would be better if I discuss the ratio laid down by the said authorities, particularly because one of the authorities it the judgment of Division Bench of our own High Court and second authority is the judgment of the Supreme Court.
Kurma Pullamma vs Kurma Thatalingam Alias Raju on 20 April, 1944
14. This to my mind, is the basic difference between the ratios of the various authorities relied upon by Mr. Khadar (mentioned above ; Kurma Pullamma v. Kurma Thatalingam on the one hand and the above mentioned Kandaswami's case relied upon by Mr. Mantri (though cited also by Mr. Kadar) and the three authorities relied upon by the Session Court on the other. The latter group of four authorities reveal a similar pattern of facts which is basically distinguishable form the set of facts detaining in the cases relied upon by Mr. Kadar. I may mention that Mr. Mantri did not rely upon the authorised as relied upon by the Sessions Court and he may be right in doing so because the question posed before him is relay speaking not dealt with by the said authorities.
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