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1 - 9 of 9 (0.20 seconds)G Shoe Export, Mumbai vs Acit 25(1), Mumbai on 24 January, 2018
4. We have considered rival contention and perused the material on
record including cited case laws. We have observed that hearing in ITA no.
1994/Mum/2014 was held on 29.10.2015 for AY 2007-08 and the order was
pronounced by tribunal on 01.02.2016 beyond the period of 90 days from
the conclusion of the hearing. The recent decision of Hon'ble ITAT in the
case of G. Shoe Exports v. ACIT (supra) which has elaborately dealt with this
issue of pronouncement of order beyond 90 days is reproduced here under:-
Anil Rai vs State Of Bihar on 6 August, 2001
7. From the above, we find that the Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court in
the case referred above has held that unexplained delay in
pronouncement of the order renders it vulnerable. It was held that such
judgments were bad in law and were to be set aside. It was
expounded that justice should not only be done, but should appear to
have been done and that justice delayed is justice denied. The Hon'ble
High Court has also referred to Hon'ble Apex Court decision where
serious note was taken of the prejudice caused to the litigant due to
delay in delivery or pronouncement of the judgment for the reasons not
attributable either with the litigant or to the state or to the legal
profession.
M/S Supraja'S Sandy Lane Bar & ... vs The Acit., Central Circle - 2,, ... on 29 June, 2017
(i) The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute
the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the
Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its
hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance
had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a
loss to understand what is meant by 'administrative clearance' and the basis for the
same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was
received, are all questions still at large. Mr. Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel who
appears for all the respondents, including the Registry of the Tribunal is unable to
shed any light on the same. Moreover, we are unable to comprehend the meaning of
'Administrative clearance' in the face of Rule 34 (5)(c) read with Rule 34(8) of the
Tribunal Rules. It is clear that the above provisions mandate the Tribunal to
pronounce its order at the very latest on or before the 90th day, after the conclusion
of the hearing. In fact, this Court in Shivsagar Veg. Restaurant (supra) after referring
to various decisions of the Apex Court directed the President of the Tribunal to frame
guidelines to prevent delay in delivery of orders/judgments. It also directed all the
revisional and appellate authorities (including Tribunal) under the Act to decide the
matters heard by them within a period of three months from the date of the
conclusion of the hearing. This is further compounded by the fact that the
submission of the petitioner in respect of the entire issue being covered by orders of
coordinate benches was according to the petitioner, lost sight of while passing the
order dated 3rd February, 2016.
Assistant Commnr., Income Tax, Rajkot vs Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd on 15 September, 2008
10. From the above, it is abundantly clear that the orders have to be passed in
variably within three months of the completion of hearing of the case. In this
case, admittedly the order was passed beyond three months. No reason
whatsoever for the delay has been recorded. As held by the Hon'ble
jurisdictional High Court above, such delay is incurable and even
administrative clearance cannot cure the same. As held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Asstt. CIT v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [2008]
305 ITR 227/173 Taxman 322, any order of the tribunal without considering
the decision of Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court or the Hon'ble Apex Court
judgement even if not bought to the notice of the tribunal, results in the order of
the tribunal being liable for rectification upon filing of an application under
section 254(2) of the Act for containing mistake apparent from the record.
Admittedly, in this case, the impugned common tribunal orders are not in
accordance with the above two jurisdictional High Court's decision which
clearly mandate that the order of the tribunal should be pronounced within a
period of three months of the hearing of the appeal. The Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal Rule 34(5) as mentioned hereinabove also provides the same. Hence,
in accordance with the ratio of the above Hon'ble High Court and Hon'ble
Supreme Court judgements, such decisions rendered after 3 months need to be
recalled and heard afresh as they are liable for mistake apparent from record.
Accordingly, we recall the afore-said common orders of the Tribunal due to
delay beyond three months in pronouncing the order in accordance with the
Hon'ble jurisdictional High Court decision as above. The registry is directed to
fix the appeals in normal course for hearing.
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Devang Rasiklal Vora vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 18 August, 2003
In the case of Devang Rasiklal Vora v. Union of India 2004 (3) BCR 450, the
Division Bench of this Court to which one of us is a party (Daga, J.)
Udai Ram Sharma And Others Etc vs Union Of India And Others on 7 February, 1968
In R.C. Sharma v. Union of India [1976] 3 SCC 754, the Apex Court after
noticing absence of the provision in the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter
of time frame in delivery of judgment, observed as under :
M/S Guru Bar And Restaurant vs The Asst Commr Of Comml Taxes on 22 August, 2008
3. Furthermore, the ld. Counsel pointed out that subsequent to the above
decision, the ITAT Rules provide vide Rule 34(5) provide for a time limit of three
months in passing the order.
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