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1 - 10 of 22 (0.28 seconds)The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
The Carriage by Air Act, 1972
Section 140 in The Air Force Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
Section 5 in The Air Force Act, 1950 [Entire Act]
The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855
Smt. Kanta Devi vs Union Of India And Anr on 12 March, 2003
40. The issue has to be viewed in a different angle as well.
Section 5 of the Act prescribing the liability in the case of death
starts with a 'non-obstante clause'. The said provision says that,
notwithstanding anything contained in the Fatal Accidents Act,
1855 or any other enactment or rule of law in force in any part of
India, the rules contained in the First Schedule, the Second
Schedule and the Third Schedule shall, in all cases to which
W.P.(C) No.32550 OF 2010
51
those rules apply, determine the liability of a Carrier in respect of
the death of a passenger. Assume for a moment, that there is
a law enacted by the State for working out the compensation
with reference to age/income/dependency etc., which, however
does not have any significance, being contrary to the provisions
of the Act/Rules contained in the Schedules as mentioned above,
in view of the non-obstante clause. If this is the position, how
'common law' principles can be applied notwithstanding the non-
obstante clause under Section 5, is a matter to be explained by
the second respondent, in which they have failed. Even if it is an
omission on the part of the law makers, such gaps cannot be
filled up by this Court applying the principles of 'casus omissus'
as explained by the Apex Court in the decision reported in
(2003)4 SCC 753 (Kanta Devi vs. Union of India and
another). In short, the law has to be read and understood as it
is, without contributing anything to lead to a different situation,
not intended by the law makers .
Manjuri Bera vs Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. And Anr on 30 March, 2007
In
view of the law declared by the supreme court in Manjuri Bera
(Smt) vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd & another [(2007)10
SCC 643] 'No fault Liability' does not cease because of 'no
dependency'; which on the other hand constitutes an abstract
figure payable in all cases. Paragraph 20 of the said verdict
added by Honourable Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia, while concurring
with the judgment delivered by Dr. Justice Arijit Pasayat on
behalf of the Bench is relevant in this context, and is extracted
below: