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1 - 10 of 13 (0.34 seconds)K.A.N. Chidambaram Chettiar vs Krishna Vathiyar And Ors. on 15 August, 1916
The conclusion arrived at was tersely stated by Pakenham Walsh, J., who pronounced the judgment of the Bench as follows, at p. 196; "On a review of the authorities it appears to us that the Full Bench case, Chidambaram Chettiar v. Krishna Vathiyar (1916) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 233 : 32 M.L.J. 13 only covers agreements which relate to execution, and not to agreements which attack the decree itself". This view which reconciles almost all, if not all, the Madras decisions on the subject, is one with which I venture to express my entire concurrence. The agreement pleaded in the present case is one which relates to execution alone, and does mot attack the decree itself,-for it is merely an agreement not to execute the decree as against the 1st judgment-debtor, and nothing more. It follows therefore that the agreement can be pleaded in execution, and that the executing Court can determine whether the agreement is true.
R.D.K. Venkatalingama Nayanim Bahadur ... vs Rao Muni Venkatadri Rao Garu on 12 April, 1927
The bench decision in Rajah of Kalahasti v. Venkatadri Rao (1927) I.L.R. 50 Mad.
Debendra Narain Sinha And Ors. vs Sourindra Mohan Sinha And Ors. on 7 May, 1914
4. Debendra Narain Sinha v. Sourindra Mohan Sinha (1914) 24 I.C. 391 and the unreported case decided by Napier and Krishnan, JJ., (S.A. No. 62 of 1920) may be taken as representing the two contrary views, as the remaining cases more or less follow the one or the other of these two. In the former case it was held that the words "any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document" found in the earlier part of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are controlled by the words "as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest" in its later part which are applicable only in the case of documents of a dispositive character, and that the former words have therefore a narrower scope in Section 92 than in the preceding section, and cannot cover the case of a decree; reliance was also placed on the omission of these words from the fourth proviso to S 92. Napier, J., was of opinion that:
Ma Shwe Mya vs Maung Mo Hnaung on 26 January, 1921
79 and also by a single Judge of the Rangoon High Court in Ma Shwe Pee v. Maung San Myo (1928) I.L.R. 6 Rang. 573.
Benode Lal Pakrashi vs Brajendra Kumar Saha on 4 June, 1902
and Gauri Singh v. Gajadhar Das (1909) 6 A.L.J. 403 which adopted the same view as that of the majority of the Full Bench, and the Calcutta cases, Benode Lal Pakrashi v. Brajendra Kumar Saha (1902) I.L.R. 29 Cal.
Hassan Ali vs Gauzi Ali Mir on 29 June, 1903
810, Hassan Ali v. Gauzi Ali Mir (1903) I.L.R. 31 Cal.
Atmakuru Butchiah Chetti vs S. Tayar Rao Naidu And Ors. on 26 August, 1930
The case-law has been so exhaustively reviewed by a Bench of this Court in a recent case, Butchiah Chetti v. Tayar Rao Naidu (1930) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 184 : 60 M.L.J. 721 that it is unnecessary to go through it again.
Section 47 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Ganga Dihal Rai vs Ram Oudh And Ors. on 23 November, 1928
258 but it was dissented from by the learned Chief Justice of the same Court in a subsequent case, Ganga Dihal Rai v. Ram Oudh A.I.R. 1929 All.