Search Results Page
Search Results
1 - 10 of 19 (0.23 seconds)The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Section 302 in The Indian Penal Code, 1860 [Entire Act]
Virsa Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 11 March, 1958
The Division Bench also further held that the decision in Virsa Singh
case [Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 : 1958 Cri LJ 818]
has throughout been followed as laying down the guiding principles. In
both these cases it is clearly laid down that the prosecution must prove [1]
that the body injury is present, [2] that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, [3] that the accused intended to inflict that
particular injury, that is to say it was not accidental or unintentional or that
some other kind of injury was intended. In other words clause Thirdly
consists of two parts. The first part is that there was an intention to inflict
the injury that is found to be present and the second part that the said
injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Under
the first part the prosecution has to prove from the given facts and
circumstances that the intention of the accused was to cause that
particular injury. Whereas under the second part whether it was sufficient
to cause death, is an objective enquiry and it is a matter of inference or
deduction from the particulars of the injury. The language of clause Thirdly
Page No. 22/27
of Section 300 speaks of intention at two places and in each the sequence
is to be established by the prosecution before the case can fall in that
clause. The 'intention' and 'knowledge' of the accused are subjective and
invisible states of mind and their existence has to be gathered from the
circumstances, such as the weapon used, the ferocity of attack, multiplicity
of injuries and all other surrounding circumstances. The framers of the
Code designedly used the words 'intention' and 'knowledge' and it is
accepted that the knowledge of the consequences which may result in
doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that such consequences
should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that
he must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences
would or could follow. But that knowledge is bare awareness and not the
same thing as intention that such consequences should ensue. As
compared to 'knowledge', 'intention' requires something more than the
mere foresight of the consequences, namely, the purposeful doing of a
thing to achieve a particular end.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 134 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [Entire Act]
Section 161 in The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Entire Act]
Jai Prakash Wadhwa And Ors. vs Lt. Governor, Delhi Admn. And Anr. on 15 January, 1997
[Jai Prakash vs. State (Delhi Admn). (1991) 2 SCC 32] para
12, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 41)
Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh vs The State Of Maharashtra on 14 July, 2022
In Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra,
[2022] 12 SCR 196, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in
assessing the value of the evidence of the eye-witnesses, two principal
considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible
to believe their presence at the place of occurrence or in such situations as
would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them
and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable
in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances
either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other
evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity
Page No. 15/27
of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a court would
attach to their evidence.
Krishna Mochi & Ors vs State Of Bihar on 15 April, 2002
26. Recovery of the weapon used in the commission of the offence is not a sine
qua non to convict the accused. If there is a direct evidence in the form of
eye-witness, even in the absence of recovery of weapon, the accused can
be convicted. It has been held in Krishna Mochi and others vs. State of
Bihar, [2002] 6 SCC 81, that the recovery of no incriminating material from
the accused cannot alone be taken as a ground to exonerate the accused
from the charges, more so, when participation of the accused in the crime is
unfolded in ocular account of the occurrence, by the witnesses, whose
evidence has been found to be unimpeachable.