In Saradamani Kandappan and Others Vs.
S. Rajalakshmi and Others (cited supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court while dealing with the principle as to whether time is not the
essence of the contract relating to the immovable properties has
observed in paragraph Nos.23, 24, 27 & 28 as follows:
http://www.judis.nic.in “23. It is of some interest to note that the distinction
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between contracts relating to immovable properties and
other contracts was not drawn by Section 55 of Contract
Act (or any other provisions of Contract Act or Specific
Relief Act, 1963). Courts in India made the said
distinction, by following the English law evolved during
the nineteenth century. This Court held that time is not of
the essence of the contracts relating to immovable
properties; and that notwithstanding default in carrying
out the contract within the specified period, specific
performance will ordinarily be granted, if having regard
to the express stipulation of the parties, nature of the
property and surrounding circumstances, it is not
inequitable to grant such relief. [vide Gomathinayagam
Pillai (supra), Govind Prasad Chaturvedi (supra) and
Indira Kaur v. Sheo Lal Kapoor 1988 (2) SCC 188 and
Chand Rani (supra) following the decision of Privy
Council in Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji
Dhunjibhai AIR 1915 PC 83 and other cases]. Of course,
the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani made a slight
departure from the said view.
28. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case,
we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S.
http://www.judis.nic.in Vidyanadam (supra):