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1 - 10 of 18 (0.64 seconds)The Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1965
George J. Ovungal vs Peter on 3 July, 1990
The learned Counsel has placed reliance also on the judgment in the case of George, J. Ovungal v. Peter, . This was a case of eviction under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, namely, its section 11 and the question which was being considered by the Court was as to whether the destruction of leased premises would automatically cause the termination of the landlord-tenant relationship. The Court held that the destruction of a shop room leased out on rent would not automatically terminate the lease and put an end to the landlord-tenant relationship. The meaning of the word "building" includes site of the building which is integral and inseparable part of it. Without the site, the superstructure of a shop room on land cannot normally exist. Thus when a lease of a residential house or a shop-room on land is granted for occupying the same, such a lease would normally take in the site unless it is excluded either expressly or impliedly from the lease. So long as there is no total destruction of the subject-matter of the lease in the sense that the superstructure as well as the land underneath the superstructure are destroyed completely, the particular principle of automatic termination of the tenancy of the shop-room in favour of the plaintiff cannot be applied. Even after the destruction of the super-structure of the shop-room, the tenant is entitled to continue in possession of the land upon which the superstructure of the shop-room stood before its destruction; as part of the property demised subject to all the rights and liabilities as a tenant, since the landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant continues to exist. The tenant may be bound to pay the rent under the lease. He may be entitled to exercise an option to give up tenancy under the Transfer of Property Act. So also it may be open to the landlord to claim rent or exercise any other right as landlord of the property including a right to terminate the lease with reference to the part of the demised property even now remaining, namely, the land which formed the floor of the shop-room.
Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta vs Indradaman Amratlal Sheth on 28 April, 1964
The learned Counsel has also drawn my attention to the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indraman Amratlal Sheth, , wherein the Supreme Court has observed in the context of an application for termination of the lease on the ground of bona fide need of the premises and for the purpose of demolishing and re-building it before occupation that occupation of the premises in Clause (g) of section 13(1) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. If the landlord on getting possession starts the work of demolition, occupation under the clause includes occupation for demolition to make it fit for residence.
Raghaba Chandra Das vs Bipin Behari Mohapatra And Ors. on 8 August, 1988
In another decision relied by Mr. Thali in the case of Raghaba Chandra Das v. Bipin Behari Mohapatra and others, , a Full Bench of that High Court has held that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of personal occupation the necessity for personal occupation could be of vacant land after demolishing the tenanted premises. The Court observed that demolition of a house can be ordered also when the landlord's requirement is only of the vacant site on which the tenanted house stands. Such a necessity is covered within the four corners of the expression "personal occupation". The landlord may require the vacant land for other purposes, namely, for having a garage, making addition to the existing building, providing accommodation to his growing family, providing a motorable road for his adjacent building and for other amenities depending on the facts of each case. But the landlord cannot be allowed to seek eviction for the purpose of demolishing the building to enable him to re-construct another one only for augmenting his income, as personal requirement as a pre-condition.
Abdula Samad Makhadum Baksh Sheikh And ... vs Sudha Anant Parakhe on 30 January, 1982
The learned Counsel has also placed reliance in support of his submissions on certain decisions. Thus he invited my attention to the case of Abdul Samad Makhadum Baksh Shaikh v. Sudha Akant Parakhe, 1982 Mh.L.J. 647. This was for the purpose of showing that a plaintiff seeking possession of the premises on the ground of personal occupation, (in the instant case was under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, similar to our section 23(1)(a)) must place before the Court all necessary details which are required for granting relief. A mere ipse dixit of the landlord that he requires the accommodation for his personal accommodation is not enough. Unless the landlord gives such details, the tenant cannot be expected to meet the case of the landlord. In the absence of such comparative data and material being available indicating as to how the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation, the tenant in meeting the case of the landlord would be greatly prejudiced and it would permit the landlord to make out a case at the time of trial in any manner he liked, and the tenant would have no opportunity and occasion to meet such a case which is sprung in his face for the first time.
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs The Motor & General Traders on 18 March, 1975
My attention was also drawn by the learned Counsel to the case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General Traders, . This was for the purpose of showing that during the pendency of proceedings under the Rent Control legislation by the landlord for permission to evict the tenants, subsequent event disabling the landlord from seeking eviction is bound to be taken note of while disposing the proceeding. The Supreme Court observed in this regard that where, during the pendency of a proceeding under Rent Control legislation by the landlord for permission to evict the tenants, a subsequent event in the facts of the case takes place which has a material bearing on the landlord's right to evict, the approach of the High Court in revision, in taking cognizance of the new development cannot be said to be wrong or illegal.
P. Orr And Sons (P) Ltd vs Associated Publishers (Madras) ... on 9 November, 1990
8. I have considered all these rulings relied by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and I am at a loss to appreciate in what context these would help the petitioner's case. Admittedly all of them had been passed in the peculiar facts of each case and are therefore distinguishable. So far the case of Abdul Shaikh, 1982 Mh.L.J. 647, there cannot be any dispute that a landlord seeking possession of the premises had to give details required for granting the relief in order to establish the bona fide of his occupation. But this is a case dealing with the merits of the application itself and it does not concern with the point placed for our determination which is to find out whether the right of the landlord to terminate the lease of the premises on the ground of his personal occupation ceased to exist during the pendency of his application for eviction. The case of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu, , appears also to take the petitioner's case nowhere. The Supreme Court in the said ruling has emphasized that the Courts are bound to take into consideration new developments which have a material bearing on the landlord's right to evict. There cannot be any dispute on this proposition although the Court has acknowledged that it is the basic rule of jurisprudence that the right of relief must be adjudged as to exist on the date of institution of legal proceedings and a fact arising after the lease becomes relevant only when it has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or in the manner of moulding it. The Court has also in such circumstances alerted that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful and also legal and factual in accord with the current realities the Court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed . Similar appears to be the position in Bhagwant Vishnu Purandare's, case and P. Orr and Sons', case . While the first one refers to the fact that the landlord is required to give in an application for eviction all the details regarding his bona fides need to occupy the suit premises, the second has examined the question of the meaning of the expression "immediate purpose" with regard to the bona fide requirement of the landlord to demolish and re-construct the building leased for the purpose of its use and personal occupation. Thus, none of these authorities appear to serve any purpose in the adjudication of the real issue in controversy of this case.
K.A. Anthappai vs C. Ahammed on 5 May, 1992
In the case of K.A. Anthappai v. C. Ahammed, , the Supreme Court while examining the question of bona fide need in the matter of eviction on the ground of personal occupation under sections 11(3) and (20) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 has observed that the question whether the building is required bona fide by the landlord for his own residence is primarily one of fact and the finding recorded by the Appellate Authority after considering the evidence on record could not be interfered with the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Inspite of the fact that there was no specific pleading of tenant that the claim of landlord was false the Appellate Authority has examined whether the said claim of the landlord was false and after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties, the Appellate Authority had found that the claim of the landlord was not false. Therefore interference with the findings of the Appellate Authority by the High Court would not be proper. The Supreme Court has also held that in the matter of eviction the claim of the landlord that he needs the building bona fide for personal occupation cannot be negatived on the ground that the building requires repairs and alterations before the landlord occupies the same.