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1 - 10 of 11 (1.11 seconds)The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Badri Pershad vs Smt. Kanso Devi on 26 August, 1969
It was conceded that the language of sub-section (2) was apparently wide to include acquisition of property by a Hindu female under any instrument and this would apparently cover a case where property was given to a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument etc. prescribed limited interest. It was, however, pointed out that such an interpretation would "virtually emasculate sub-section (1)" for in that event, a large number of cases, where property is given to a Hindu female, at a partition or in lieu of the maintenance under an instrument, order or award would be excluded from the operation of the beneficient provision enacted in sub-section (1)". It was, therefore, held that sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) "so as to leave as large a scope as possible to sub-section (1) and, so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as grant, without any pre-existing right, under a gift. Will, instrument, decree,. order or award, the term of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property". It was further held that "where, however, property is required by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribed a restricted estate in the property". Support for this line of approach was sought from an earlier decision of the Court in Badri Parshad v. Smt. Kanso Devi, . In that case, the award gave a restricted estate to the widow in the properties allotted to here but sub-section (1) was held applicable because, inter alia the properties given to her under the award were or the basis of a pre-existing right which she had as an heir of her husband and not as a new grant made for the first time. A question was, therefore, posed if in the case of Tulasamma, properties were acquired by her under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right or they were acquired for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise alone and to nothing else. The Court then examined the nature of the right of maintenance and the extent to which it conferred a right in relation to property and observed that the right of the widow to be maintained is, of course, not jus in rem since it does not give her any interest in the joint family property but is certainly jus ad rem i.e. right against the joint family property and that when specific property was, therefore, allotted to the widow in lieu of her claim for maintenance, the allotment would be in satisfaction of the right to be maintained out of the joint family property. That is how the question posed was answered in favor of Tulasamma and it was held that the properties were acquired by her under the compromise in virtue of a pre-existing right and not for the first time as a grant owing its origin to the compromise. The decisions of the various High Courts, which had taken the contrary view were over-ruled and the cases which had taken a view consistent with the view of the Supreme Court were approved. The theme, as indeed, the reasoning found further elaboration at the hands of Fazal Ali, J. was delivered the main- judgment. Fazal Ali, J. analysed some of the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and the decisions of the various High Courts in which contrary view had been taken by the High Courts.
Naraini Devi vs Smt. Ramo Devi And Ors on 18 December, 1975
(29) The decision of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Ram Devi, 1978 Allahabad Law Reports 715(16), on which reliance was placed is of little assistance to the plaintiffs for a variety of reasons. In the first instance, the peculiar facts of that case are clearly distinguishable. The widow never came to possess the property in that case. She claimed the benefit of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, merely on the basis that she had the right of being maintained out of the joint family estate and of residence in the joint family house and that these rights constituted property which she possessed and by virtue of that possession, she became full owner of the property by operation of sub-section (1) of Section 14. It was in this context that it was held that "bare right of being maintained out of the joint family estate and of residence in the joint family house could not be said to be such a property as may have been possessed by the widow within the meaning of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 so as to make her a full owner of any property, unless some property had been specifically earmarked and settled on her in lieu of that right of maintenance." No property had, therefore, been given to her in lieu or in recognition of any such right of maintenance. Secondly, the learned Judge did not purport to express any considered opinion in the view that he took that the suit must be tried afresh. That is why the learned Judge added that "I need not express any concluded opinion in the matter." Moreover, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tulasamma is an authoritative enunciation of the law as to the nature and characteristic of the right of a widow of being maintained out of the joint family estate and as to the circumstances in which there is a preexisting right to the property as distinguished from the insrument which may be the only foundation of the right.
Section 39 in The Transfer Of Property Act, 1882 [Entire Act]
Section 2 in The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 [Entire Act]
Section 90 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
The Hindu Disposition Of Property Act, 1916
Jagat Singh And Ors. vs Teja Singh And Ors. on 20 January, 1970
(17) It was then urged, on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council, in the case of Tagore, (1872) Ix Bengal Law Reports 377(3), that the bequest of a life estate simpliciter in favor of a Hindu widow was invalid being inconsistent with the traditional widow's estate or limited estate of a Hindu widow, as known to Hindu Law. There is no force in this contention. The testator was a sole surviving co-parcener, and was under no obligation to make any bequest in favor of Kalawati, a widow of a pre-deceased son, apart from a provision for her maintenance or any bequest that may be in the nature of such a provision. If that be so, he was free, subject to the aforesaid provision, to give or withhold any benefit from the widow. True, there is a clear distinction between life estate simpliciter and the limited estate of a widow or a widow's life estate, as known to Hindu Law. It is well known that a widow or other limited heir is not a tenant for life but is owner of the property inherited by her subject to certain restrictions on alienation and subject to its devolving on the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The whole estate is for the time vested in her and she represents it completely. As observed by the Privy Council, in the case of Janki Amal 1916, 43 Indian Appeals 207 (4), " her right is of the nature of right of property; her position is that of owner; her powers in that character are, however, limited and in the familiar language of Mayne's Hindu Law, "so long as she is alive no one has any vested interest in the succession." As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagat Singh vs. Teja Singh 1962 Sc 83(5), : "WHENa widow succeeds as heir to her husband. the ownership in the properties both legal and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of the reversioners therein being only spes successionis. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. it is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate as known to Hindu law.