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1 - 10 of 11 (0.23 seconds)Section 69 in The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 [Entire Act]
S. Rajagopal vs C. M. Armugam & Ors on 3 May, 1968
39. It is not the business of the appellate Court to supplement the
evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence,
in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the
evidence in the Trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted
in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not
entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence
under this Rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce
certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so or elected not to
do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide State of
U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [AIR 1957 SC 912] and S.
Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam [AIR 1969 SC 101] .)
State Of U. P vs Manbodhan Lal Srivastava on 20 September, 1957
39. It is not the business of the appellate Court to supplement the
evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence,
in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the
evidence in the Trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted
in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not
entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence
under this Rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce
certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so or elected not to
do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide State of
U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [AIR 1957 SC 912] and S.
Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam [AIR 1969 SC 101] .)
Sanjay Kumar Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 10 March, 2022
In support of his contentions,
learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin1 and Sanjay Kumar Singh v.
State of Jharkhand2.
Govt. Of Karnataka And Anr vs K.C.Subramanya And Ors on 16 September, 2013
24. In the written statement, the appellants-defendants did mention about
the said earlier suit filed at the behest of the respondent-plaintiffs. According
to the appellants-defendants, if the findings rendered in that case would have
any bearing on the facts of the present case, the same ought to have been
relied upon. The other documents which have been produced along with the
application under Order 41 Rule 27 also be of no significance and
admittedly, these documents were in existence during the pendency of the
civil suit. As to when the appellants-defendants came in possession of those
documents have not sufficiently been disclosed. Even otherwise, the
findings rendered by the Courts below regarding entitlement to recover the
amount in question is concerned, the same is rested on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence of the parties. In the absence of any evidence being
adduced by the appellants-defendants to prove any deficiency in work
carried out with the respondents-plaintiffs at the site, the plea, raised is that,
the respondents-plaintiffs are not entitled to the money as per the agreed
terms, cannot be accepted. Bill dated 21.09.1999 has admittedly been
received by one Rameshwar Prasad, who was the official of the appellants-
defendants. The respondents-plaintiffs deposed that the work was done and
the bill was raised. That evidence remained unassailable.
N. Kamalam (Dead) And Anr vs Ayyasamy & Anr on 3 August, 2001
26. The Supreme Court in N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy4 has unequivocally
held that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC are not intended to
permit an appellant to rectify weaknesses in their case or fill omissions
committed at the Trial Court stage. The provision does not authorize the
rectification of lacunae or gaps in evidence or facts at the appellate stage.
The Court also emphasized on the element of delay, noting that in the said
case, additional evidence was sought to be introduced nearly a decade after
the filing of the appeal, which weighed significantly against the appellant.
Similarly, in the present case, the appellants-defendants are seeking to
adduce additional evidence after a substantial lapse of time, offering an
unsatisfactory explanation that the relevant file went missing during office
relocation. Upon a closer examination of the principles underlying Order 41
Rule 27, it is evident that additional evidence at the appellate stage is
permissible only under specific and limited circumstances. The appellants-
defendants in this case have failed to satisfy the permissible grounds, which
are inter alia:-
Muncipal Corporation For Greater ... vs Lala Pancham Of Bombay & Others on 1 October, 1964
"19. Incidentally, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 have not been
engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and
to fill up the omission in the Court of appeal -- it does not authorise
any lacunae or gaps in evidence to be filled up. The authority and
jurisdiction as conferred on to the appellate Court to let in fresh
evidence is restricted to the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a
particular way. This Court in Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Bombay v. Lala Pancham [AIR 1965 SC 1008 : 67 Bom LR 782] has
been candid enough to record that the requirement of the High Court
must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain
such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. In para 9 of the
judgment, this Court observed: (AIR p. 1012)
"This provision does not entitle the High Court to let in fresh
evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence
it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the
appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of
pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is
only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate
Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. The High
Court does not say that there is any such lacuna in this case. On
the other hand what it says is that certain documentary evidence
on record supports „in a large measure‟ the plaintiffs' contention
about fraud and mala fides. We shall deal with these documents
presently but before that we must point out that the power under
clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 cannot be exercised for
adding to the evidence already on record except upon one of the
grounds specified in the provision."
Pramod Kumari Bhatia vs Om Prakash Bhatia And Ors on 15 November, 1979
Further in Pramod Kumari Bhatia v. Om Prakash Bhatia [(1980) 1
SCC 412 : AIR 1980 SC 446] this Court also in more or less an
identical situation laid down that since an application to the High
Court has been made very many years after the filing of the suit and
also quite some years after the appeal had been filed before the High
Court, question of interfering with the discretion exercised by the High
Court in refusing to receive an additional evidence at that stage would
not arise. The time-lag in the matter under consideration is also
enormous and the additional evidence sought to be produced was as a
matter of fact after a period of 10 years after the filing of the appeal.
Presently, the suit was instituted in the year 1981 and the decree
therein was passed in 1983. The first appeal was filed before the High
Court in April 1983 but the application for permission to adduce
additional evidence came to be made only in August 1993. Needless to
Signature Not Verified Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed Digitally Signed
By:MAANAS JAJORIA
Signing Date:24.12.2024 By:PURUSHAINDRA
18:39:15 14 KUMAR KAURAV
record that the Courts shall have to be cautious and must always act
with great circumspection in dealing with the claims for letting in
additional evidence particularly, in the form of oral evidence at the
appellate stage and that too, after a long lapse of time. In our view, a
plain reading of Order 41 Rule 27 would depict that the rejection of the
claim for production of additional evidence after a period of 10 years
from the date of filing of the appeal, as noticed above, cannot be
termed to be erroneous or an illegal exercise of discretion. The three
limbs of Rule 27 do not stand attracted. The learned trial Judge while
dealing with the matter has, as a matter of fact, very strongly
commented upon the lapse and failure on the part of the plaintiffs even
to summon the attestors to the will and in our view contextually, the
justice of the situation does not warrant any interference. The attempt,
the High Court ascribed it to be a stage-managed affair in order to
somehow defeat the claim of the respondents -- and having had the
privilege of perusal of record we lend our concurrence thereto and the
finding of the High Court cannot be found fault with for rejecting the
prayer of the appellants for additional evidence made in the belated
application. In that view of the matter, the first issue is answered in the
negative and thus against the plaintiffs, being the appellants herein."