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1 - 10 of 10 (1.51 seconds)Mir Sarwarjan vs Fakhruddin Mahomed Chowdhuri on 9 November, 1911
It is thus settled beyond controversy that where a manager and karta of a Hindu joint family enters into a contract for the sale of immovable property belonging to the family for a legal necessity, the purchaser is entitled in law to obtain a decree for specific performance of contract though some of the members of the joint family are minors, in case the manager subsequently refuses to complete the transaction of sale. The only requirement for the validity of such a contract of sale is that there must be a justifying necessity. Indeed, this is true of all transfers effected by the manager and karta of a Hindu family. The learned Government Advocate accepted the correctness of this proposition of law. He, however, urged that although the contract of sale can be on forced even against the minors of a Hindu joint family, the latter cannot enforce the same against the purchasers, if they or some of them are minors. There is no logic in this contention. In the eye of law, there is no distinction between a contract of sale and a contract for purchase, and if the purchaser can enforce specific performance of contract against the minor sellers, there is no reason why the minor sellers should not similarly enforce the same against the minor purchasers. To accept this argument will be tantamount to introducing a qualification in the aforesaid principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Subrahmanayam 75 Ind App 115 : (AIR 1948 PC 95), in that that principle will not conic into operation when some of the purchasers happened to be minors. According to the learned Government Advocate, specific performance of contract of sale entered into by the manager of a Hindu joint family can be decreed by Count only when it is in favour of majors. There is no rational basis for different treatment of contract of sale and contract for purchase and it is not acceptable on the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Subrahmanyam, 75 Ind App 115 : (AIR 1048 PC 95). It will appear from their observations quoted above that a contract can be specifically enforced by or against the minor. This contention, therefore is not supportable in principles and on authorities and must be overruled.
Hari Charan Kuar And Ors. vs Kaula Rai And Ors. on 29 March, 1917
As a general proposition of law, it is no doubt correct, but the important question is whether those observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council apply even to a contract of sale entered into by a manager and karta of a joint Hindu family on behalf of the minor members for legal necessity. This question was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Hari Charan Kuar v. Kaula Rai, 2 Pat LJ 513 : (AIR 1917 Pat 478) (FB) and their Lordships have laid down that the case of Mir Sarwarjan does not apply to contracts made by the managing members of a joint Hindu family for family necessities or for the benefit of the family. They have further held that a contract entered into by the manager of a joint Hindu family can be specifically enforced even though some of the members of the joint family were minors at the time when the contract was entered into.
Minor Ramalingam Reddi By Next Friend ... vs Babanambal Ammal on 14 April, 1950
14. Recently, in a very elaborate and learned judgment, Viswanatha Sastri, J., has, on a careful review of various authorities, including the aforesaid Privy Council decision, laid down in Ramalingam v. Babanambal Ammal, AIR 1951 Mad 431 that a minor Hindu is bound by a contract entered into by his guardian on his behalf for sale of his property for purposes considered under Hindu law as necessary; such a contract can be enforced against him.
Ardeshir H. Mama vs Flora Sassoon on 21 May, 1928
12. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents contended that even on the assumption that the sale deed (Ext. 8e) was genuine, the long delay made in its enforcement disentitled the plaintiffs to any relief and relied, in support of this proposition of law, on the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ardeshir v. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208 and a Bench decision of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad Said v. Anandi Devi AIR 1960 Pat 109. It will be seen that this contract of sale was made on 27-11-1953. The present suit was brought on 23-5-1956- In between, the position of the parties changed, and the registered sale deed (Ext. C) was executed by defendants 1 and 2 on 4-10-1954. The purchasers served on the Company a notice to quit on 8-9-1954. The plaintiffs are partners in this Company. They, therefore, certainly became aware of this registered sale deed on 8-9-1954. if not earlier. Stil1, they waited for twenty months to bring the present suit for no obvious reason; Prior to that, they had failed to take any steps for its compulsory registration. Apart from this, they have not as yet paid the balance of the consideration of Rs. 3800/-, and there is no evidence of willingness on their part to make immediate payment of this amount. The lower appellate Court has found as a fact that the plaintiffs made undue delay in bringing the suit for specific performance of contract. Thus, the two circumstances namely, undue delay on the part of the plaintiffs and absence of willingness to perform their part of the contract are, in my opinion, enough to nonsuit them. In the case of Ardeshir; AIR 1928 PC 208, their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that the plaintiffs are required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract On their part, and failure to do so brought with it the inevitable dismissal of their suit. Similarly in the other case, namely, AIR 1960 Pat 109, a Bench of this Court, to quote the placitum has laid down as follows:
Section 77 in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
The Registration Act, 1908
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Section 23 in The Registration Act, 1908 [Entire Act]
Rameshwar Prasad Sahi vs Mt. Anandi Devi And Ors. on 20 October, 1959
12. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondents contended that even on the assumption that the sale deed (Ext. 8e) was genuine, the long delay made in its enforcement disentitled the plaintiffs to any relief and relied, in support of this proposition of law, on the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ardeshir v. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208 and a Bench decision of this Court in Rameshwar Prasad Said v. Anandi Devi AIR 1960 Pat 109. It will be seen that this contract of sale was made on 27-11-1953. The present suit was brought on 23-5-1956- In between, the position of the parties changed, and the registered sale deed (Ext. C) was executed by defendants 1 and 2 on 4-10-1954. The purchasers served on the Company a notice to quit on 8-9-1954. The plaintiffs are partners in this Company. They, therefore, certainly became aware of this registered sale deed on 8-9-1954. if not earlier. Stil1, they waited for twenty months to bring the present suit for no obvious reason; Prior to that, they had failed to take any steps for its compulsory registration. Apart from this, they have not as yet paid the balance of the consideration of Rs. 3800/-, and there is no evidence of willingness on their part to make immediate payment of this amount. The lower appellate Court has found as a fact that the plaintiffs made undue delay in bringing the suit for specific performance of contract. Thus, the two circumstances namely, undue delay on the part of the plaintiffs and absence of willingness to perform their part of the contract are, in my opinion, enough to nonsuit them. In the case of Ardeshir; AIR 1928 PC 208, their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed that the plaintiffs are required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract On their part, and failure to do so brought with it the inevitable dismissal of their suit. Similarly in the other case, namely, AIR 1960 Pat 109, a Bench of this Court, to quote the placitum has laid down as follows:
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