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1 - 10 of 12 (0.89 seconds)Article 12 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Vst Industries Ltd vs Vst Industries Workers Union & Anr on 7 December, 2000
''28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a ''person'' if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani SCC at p. 6 and 8 and VST Industries Ltd. v. Workers' Union)...... Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity.''
Article 32 in Constitution of India [Constitution]
Ajay Jadeja vs Union Of India And Ors. on 17 September, 2001
15. The petitioner iterated the following observations of the learned single Judge in Ajay Jadeja (supra), adopting the same as his submissions:-
Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta ... vs V.R. Rudani & Ors on 21 April, 1989
''28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a ''person'' if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust v. V.R. Rudani SCC at p. 6 and 8 and VST Industries Ltd. v. Workers' Union)...... Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity.''
Federal Bank Ltd vs Sagar Thomas & Ors on 26 September, 2003
''From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a company which is financed and owned by the State; (vi) a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.''
(underlining added)
The Societies Registration Act, 1860
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Subbarayudu, V.C. & Ors on 22 January, 1998
''We clarify that this order is in special circumstances of this case and will not be treated as a precedent in any other case of whatsoever nature.''
''In view of the matter having been referred to the Arbitrator, the petition stands dismissed as withdrawn. All interim orders including the order dated 17th September, 2001 stand vacated.''
In other words, the writ petition filed by Ajay Jadeja was withdrawn by him as he agreed to have the matter settled by an Arbitrator. And, the Division Bench was careful enough to record that the order was not to be treated as a precedent. It is in view of these special circumstances and the withdrawal of the writ petition itself that the order dated 17.9.2001 passed by the Single Judge stood vacated. Thus, this order of the Division Bench cannot be regarded as having reversed the decision of the Single Judge on merits. In other words, it cannot be understood to mean that the Division Bench held that the writ petition against BCCI was not maintainable or that it took any view on the question of maintainability. Hence, the argument of Dr Singhvi appearing for the BCCI that this bench is bound by the decision of that Division Bench is misplaced and reliance on the Supreme Court decision in State of A.P. v. V.C. Subbarayudu and Ors: is not apposite. Here, the earlier Division Bench did not take any view on maintainability and itself recorded that the order was not to be treated as a precedent.
Ajay Hasia Etc vs Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. Etc on 13 November, 1980
6. Another point which needs to be put aside is that the petitioner straight away contended that, in this petition, he is not advancing the argument that BCCI falls within the meaning of ''State'' as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution. He further submitted that he is also not raising the issue as to whether BCCI is an instrumentality of the State or not. It is his contention that a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution may be directed against ''any person'' and it is not at all necessary that the reliefs must be sought against the ''State'', ''Government'' or ''authority'' or ''instrumentality of the State''. Therefore, we are not called upon to decide the issue whether BCCI would fall within the definition of ''State'' under Article 12. Though, the counsel for the BCCI has given elaborate written submissions on this aspect contending that BCCI was neither ''State'' nor an ''instrumentality of the State'' relying upon the test laid down in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib: , we need not refer to them as this issue is not before us. It may be mentioned that by an order dated 23.8.1989 passed in a writ petition (cw 632/1989 : Mohinder Amarnath v. BCCI and Ors) a Division Bench of this Court held that the BCCI did not ''qualify to be called a instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution'' and declined to entertain the writ petition. In the Special Leave Petition [SLP(civil) No. 10142/89] preferred against this order of 23.8.1989, the Supreme Court passed an order on 26.9 1989 disposing of the same in the following manner:-