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1 - 9 of 9 (0.26 seconds)Section 5 in The Oaths Act, 1969 [Entire Act]
Section 118 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Harjinder Singh Alias Jinda vs Delhi Administration on 14 November, 1967
Harjinder Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1968 SC 867. Pilu Sahu is a man about 70 years old. As many as 19 injuries were inflicted on his person-some on vital parts of the body. One of the injuries (No. 12) which was dealt on the
left chest caused fracture of the 8th and 9th ribs of the left side of the chest and the other injury caused fracture of the right temporal bone resulting in the fractured pieces, depressing into the brain substance. These are injuries which are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Queen-Empress vs Maru And Anr. on 16 January, 1888
In Queen-Empress v. Maru, (1888) ILR 10 All 207, Mahamood, J. held that Section 13 of the Oaths Act is only applicable when the omission is accidental.
Section 6 in The Oaths Act, 1969 [Entire Act]
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
State vs Sagar Mal And Ors. on 15 November, 1950
In that case the charge against Berumal one of the accused persons was that he and Babulal on or about 31-1-52 between 3 and 5 P. M. committed murder by intentionally causing the death of Foujmal and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302, I. P. C. The charge against the other accused Babulal was that he and Bherumal at the same time and place committed the murder of Foujmal by intentionally causing the death and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302, I. P. C. In
neither of the charges there was mention of Section 34 or the words "in furtherance of the common intention of both" were embodied in the body of the charge. After getting satisfactory proof that the two accused persons acted in furtherance of a common intention in committing the murder of Foujmal, the High Court convicted them under Section 302/34, I. P. C. although the Sessions Judge acquitted them on the ground that Section 34 had not been included in the charge. We respectfully agree with the view Wanchoo, C. J. had taken in that case. We are not referred to any decision cither of this Court or of the Supreme Court where a contrary view was taken.
Anda And Ors. vs The State Of Rajasthan on 9 March, 1965
The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary way of nature. When this sufficiency exists and death follows and the causing of such injury is intended, the offence is murder. If the intended injury cannot be said to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, that is to say, there was probability in a lesser degree of death ensuing from the act committed, the conviction should be for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148. It is clear from the evidence in this case that the appellants intended to cause the injuries which were found on the person of Pilu. In fact if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellants inflicted them, the only possible inference that can follow is that they intended to inflict the same. Whether the appellants knew of the seriousness of the injuries or intended the serious consequences is not at all material. The question sol far as intention is concerned is not whether they intended to kill or to inflict the injuries of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether they intended to inflict the injuries in question and once the existence of the injuries is proved, the intention to cause the injuries will be presumed unless the evidence or circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
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