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1 - 10 of 23 (0.49 seconds)Shiv Sarup Gupta vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta on 30 July, 1999
In Adil Jamshed Frenchman v. Sardur Dastur
Schools Trust [(2005) 2 SCC 476] the Apex Court
reiterated that, as laid down in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr.
Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222] a bona fide
requirement must be an outcome of a sincere and honest
desire in contradistinction with a mere pretext for evicting the
tenant on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the
premises for himself or for any member of the family which
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would entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant. The
question to be asked by a judge of facts by placing himself in
the place of the landlord is whether in the given facts proved
by the material on record the need to occupy the premises can
be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. The concept of
bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical
approach instructed by the realities of life.
Deena Nath vs Pooran Lal on 11 July, 2001
As reiterated in
Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705] bona fide
requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or
fanciful desire. The bona fide requirement is in praesenti and
must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court
that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire.
K.Ammu vs Nafeesa on 18 August, 2015
In Ammu v. Nafeesa [2015 (5) KHC 718] a
Division Bench of this Court held that, it is a settled
proposition of law that the need put forward by the landlord
has to be examined on the presumption that the same is a
genuine one, in the absence of any materials to the contra.
Jerry Joseph vs Selvaraj on 2 April, 2002
12. The said finding of the Rent Control Court was
reversed by the Appellate Authority in its judgment in
R.C.A.No.7 of 2018 dated 31.01.2019. The Appellate Authority
noticed that the son of the landlord, who was examined as
PW2, has supported the case of the landlord, who was
examined as PW1, for an order of eviction under Section 11(3)
of the Act. After analysing the pleadings and evidence on
record, the Appellate Authority found that the oral testimonies
of PWs 1 and 2 are sufficient to establish the need projected in
the Rent Control Petition to seek an order of eviction under
Section 11(3) of the Act. The Appellate Authority noticed that,
while considering the bona fide need of the landlord, the Rent
Control Court went to the extent of analysing the suitability of
the building for the purpose of starting a mobile phone
business by PW2. Relying on the decision of this Court in
Jerry Joseph v. Selvaraj [2002 (2) KLT 129], wherein it
was held that the tenant cannot dictate the landlord regarding
his need or choice of the building, the Appellate Authority
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found that the reasoning of the Rent Control Court to doubt
the bona fides of the need projected in the Rent Control
Petition cannot be sustained.
M.L. Prabhakar vs Rajiv Singal on 4 January, 2001
In M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singal [(2001) 2
SCC 355] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which
eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement was sought
for under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Ram Narain Arora vs Asha Rani & Ors on 31 August, 1998
In the said decision, the Apex Court relied on the law laid
down in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC
141], wherein it was held that the question whether the
landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation is a question which is intermixed with the
question regarding bona fide requirement. Whether the
landlord has any other reasonably suitable residential
accommodation is a defence for the tenant. Whether the other
accommodation is more suitable than the suit premises would
not solely depend upon pleadings and non-disclosure by the
landlord. The landlord having another accommodation would
not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties
understood the case and placed materials before the court and
case of neither party was prejudiced. On the facts of the case
on hand, the Apex Court found that, even though the landlord
has not mentioned about the other two premises, the material
in respect of the other two premises was placed before the
Rent Controller as well as before the High Court, thus no
prejudice has been caused, and the parties have squarely
dealt with this question.
Vineethan vs Fathima on 17 October, 2015
Vide: Narayanan Nair v.
Pachumma [1980 KLT 430], Prasannan v. Haris [2005
(2) KLT 365], Vineethan v. Fathima and others [2016
(1) KHC 631]. In view of the legal position well settled by the
aforesaid decisions, the landlord is not required to plead or
prove other sources of income of the tenant. That apart,
income is a fact which remains exclusively in the knowledge of
each person only and another person cannot adduce evidence
to prove income. Merely on the reason that the landlord has
stated that the tenant has other sources of income and he is
not mainly depending upon the income from the business
carried on in the tenanted premises, for his livelihood and he
failed to prove so, the tenant cannot escape from the burden
of proof cast on him under the first limb of the second proviso
to Section 11(3) of the Act. Where the statutory provision
itself explicitly imposes the burden of proof on a party to the
lis, there cannot be any variation whatever be the pleadings of
the other party in that respect. The second proviso to Section
11(3) is an exception to the principal provision, granting
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protection to the tenant. When the second proviso itself
imposes the burden of proof on the tenant, the question
whether the landlord has pleaded or proved the facts
constituting the said proviso is insignificant and irrelevant.
Even if the landlord pleaded so, the burden of proof will not be
shifted to him. Since the second proviso to Section 11(3) is an
exception to the principal provision, which would dis-entitle
the landlord to get the order of eviction under Section 11(3),
the burden of proof, under the said proviso is always on the
tenant and unless the burden of proof under the second
proviso is discharged satisfactorily, the tenant is not entitled to
get protection under the said proviso to Section 11(3) of the
Act.
M/S Bharat Sales Ltd vs Life Insurance Corporation Of India on 5 February, 1998
In Bharath Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance
Corporation of India [(1998) 3 SCC 1] the Apex Court held
that sub tenancy or subletting comes into existence when the
tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation,
wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive
possession thereof. This arrangement comes about obviously
under a mutual agreement or understanding between the
tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered.
In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather,
the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord,
concealing the overt acts and transferring possession
clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the
landlord, in the sense that the landlord had not let out the
premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to
his entering into possession over the demised property. It is
the actual, physical and exclusive possession of that person,
instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord
that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put
some other person into possession of that property. In such a
situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by
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direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding
between the tenant and the sub tenant. It would also be
difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the
person to whom the property had been sublet had paid
monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent,
undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub lease. It
may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or
promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump-sum in
advance covering the period for which the premises is let out
or sublet or it may have been paid or promised to be paid
periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration
may have been made secretly, the law does not require such
payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is
permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case
proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive
possession to infer that the premises were sublet.
Unni Vacco vs Thankamma Gregory on 3 February, 2003
In Unni Vacco v. Thankamma Gregory [2003
(2) KLT 459] a Division Bench of this Court held that, it is
true that with regard to the question of sub-lease, there
should be an exclusive possession by the alleged sub-lessee.
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But as stated in many cases, the transaction is between the
lessee and sub-lessee. When a person other than the tenant is
found to be in the building, the burden is on the tenant to
show that there is no sub-lease or transfer of possession. On
the facts of the case on hand, the Division Bench found that
the tenant has not discharged the burden. Both the courts
found that the sub-lease is proved. The tenant, even though
had tried to argue on the basis of the licence, the mere fact
that the licence is in the name of the tenant cannot ignore the
possibility of another person being in possession. The
Commissioner has visited the property and he has filed a
report. His evidence is relevant. There is nothing wrong in
accepting the report of the Commissioner and on the basis of
it, the other evidence adduced in the case, one can come to
the conclusion that the tenant has not been successful in
establishing that respondents 2, 3 and 4 are not in exclusive
possession. The Division Bench noticed that the evidence of
RW1, the Secretary of Kerala High Court Bar Association also
shows that the second respondent is conducting a hotel in his
own name.