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Ramsarup Das And Ors. vs Rameshwar Das And Ors. on 26 September, 1949 cites

Sham Chand Giri vs Bhayaram Panday on 5 April, 1894

In this connection, reliance was placed on a decision of a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court, sitting on the Original Side, in the case of Sham Chand Giri v. Bhayaram Pandey, 22 Cal. 92. In that case the plaintiff had sued for a declaration that he had been selected to succeed as mahanth of the Tarkeshwar Shrine and for possession of the properties attached to the institution as also for an injunction to restrain the defendant from interferring or dealing with the properties of the Shrine. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff died, and an application was made for substitution in his place by one who claimed to be the successor-in-office to the deceased plaintiff. He also applied to amend the plaint to make the consequential changes in the pleadings. Sale, J. held that the right to sue did not survive to the applicant, and that, therefore, he could not be substituted in place of the deceased plaintiff. In the course of his judgment, his Lordship made the following pertinent observations:
Calcutta High Court Cites 1 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur vs Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi, Bhaba Prasad ... on 28 June, 1911

441 : (34 I. C. 548), relying upon the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jagadindra Nath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, 32 Cal. 129 : (31 I. A. 203 (P. C.)). Another difficulty in this case is that this is not a suit to remove a shebait on the ground that he has been acting in a way prejudicial to the interest of the debottar estate. This was a suit by the plaintiff claiming to be the rightful shebait of the debottar estate as against defendant 1 who was claiming to be the rightful owner of the property as shebait and mahanth. It may be mentioned in this connection that, though defendant 1 claimed the properties in dispute as the personal properties of the mahanth, and got an issue added namely, Issue No. 10 and a large volume of oral and documentary evidence was adduced on this question, the lawyer on behalf of defendant 1 in the Court below withdrew that plea, and unequivocally stated that he was not claiming the property as the absolute personal property of the mahanth but as property belonging to the Asthal which was of a debottar character. In this Court also, Mr. P.R. Das and Mr. Lakshmi Kanta Jha, who followed him, have unequivocally taken the same position. Hence, it cannot be said now that defendant 1 was asserting an interest in the property adverse to the debottar estate. The case must, therefore, be determined on grounds other than that urged on behalf of the deity that defendant 1 should be removed from his position, because he was claiming a title adverse to that of the deity. Hence, it would appear that the deity is not a necessary party to this litigation.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 131 - Full Document

A.S.S. Subbaiya Pandaram vs Mahamad Musthapa Maracayar And Ors. on 31 August, 1916

14. But it was contended by Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha on behalf of Parmeshwar Das that, if the substitution is not made, the result would be that the property will have to go back from the hands of the receiver, who is at present managing the same, to defendant 1 who has been adjudged to be a mere trespasser. It is not correct to describe defendant 1 as a mere trespasser. He has been adjudged by the Court below to be a trespasser, as his title by virtue of his being the chela of Bhagwat Das was found to be inferior to the plaintiff's title on the basis of the ekrarnama of 1919. But if the plaintiff's title is dead with him, defendant 1, having been the person in possession, from whom the receiver had taken over, will naturally get the property back, and hold it so long as he is not ejected by a person with a better title. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha referred to the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mahamed Mustapha Maracayar, 60 I. A. 295 ; (A.I.R. (10) 1923 P.C. 175) in support of his contention that the decision of the Court below that the possession of defendant 1 was that of a trespasser will not be res judicata in any suit to be instituted hereafter by another person claiming the debottar properties as the shebait; but certainly it would merely emphasize the fact that that possession was adverse to the debottar estate. As indicated above, there is no danger of that in the present case, inasmuch as the defendant both in the Court below and in this Court has unequivocally abjured all claim to hold the property adversely to the debottar estate.
Madras High Court Cites 16 - Cited by 18 - Full Document

Rao Masoom Ali Khan vs Rao Ali Ahmad Khan on 3 August, 1933

15. It was further contended by Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha that, the receiver having already taken possession of the estate, be is holding it for the rightful owner of the property; and, as defendant 1 is not the rightful owner, if the suit were to be dismissed, it would naturally mean that the receiver would make over the property to defendant 1. Hence, be suggested that the receiver should be directed to continue in possession of the property until Parmeshwar Das, or somebody else, had established his right to the shebaitship in preference to defendant 1. But I am not aware of any procedure known to law in accordance with which this Court can ask the receiver to continue in possession indefinitely, or even for a specified period, in the expectation that a decision might be given in favour of Parmeshwar, or in favour of another person, as preferential successor-in-office to the shebaitship, the suit giving rise to these appeals will have to be determined one way or the other, and the receiver will naturally have to make over possession of the property in accordance with that decision. But Mr. Lalnarayan Sinba relied upon the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Muhammad Ali Khan v. Ahmad Ali Khan, I.L.R. (1945) ALL 818: (A.I.R. (32) 1945 ALL 261). In that case, Braund and Wali-ullah JJ. (Allsop J. dissenting) directed that the respondent should be appointed receiver and manager without security of the property of the waqf the receiver to be discharged if, within three months from the date of the order of the High Court, fresh proceedings for the removal of the mutwalli were not taken. In that case, their Lordships bad agreed to allow the revisional application against the order of the District Judge removing a certain person from the position of a mutwalli and appointing another one in his place. Such a direction was proposed to be made by Braund, J. under the provisions of Order 40, Rule 1, Civil P.C. Waliullah J. was inclined to accept that view, but, not being sure whether such an appointment could be made under Order 40, of the Code, suggested that the provisions of Section 151, Civil P. C. could he resorted to, in the alternative. Allsop J. pointed out, differing from his learned colleagues, that there was no proceeding pending before any Court in which a receiver could be appointed. He therefore, took the view that the High Court could only set aside the orders of the District Judge, which were ultra vires, and leave the parties to their remedies at law. It is a title difficult to appreciate the reasonings of the majority of the Full Bench appointing a receiver in respect of the property which had ceased to be the subject-matter of a litigation.
Allahabad High Court Cites 76 - Cited by 20 - Full Document
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