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1 - 10 of 13 (1.86 seconds)Munshi Mahamad Kazem Ali And Anr. vs Munshi Naimuddin Ahmed And Ors. on 24 August, 1921
11. In the present case, Ex. 69 appears to have been obtained by one of the assessees because assessment was imposed upon all the members of the firm, though the statement was made by only one of them, namely defendant 1. Even assuming that the strict view taken in Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed (1925) 12 A.I.R. Rang. 84 is correct, it is difficult to see anything illegal in the grant of copies of such documents to the assessee himself. The use of the word "disclosure" in Clause (2) of Section 54, Income-tax Act implies that the disclosure must be to a stranger and not to the party who made the statement. Where one partner makes a statement on behalf of the partnership, we do not think it reasonable to hold that the grant of copies of that statement to other members of the partnership is illegal. It is not clear whether the declaration of the confidential character of such statements under Section 54 was intended to have a wider scope than the enactment in the latter part of the provision. But even so, it will be meaningless to talk of a statement as confidential in respect of the very person who made the statement. If one is to have regard to the general policy of the Legislature in matters of this kind, we may point out that in the penultimate proviso to Section 54| Income-tax Act an exemption has been made in respect of documents etc., relating to a procedure under Section 26-A of the Act. That Section relates to proceedings taken for the registration of partnerships for the purpose of the Act and the proviso to Section 54 distinctly contemplates that an Income-tax Officer may even be compelled to produce documents which will show the precise relationship between partners. Though Ex. 69 was not made in proceedings under Section 26-A of the Act, the above provision is some indication that it was not the policy of the Legislature to preclude from the cognisance of the Court information of the kind now sought to be obtained from Ex. 69. We accordingly hold that Ex. 69 is admissible in evidence and that it establishes the truth of the plaintiff's claim that the plaintiff's branch was entitled to a three-sixteenths-share in Kottu No. 3.
The Income Tax Act, 1961
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Venkatachella Chettiar And Ors. vs Sampathu Chettiar And Ors. on 22 September, 1908
281 and Venkatachala Chettiar v. Sampathu Chettiar (1909) 32 Mad. 62 may not be good under this Section. But the question for decision in the present case is not whether the Court can compel any public servant to produce before it any document of the kind mentioned in Section 54, but whether the Court is precluded from admitting in evidence a certified copy which has been given to one of the partners by the income-tax authorities, even when such a statement is otherwise relevant under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Clause (1) of Section 54 first declares that all particulars contained in certain documents 'shall be treated as confidential' and it then proceeds to direct that no Court shall insist on their production by a public officer. Clause (2) enacts a penalty in respect of the disclosure of such particulars by any public servant. It has been maintained before us that the declaration in the earlier part of Clause (1) has a wider effect than the direction in the latter part of the clause and prevents the admissibility of the copy in evidence even though it is available before the Court without any summons to a public officer.
Jadobram Dey vs Bulloram Dey on 9 February, 1899
8. It was contended on behalf of the contesting defendants that the statement Ex. 69 was not admissible in evidence, and this contention was accepted by the lower Court. We are unable to accede to this contention. The objection is based on Section 54, Income-tax Act of 1922. There can be no doubt that this provision is stricter and wider in scope than the corresponding provision in the Act of 1886 and decisions like those in Jadobram Dey v. Bulloram Dey (1899) 26 Cal.
The Indian Contract Act, 1872
Section 65 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 76 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Grandhe Gangayya vs Grandhe Venkataramiah And Ors. on 12 September, 1917
4. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit both on the ground that as framed the suit was not maintainable and also on the ground that the plaintiff was bound by the settlements evidenced by Exs. 4 and 5. He also found against the plea that these settlements were brought about by fraud, coercion and undue influence. As regards Kottu No. 3, he held that defendants 24, 25 and 28 had no interest in it. He also recorded a finding of estoppel which has not been seriously supported before us. Against this decree of dismissal, the plaintiff and defendants 24 to 27 have preferred this appeal. Dealing first with the question of the maintainability of the suit, we may observe that we are unable to concur in. the view of the lower Court that the suit as framed is not maintainable. It has not been disputed that the plaintiff is a member of a joint Hindu family with defendants 24 and 25 and that as between them the interest of defendants 24 and 25 in the partnerships now in question was held as joint family property. It is true that according to the decision of the Full Bench in Gangayya v. Venkataramiah (1918) 5 A.I.R. Mad. 37 a person in the position of the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for the dissolution of a partnership in which the managing member of his family was a partner; but that judgment does not deal with the rights of such a person and the remedies open to him after a dissolution of the partnership has taken place.