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1 - 10 of 13 (1.11 seconds)Section 307 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 465 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Kalu Khoda And Ors. vs The State on 7 March, 1962
The Court relied upon the decision of Gujarat High Court in
Kalu Khoda v. State {AIR 1962 Guj. 283}, wherein the Court
interpreted Section 337 of the (Old) Cr.P.C. which is
analogous to Section 306(4) of Cr.P.C. As against this,
Kerala High Court in Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum
{1988 Crl.L.J. 812} has observed that examination under
Section 306(4) would be even before issuing process and at
that stage no inquiry is involved and accused will be no
where in picture, therefore, there is no question of accused
being permitted to cross-examine the approver at that stage
and he has no right to participate in that examination.
Sanjay Gandhi vs Union Of India And Ors on 14 February, 1978
No party to a criminal trial has a vested right in
slow motion justice since the soul of social justice in this
area of law is prompt trial followed by verdict of innocence
or sentence. Since a fair trial is not a limping hearing,
we view with grave concern any judicial insoucience which
lengthens litigation to limits of exasperation
The Court further held that the scope of committal
proceedings is limited to merely ascertaining whether the
case, as disclosed in the police report involves an offence
triable exclusively by the Court of Session. The Court
thereafter observed: -
Section 34 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Section 200 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Section 337 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Suresh Chandra Bahri vs State Of Bihar on 13 July, 1994
In Suresh Chandra Bahris case (supra) this Court
considered the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 306
and observed that the object and purpose of enacting the
provision is obviously intended to provide a safeguard to
the accused inasmuch as the approver has to make a statement
disclosing his evidence at the preliminary stage before the
committal order is made and the accused not only becomes
aware of the evidence against him, but he is also afforded
an opportunity to meet with the evidence of the approver
before the committing court itself at the very threshold so
that he may take steps to show that the approvers evidence
at the trial was untrustworthy, in case there are any
contradictions or improvements made by him during his
evidence at the trial. Learned Judges pointed out the
utility of examination of the approver at two stages. While
holding that the provision is mandatory, the Court said that
since the defect was rectified in that case the
non-compliance of it cannot be held to have vitiated the
proceedings. Their Lordships did not consider the situation
as in the case where the approver was examined and the case
went to the trial court where the approver was
cross-examined without raising any demur regarding the
omission to cross-examine him at the pre-committal stage.
After considering the provisions of Section 306, the Court
held that
if the defect of not examining the approver at the
committal stage by the committing Magistrate is rectified
later, no prejudice can be said to be caused to an accused
person and, therefore, the trial cannot be said to be
vitiated on that account.