Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 31 (0.27 seconds)Section 139 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
Section 118 in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [Entire Act]
The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Bir Singh vs Mukesh Kumar on 6 February, 2019
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding that
presumption takes effect even in a situation where the accused
contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily signed and handed
over by him to the complainant. [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir
Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 :
Section 70 in Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 [Entire Act]
G. Vasu vs Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri on 8 December, 1986
32. The Evidence Act provides for presumptions, which fit within one of
three forms:"may presume" (rebuttable presumptions of fact), "shall
presume" (rebuttable presumption of law) and conclusive
presumptions (irrebuttable presumption of law). The distinction
between "may presume" and "shall presume" clauses is that, as
regards the former, the Court has an option to raise the presumption
or not, but in the latter case, the Court must necessarily raise the
presumption. If in a case the Court has an option to raise the
presumption and raises the presumption, the distinction between the
two categories of presumptions ceases and the fact is presumed,
unless and until it is disproved. [G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin
Quadri [G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri, 1986 SCC OnLine AP
147 : AIR 1987 AP 139] ]
Section 139, NI Act-Effect of presumption and shifting of onus of proof
The State Of Madras vs A. Vaidyanatha Iyer on 26 September, 1957
The more authoritative view has been laid down
in the subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Dhanvantrai
Balwantrai Desai v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1964 SC 575 : (1964) 1
Cri LJ 437] where this Court reiterated the principle enunciated in
State of Madras v. Vaidyanatha Iyer [AIR 1958 SC 61 : 1958 Cri LJ
232] and clarified that the distinction between the two kinds of
presumption lay not only in the mandate to the court, but also in the
nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the case of a
discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted
by an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is
consistent with the innocence" of the accused. On the other hand in
the case of a mandatory presumption
"the burden resting on the accused person in such a case would not be
as light as it is where a presumption is raised under Section 114 of the
Evidence Act and cannot be held to be discharged merely by reason of
the fact that the explanation offered by the accused is reasonable and
probable. It must further be shown that the explanation is a true one.
The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which occur in this provision