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Union Bank Of India, Bombay vs Suresh Bhailal Mehta And Anr. on 23 April, 1996 cites

Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda vs Durga Prosad Chamaria And Others on 1 March, 1961

17. The trial court has taken support (for its own view) from a decision of the Privy Council, reported in AIR 1930, Privy Council, page 57. This decision has been interpreted by the trial Court to establish a principle to the effect that "in the pleading, the party has to put forward all the material facts, and no evidence can be looked into upon (which) is never put forward in the pleadings of the parties (sic)". In my opinion, the trial court has clearly misread and misinterpreted the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council. This would be apparent even from a plain reading of Order 7, Rule 6 and Order 6, Rule 2 of the CPC discussed hereinabove. As I have already indicated hereinabove, what is required to be pleaded are grounds, and/or reasons and/or the principles upon which the plaintiff claims exemption from the prescribed period of limitation, in view of or in the context of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Clearly, no party can be held to be mandatorily obliged to plead specific evidence in support of a general proposition of the nature contemplated by Order 7, Rule 6. Even otherwise, the trial court has clearly misconstrued the decision of the Privy Council, in view of the interpretation of the Supreme Court itself in respect of the very same decision of the Privy Council. The Supreme Court in the case of Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 has interpreted the aforesaid Privy Council decision, and in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision, taken a view which only sets at naught the view expressed by the trial court, 17.1 A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of S.F. Mazda v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 1236 in para 6 thereof.
Supreme Court of India Cites 7 - Cited by 161 - P B Gajendragadkar - Full Document

Nagubai Ammal & Others vs B. Shama Rao & Others on 26 April, 1956

17. The trial court has taken support (for its own view) from a decision of the Privy Council, reported in AIR 1930, Privy Council, page 57. This decision has been interpreted by the trial Court to establish a principle to the effect that "in the pleading, the party has to put forward all the material facts, and no evidence can be looked into upon (which) is never put forward in the pleadings of the parties (sic)". In my opinion, the trial court has clearly misread and misinterpreted the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council. This would be apparent even from a plain reading of Order 7, Rule 6 and Order 6, Rule 2 of the CPC discussed hereinabove. As I have already indicated hereinabove, what is required to be pleaded are grounds, and/or reasons and/or the principles upon which the plaintiff claims exemption from the prescribed period of limitation, in view of or in the context of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. Clearly, no party can be held to be mandatorily obliged to plead specific evidence in support of a general proposition of the nature contemplated by Order 7, Rule 6. Even otherwise, the trial court has clearly misconstrued the decision of the Privy Council, in view of the interpretation of the Supreme Court itself in respect of the very same decision of the Privy Council. The Supreme Court in the case of Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, reported in AIR 1956 SC 593 has interpreted the aforesaid Privy Council decision, and in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the said decision, taken a view which only sets at naught the view expressed by the trial court, 17.1 A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of S.F. Mazda v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 1236 in para 6 thereof.
Supreme Court of India Cites 9 - Cited by 565 - S J Imam - Full Document
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