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Kirtisinh G. Rana vs State Of Gujarat And Ors. on 4 May, 1990 cites

Keshab Govind Kulkarni vs Extra Assistant Judge, Sourth Satara ... on 17 March, 1959

It may only be pointed out that we do not find provision in the Act disqualifying a person from filing nomination and/or contesting election to the Municipality by reason of his being engaged as an Advocate against the Municipality. It may be a disqualification under Section 1 l(2)(c) of the Act to be engaged for the Municipality but it is not a disqualification to be engaged as an Advocate against the Municipality till one is actually elected to the Municipality. Therefore, the citation of the above decision by Shri Raval is in apposite.
Bombay High Court Cites 10 - Cited by 3 - Full Document

Lomeshprasad Hariprasad Desai vs State Of Bombay And Anr. on 12 July, 1954

4. It was contended by Shri Raval on behalf of the appellant that in the present case, the appellant had ceased to be professionally interested or engaged in the aforesaid suit against the Municipality with effect from 29th August, 1988 (i.e., before his getting elected to the Municipality) by reason of a letter dated the 29th August, 1988 written by his client, i.e., the plaintiff in suit informing him (appellant) in reply to a letter written by the appellant to his client that he (the appellant's client) was relieving him as his Advocate in the suit against the Municipality. The record shows that, in fact, the appellant had submitted a purshis of retirement from the case to the Court as late as on November, 1988. Relying upon the decision 1988. Relying upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Lomeshprasad Hariprasad Desai v. State of Bombay and Anr. Shri Raval submitted that it was immaterial as to when the appellant had filed purshis of retirement before the Court if it found that his engagement as a lawyer had come to an end by virtue of the letter dated the 29th August, 1988 written by his client to him in reply to his letter to his client for relieving him as his lawyer in the suit. It is true that the decision cited by Shri Raval fully supports the proposition that in order to decide whether a councillor can be said to be in the employ of the Municipality or not (or whether he was professionally interested or engaged in any case against the Municipality), the Court must look not at the Civil Procedure Code, but to the ordinary law which regulates the contract between master and servant or advocate and client. In other words, if the letter dated the 29th August, 1988 is accepted as genuine, the engagement of the appellant as an advocate against the Municipality in the aforesaid suit must be held to have come to an end on 29th August, 1988 i.e., before the appellant was elected as a member of the Municipality. However, the Collector as well as the Director of Municipalities have not acted upon this letter dated the 29th August, 1988 in view of the fact that on 22nd November, 1988 the appellant as the advocate of the plaintiff in the suit had filed an application before the learned Civil Judge praying for extension of the status quo order which the learned Judge had earlier passed in favour of the plaintiff in the suit. It appears that the status quo order had expired on 29th October, 1988 and thereafter on 22nd November, 1988 an application was submitted to the learned Judge, admittedly under the signature of the appellant as the plaintiff's lawyer in the suit, stating that on the 29th October, 1988 the appellant was busy before the Surendranagar Court in connection with another case, and therefore, he had not applied on that day on behalf of the plaintiff for extension of the statue quo and he was therefore, applying for extension of the status quo on the 22nd November, 1988. The appellant had raised a controversy about his authorship of this application stating that his nephew, who was working with him in his office had used a blank paper signed by him for writing out the application and had submitted the same to the Court. However, the Collector and the Director of Municipalities have not accepted this explanation and have as a matter of fact found that the application was submitted by the appellant and that he was also present in the Court on that day. In the order passed by the learned Civil Judge below this application, it was first stated that the appellant was not present, and therefore, the application was kept for hearing on 30th November, 1988 but the word "not" is scored off. The appellant alleged that this word was scored off by somebody inimically disposed towards him. This explanation tendered by the appellant was not accepted by the Collector and the Director of Municipalities and if the learned single Judge did not enter into this factual controversy but accepted the factual finding recorded by the Collector and the Director, his view cannot be found fault with. It is also pertinent to note that in the retiring purshis dated the 30th November, 1988 there was no reference to the letter dated the 29th August, 1988 allegedly written by the appellant's client to the appellant. Therefore, the alleged letter dated the 29th August, 1988 cannot be said to be above suspicion. It is then clear that on the 22nd November, 1988 i.e., even after his election, the appellant had acted as advocate against the Municipality in the aforesaid suit. In other words, the appellant who was engaged as Advocate prior to the election had continued to act as advocate even after his election on 30th September, 1988. The question raised is whether the appellant's act in continuing to act as an advocate in the aforesaid suit against the Municipality even after his election attracts the disability mentioned in Section 38(1)(c) of the Act.
Bombay High Court Cites 0 - Cited by 2 - B P Sinha - Full Document
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